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 When U.S. officials in 1952 approved the first Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
operation to overthrow Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz, they unknowingly stepped into a 
regional conflict that, for nearly ten years, included dissident Guatemalan exiles, Caribbean 
Basin dictators, and the Guatemalan governments of Arbenz and his predecessor Juan José 
Arévalo. Since the mid-1940s, exiles and dictators had denounced the Guatemalan Revolution as 
the product of Mexican, Soviet, and international communism. The anti-communist ideology of 
Guatemalan exiles, Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, Honduran dictator Tiburcio Carías, 
and Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo facilitated various conspiracies aimed to destabilize 
Arévalo and Arbenz’s governments throughout the 1940s. For their own reasons, a network of 
exiles and dictators put into motion a counter-revolution that included subversive ventures and 
self-proclaimed anti-communists who became patrons for colonel Carlos Castillo Armas in the 
early 1950s. In 1952, it was this network’s intelligence-sharing and lobbying of U.S. officials 
that built the foundation of Operation PBFORTUNE. The CIA’s involvement and resources 
bolstered regional support for Castillo Armas’s plot, thereby radicalizing the network’s dynamics 
and size. However, the State Department and Agency’s unfamiliarity with the network’s history 
led to the conspiracy’s abrupt termination while U.S. officials paternalistically blamed the 
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 In August of 1952, Dominican Ambassador in Mexico City Héctor Incháustegui Cabral 
wrote to Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo. He recounted a handful of meetings with 
representatives of colonel Carlos Castillo Armas and colonel Roberto Barrios Peña, two 
Guatemalan exiles who “were searching for assistance, weapons,” to support uprisings and 
invasions against the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz. On the morning of August 21, 
Incháustegui Cabral invited the Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Colombian ambassadors in Mexico 
City to the Dominican Embassy. The purpose of the conference, he summarized for the 
Dominican dictator, was “to learn what would be the position of their Governments in the 
possibility that there emerged a serious movement in Guatemala” to overthrow Arbenz’s 
government. Incháustegui Cabral confirmed for Trujillo, “Everyone, absolutely everyone, agrees 
that a change in Government, in the ideology of the Government rather, in Guatemala would be 
very useful for the healthy life of the Continent, primarily in the Caribbean zone.” Concluding 
the conference, all four ambassadors decided to invite the Honduran ambassador in Mexico City 
for additional meetings and suggest that their respective governments encourage the Honduran 
government to aid Castillo Armas and Barrios Peña.1 
 This August 1952 conference between Dominican, Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and 
Colombian officials to discuss Castillo Armas and Barrios Peña’s plots represents only one of 
many such moments that made up what this dissertation defines as the transnational counter-
revolution in the Caribbean Basin against the Guatemalan Revolution. Various scholars have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Héctor Incháustegui Cabral, Embajador Dominicano en la Ciudad de México, a Rafael Trujillo, 
Ciudad de México, 21 agosto 1952, Archivo General de la Nación, Santo Domingo (en adelante 
AGN), Fondo “Presidencia,” Colección “Secretaría de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores” (en 
adelante SERREE), Caja IT 2903957 “Fechas extremas 1948-1952, Ref. Antigua 2270” (en 
adelante Caja IT 2903957), Expediente “México, 1951-1952, Código 5/c.” 
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analyzed how the international Cold War influenced the Dwight Eisenhower Administration’s 
authorizing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under Operation PBSUCCESS in 1953 and 
1954 to remove Arbenz and terminate the Guatemalan Revolution. However, no one has 
examined how Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean Basin dictators since the mid-1940s had 
pursued the same goals without the support or knowledge of the United States (U.S.) 
government. 
 This dissertation reveals that dissident Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean Basin dictators 
from the mid-1940s into the early 1950s promoted a transnational counter-revolution against the 
Guatemalan Revolution that commenced before the international Cold War and served as the 
basis for Operation PBFORTUNE in 1952. Reformist teachers, students, middle-class leaders, 
and military officers in 1944 deposed Guatemalan dictator Jorge Ubico and ushered in what one 
witness hailed as “ten years of spring in the country of eternal tyranny.”2 Immediately, Ubico’s 
exiled protégés, Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio ‘Tacho’ Somoza, and Honduran dictator Tiburcio 
Carías denounced the Guatemalan Revolution and the new government under Juan José Arévalo 
as products of Mexican- and Soviet-directed communism. With this anti-communist ideology, 
Guatemalan exiles lobbied Somoza, Carías, and Trujillo to support invasions, uprisings, and air-
bombings against Arévalo’s government. Before and after the August 1952 conference, the 
dictators and their officials operated as a loosely-formed anti-communist network whose 
members repeatedly convened to discuss Guatemalan affairs, exchanged correspondence to 
evaluate the exiles, and financed exiles’ conspiracies against Arévalo and Arbenz’s governments. 
Not only did these exiles and dictators set into motion a transnational counter-revolution that 
preceded the international Cold War and Operation PBSUCCESS. The Guatemalan exiles and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Caribbean Basin dictators’ efforts became the foundation of Operation PBFORTUNE, the first 
CIA covert operation under the Harry Truman Administration in 1952 designed to overthrow 
Arbenz’s government. When Somoza and Castillo Armas offered U.S. officials a conspiracy that 
would not implicate the U.S. government, the CIA approved material and financial assistance for 
an invasion into Guatemala. The U.S. government’s involvement, however, radicalized the 
counter-revolution’s dynamics as the dictators’ intelligence-sharing accelerated and expanded to 
such an extent that the State Department terminated the operation. To exonerate themselves and 
ignore the bureaucratic debacles that surrounded Operation PBFORTUNE, U.S. officials 
resorted to racist and paternalistic constructions of ‘latinos’ to blame the dictators. 
 
A. Historiography of Anti-Communist Opposition to the Guatemalan Revolution 
 The Guatemalan Revolution is both one of the lesser examined subjects in Latin 
American Studies and one of the most thoroughly studied topics in U.S.-Latin American 
relations. On one hand, Latin Americanist scholars have examined important components of the 
Guatemalan Revolution, including agrarian reform, the labor movement, political organizations, 
and the myriad reformist impulses.3 Moreover, the memoirs of influential leaders and 
participants in the Revolution have provided invaluable insights into the Revolution’s origins, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Jim Handy, Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 
1944-1954 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Deborah Levenson-
Estrada, Trade Unionists against Terror: Guatemala City, 1954-1985 (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 14-48; Guadalupe Rodríguez de Ita, La participación 
política en la primavera guatemalteca: una aproximación a la historia de los partidos durante el 
periodo 1944-1954 (México: Universidad Autónoma de México, 2003); Greg Grandin, The Last 




goals, and dynamics.4 Historians have even assessed the impact of the Guatemalan Revolution 
upon Guatemalan foreign relations in the mid- to late 1940s and noted that Arévalo’s 
government aided the Caribbean Legion, a loose organization of leftist anti-dictatorial exiles who 
sought to overthrow Trujillo, Somoza, and Carías.5 
 On the other hand, scholars have inadvertently overlooked the actions of Caribbean Basin 
dictators and Guatemalan exiles and the prolific role of both local and regional self-described 
‘anti-communist’ opposition in Latin America against the Guatemalan Revolution. Only a 
handful of historians have considered the indigenous origins of Latin American anti-
communism, for most scholarship centers upon the impact of the international Cold War upon 
anti-communist organizations and ideologies.6 As a result, there are few studies of Guatemalan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Manuel Galich, Del pánico al ataque (Guatemala: Departamento de Publicidad de la 
Presidencia de la República, 1949); Juan José Arévalo, Guatemala: la democracia y el imperio 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Palestra, 1955); Cardoza y Aragón; Carlos Samayoa Chinchilla, El 
dictador y yo, seg. ed. (Guatemala: Editorial J. de Pineda Ibarra, 1967); Alfonso Bauer Paiz e 
Ivan Carpio Alfaro, Memorias de Alfonso Bauer Paiz: historia no oficial de Guatemala 
(Guatemala: Rusticatio Ediciones, 1996); José Manuel Fortuny, Memorias de José Manuel 
Fortuny (Guatemala: Editorial Óscar de León Palacios, 2002). 
5 Charles Ameringer, The Democratic Left in Exile: The Antidictatorial Struggle in the 
Caribbean, 1945-1959 (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1974); Piero Gleijeses, 
“Juan José Arévalo and the Caribbean Legion,” Journal of Latin American Studies 21.1 (1989): 
133-145; Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 
1944-1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 107-116; Miriam Rocío Samayoa, 
“Análisis comparativo de la política exterior de Guatemala durante los periodos del 44 al 54 y 
1954-1975,” tesis inédita, Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 1991; Julio Izquierdo 
Echeverría, “La política exterior de Guatemala en el período revolucionario, decenio 1944-
1954,” tesis inédita, Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 1995; Charles Ameringer, The 
Caribbean Legion: Patriots, Politicians, Soldiers of Fortune, 1946-1950 (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996); Roberto García Ferreira, “La política exterior 
guatemalteca: 1944-1954,” Espacios Políticos 5.6 (2012): 71-90. 
6 Margaret Power, Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against 
Allende, 1964-1973 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); Roberto 
Baptista Júnior, “Anti-sovietismo: reflexos e práticas compartilhadas de repressão no sistema 
interamericano, 1945-1964,” tese inédita, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2005; Victoria 
Langland, “Birth Control Pills and Molotov Cocktails: Reading Sex and Revolution in 1968 
Brazil,” in Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (eds.), In from the Cold: Latin America’s New 
 
 5 
anti-communism before Operation PBSUCCESS.7 Rather, the literature has focused upon how 
U.S. policies aided or bolstered Guatemalan anti-communists.8 
 This dearth of research is the understandable result of the devastating role of the U.S. 
government in facilitating the overthrow of Arbenz’s government. With Operation 
PBSUCCESS, U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
authorized the CIA under Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to provide financial and 
material assistance to Castillo Armas, organize a psychological warfare campaign, coordinate 
with Caribbean Basin dictators and anti-communist organizations, bribe Guatemalan officials, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Encounter with the Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 308-349; Víctor 
Gálvez Borrell, “Cambios y crisis del régimen político en Guatemala: 1954-1985,” Espacios 
Políticos 1.0 (julio 2008): 5-20; Marcelo Casals Araya, “Anticomunismos, política e ideología en 
Chile: La larga duración de la ‘campaña del terror’ de 1964,” tesis inédita, Pontificia Universidad 
Católica de Chile, 2012; Mario Virgilio Santiago Jiménez, “Anticomunismo Católico: raíces y 
desarrollo del movimiento universitario de renovadora orientación (Muro), 1962-1975,” tesis 
inédita, Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora, 2012; Benjamin Cowan, “‘Why 
Hasn’t This Teacher Been Shot?’ Moral-Sexual Panic, the Repressive Right, and Brazil’s 
National Security State,” Hispanic American Historical Review 92.3 (2012): 403-436; Avital 
Bloch y María del Rosario Rodríguez (eds.), La Guerra Fría y las Américas: 1945-1970 
(México: Universidad de Colima y Universidad de Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, 
2013); Roberto García Ferreira y Arturo Taracena Arriola (eds.), Guerra Fría y anticomunismo 
en Centroamérica (Guatemala: Serviprensa, 2015). On Latin American anti-communism before 
the international Cold War, see Sandra McGee Deutsch, Las Derechas: The Extreme Right in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); 
Daniela Spenser, The Impossible Triangle: Mexico, Soviet Russia, and the United States in the 
1920s (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Jeffrey L. Gould and Aldo A. Lauria-
Santiago, To Rise in Darkness: Revolution, Repression, and Memory in El Salvador, 1920-1932 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008). 
7 The only notable work that has analyzed Guatemalan anti-communism during the Guatemalan 
Revolution but before Operation PBSUCCESS is Robert H. Holden, “Communism and Catholic 
Social Doctrine in the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944,” Journal of Church and State 50.3 
(January 2008): 495-517. Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 78-86, touches upon Catholic 
and students’ anti-communism during the Guatemalan Revolution. Manolo E. Vela Castañeda, 
“Guatemala, 1954: ideas de la contrarrevolución,” Foro Internacional 45.1 (2005): 89-114, 
focuses on the anti-communist ideas during the 1954 coup. 
8 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope; Stephen M. Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution: The United 
States and Guatemala, 1954-1961 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International 
Studies, 2000); Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre. 
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and air-bomb Guatemala City. Demoralized, the Guatemalan Army removed Arbenz. 
Consequently, numerous scholars have examined U.S. policy toward Guatemala during the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations in order to make sense of why U.S. officials chose to 
destabilize Arbenz’s government. These works have ranged from the role of bureaucratic politics 
and the United Fruit Company (UFCO) in U.S. officials’ decision-making to U.S. policymakers’ 
perceptions of communism, revolution, and economic nationalism to the historical legacy of U.S. 
interventionism in Latin America.9 In fact, scholars find themselves forced to invest much of 
their energy in lobbying for the declassification of relevant CIA sources in order to examine U.S. 
policy toward Guatemala during Operation PBSUCCESS.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954 (New York, NY: Praeger, 1959); 
Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower: A Startling Reappraisal of the Eisenhower 
Presidency (New York, NY: Penguin, 1981), 218-92; Thomas M. Leonard, The United States 
and Central America, 1944-1949: Perceptions of Political Dynamics (Tuscaloosa, AL: 
University of Alabama Press, 1984), 75-105; Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses 
to Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1910-1985, sec. ed. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1985); Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin, 
TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), 145-190; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: 
The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
1988), 26-63; Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 85-133, 223-266; Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the 
Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1994), 65-73; Kenneth Lehman, 
“Revolutions and Attributions: Making Sense of Eisenhower Administration Policies in Bolivia 
and Guatemala,” Diplomatic History 21.2 (Spring 1997): 185-213; James Siekmeier, Aid, 
Nationalism, and Inter-American Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United States, 1945-
1961 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1999); Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter 
Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2005); Michael Grow, 
U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War 
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008), 1-27; Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: 
The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 21-25. 
10 Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 
TX: University of Texas Press, 1982); Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified 
Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1999). On the challenges in accessing CIA sources on Operation PBSUCCESS, see Lorraine M. 
Lees and Sandra Gioia Treadway, “A Future for Our Diplomatic Past?: A Critical Appraisal of 
the Foreign Relations Series,” Journal of American History 70.3 (December 1983): 621-629; 
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 While these scholars have made great progress in revealing the nuances of U.S. policy 
toward Guatemala from the mid-1940s into the early 1950s, much of the literature on the 
international Cold War has portrayed Operation PBSUCCESS as the point when the Cold War 
‘arrived’ in Latin America. Scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations have touched upon U.S. 
policies toward Juan Perón in Argentina, the 1948 Costa Rican Civil War, and the Bolivian 
Revolution as important events that shaped the first years of U.S. Cold War policy toward Latin 
America.11 However, specialists on the international Cold War have devoted more attention to 
developments in Europe and Asia and confined the first years of the Cold War in Latin America 
to Operation PBSUCCESS and Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba.12 Many compilations include 
chapters and selections on the Cold War in Latin America that are separated from essays on the 
Cold War’s origins while others completely overlook Latin America until Castro’s movement in 
1959.13 Latin Americanist scholars have lamented this seeming marginalization of Latin America 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Stephen G. Rabe, “The U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: The Documentary Record,” Diplomatic 
History 28.5 (November 2004): 785-790; William B. McAllister, Joshua Botts, Peter Cozzens, 
and Aaron W. Marrs, Toward “Thorough, Accurate, and Reliable”: A History of the Foreign 
Relations of the United States Series (Washington: United States Department of State Office of 
the Historian, 2015), 231-236. 
11 Wood; Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 6-41; John H. Coatsworth, Central America and 
the United States: The Clients and the Colossus (New York, NY: Twayne, 1994), 49-67; Mark 
T. Gilderhus, The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations since 1889 (Wilmington, DE: 
Scholarly Resources, 2000), 113-139; Kyle Longley, In the Eagle’s Shadow: The United States 
and Latin America (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2002), 193-216; Rabe, The Killing Zone, 
21-35. 
12 See Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2003); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions 
and the Making of Our Times (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Melvyn P. 
Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New 
York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2007); Carole Fink, Cold War: An International History (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 2014). 
13 Jussi M. Hanhimaki and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cold War: A History in Documents and 
Eyewitness Accounts (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 379-411; Melvyn P. 
Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Greg Grandin, “What Was Containment?: Short and Long 
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from the larger literature. Greg Grandin in 2006 criticized how “historians of US policy toward 
[Latin America during the Cold War] focus on the period’s most rousing events” and ignore the 
interplay between U.S. policy, the Cold War, and Latin America.14 Due to “so little crosstalk 
between foreign relations scholars and historians of Latin American politics and society,” Gilbert 
Joseph in 2010 summarized, “Studies have proceeded largely in the conventional channels of 
diplomatic history, focusing on discrete U.S. policy objectives and high-profile leaders and 
events (e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis) and drawing disproportionately on U.S. government 
documents.”15 
 Challenging these historiographical gaps between international history, Cold War 
Studies, and Latin American Studies, Latin Americanist historians have urged scholars to expand 
upon traditional analyses of U.S.-Latin American relations during the Cold War and examine 
what is now known as the ‘Latin American Cold War.’ Grandin referenced myriad works on 
Latin American social and cultural history after World War II and claimed that “the time has 
come for US historians to assess the Latin American Cold War from a higher vantage point, one 
less preoccupied with what motivated United States policymakers and more concerned with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Answers from the Americas,” in Robert J. McMahon (ed.), The Cold War in the Third World 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 27-47. Compare the absence of Latin America 
in Jeremi Suri, “The Early Cold War,” in Robert D. Schulzinger (ed.), A Companion to American 
Foreign Relations (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 215-229, to Darlene Rivas, “United States-
Latin American Relations, 1942-1960,” in A Companion to American Foreign Relations, 230-
254. 
14 Greg Grandin, “Off the Beach: The United States, Latin America, and the Cold War,” in A 
Companion to Post-1945 America, ed. Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell, 2006), 426. 
15 Gilbert M. Joseph, “Latin America’s Long Cold War: A Century of Revolutionary Process and 
U.S. Power,” in Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph (eds.), A Century of Revolution: Insurgent 
and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 400-401. 
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identifying what was being fought over in Latin America itself.”16 Whereas most works had 
sought to detail U.S. officials’ goals in Latin America, prominent Latin Americanist historians 
have suggested that scholars should identify how Latin American leaders pursued their own 
goals, constructed their own policies, and shaped the Latin American Cold War. Joseph and 
Daniela Spenser in 2008 cited recent archival discoveries and interpretative tools that would 
allow scholars to examine the “Latin Americanization” and “transnationalization” of the Cold 
War in Latin America and consider “the gamut of multiform engagements that constituted the 
Latin American Cold War.”17 Similarly, Tanya Harmer noted that the Latin American Cold War 
did not revolve solely upon U.S. policies but derived from the actions of multiple “regional 
proponents of communism and capitalism” within Latin America.18 Hal Brands defined the Latin 
American Cold War as a “series of overlapping conflicts” that included “diplomatic and 
transnational” dimensions.19 Grandin and Joseph both suggested that experts on U.S.-Latin 
American relations refine their analyses on the construction of U.S. policy toward Latin 
America, incorporate Latin American-based sources and actors, and gauge how U.S. resources 
contributed to the various revolutionary and counter-revolutionary processes and insurgent and 
counter-insurgent movements that made up Latin American Cold War conflicts.20 More recently, 
Alan McPherson identified what he describes as ‘the paradox of Latin American Cold War 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Grandin, “Off the Beach,” 426. 
17 Gilbert M. Joseph, “What We Now Know and Should Know: Bringing Latin America More 
Meaningfully into Cold War Studies,” in In from the Cold, 7; Daniela Spenser, “Standing 
Conventional Cold War History on Its Head,” in In from the Cold, 381-382. 
18 Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile & the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2011), 2. 
19 Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 2, 
7. 
20 Greg Grandin, “Living in Revolutionary Time: Coming to Terms with the Violence of Latin 
America’s Long Cold War,” in A Century of Revolution, 3-5; Joseph, “Latin America’s Long 
Cold War,” 398-407. 
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Studies.’ The more scholars have examined the Latin American Cold War, McPherson found, 
“the Cold War itself fades to the background.” Ultimately, the international “Cold War was only 
one among a host of other important, often revolutionary processes occurring before, during, and 
after the years of the Cold War.” In this vein, McPherson encouraged scholars to recognize that 
multiple “intersecting historical forces” defined the Latin American Cold War.21 
 At the same time, foreign relations scholars and Cold War Studies experts provided new 
methodological suggestions to better measure the links between the international Cold War and 
regional and indigenous events related to decolonization, technological advancements, and other 
global trends during the twentieth century. Ian Tyrrell, Thomas Bender, and others celebrated an 
“era of unprecedented internationalization in [the] historiography” of U.S. history that welcomed 
transnational and internationalist histories moving beyond a tight focus on the United States.22 In 
proposing a ‘global Cold War’ frame of analysis, Odd Arne Westad argued that historians, while 
taking into consideration the role of U.S. and Soviet ideologies, needed to examine how the Cold 
War overlapped with so-called ‘Third World’ conflicts, how Third World elites maneuvered 
within the Cold War, and how such elites utilized the Cold War in pursuit of their own goals.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Alan McPherson, “Afterword: The Paradox of Latin American Cold War Studies,” in Virginia 
Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio E. Moreno (eds.), Beyond the Eagle’s 
Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War (Albuquerque, NM: University of New 
Mexico Press, 2013), 307-308, 314. 
22 Ian Tyrrell, “American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History,” American 
Historical Review 96.4 (October 1991): 1031-1055; Thomas Bender, “Historians, the Nation, 
and the Plenitude of Narratives,” in Thomas Bender (ed.), Rethinking American History in a 
Global Age (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 1-22; Prasenjit Duara, 
“Transnationalism and the Challenge to National Histories,” in Rethinking American History in a 
Global Age, 25-46; Ian Tyrrell, Transnational Nation: United States History in Global 
Perspective since 1789 (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). 
23 Odd Arne Westad, “The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) 
Paradigms,” Diplomatic History 24.4 (Fall 2000): 561-564; Westad, The Global Cold War, 3-5. 
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Michael Hogan followed with a plea for scholars on U.S. foreign relations to “collaborate with 
those who seek to internationalize” U.S. foreign relations.24 
 These calls from Latin Americanist historians and Cold War Studies experts resonated as 
more scholars researched the Latin American Cold War. Limitations on Latin American-based 
sources in countries under dictatorships and military regimes had left scholars reliant on U.S.-
based sources and had hindered more thorough examinations like those championed by Grandin 
and Joseph. Following the end of the international Cold War and most Latin American dictatorial 
and military regimes, scholars began accessing archives and depositories that revealed how Latin 
American actors pursued their own Cold War-era policies that intersected with, conflicted with, 
or circumvented U.S. officials’ goals.25 Scholarship on the regional and international dimensions 
of the Latin American Cold War have moved away from examinations of U.S. policy toward 
Latin America and toward balanced assessments of inter-American relations in which Latin 
American actors influenced U.S. Cold War-oriented policy and key Cold War-era conflicts, and 
an increasing number of studies examine the plethora of social and political developments 
outside of the ‘rousing events’ of Operation PBSUCCESS and Castro’s movement.26 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Michael J. Hogan, “‘The Next Big Thing’: The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global 
Age,” Diplomatic History 28.1 (January 2004): 13. Also see Akira Iriye, “Internationalizing 
International History,” in Rethinking American History in a Global Age, 47-62. 
25 See the historiographical essays by Stephen G. Rabe, “Marching Ahead (Slowly): The 
Historiography of Inter-American Relations,” Diplomatic History 13.3 (Summer 1989): 297-316; 
Mark T. Gilderhus, “An Emerging Synthesis? U.S.-Latin American Relations since the Second 
World War,” Diplomatic History 16.3 (Summer 1992): 429-452; Max Paul Friedman, “Retiring 
the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin 
American Relations,” Diplomatic History 27.5 (November 2003): 621-636; Stephen G. Rabe, 
“Marching Ahead (Forthrightly): The Historiography of Inter-American Relations,” Passport 
45.2 (2014): 25-31; Andrew J. Kirkendall, “Cold War Latin America: The State of the Field,” H-
Diplo Essay No. 119 (November 2014): 1-17. 
26 Christopher M. White, Creating a Third World: Mexico, Cuba, and the United States during 
the Castro Era (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2007); Asa McKercher, 
“‘The Most Serious Problem’? Canada-US Relations and Cuba, 1962,” Cold War History 12.1 
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literature now recognizes that, especially after 1959, many Latin American regimes, 
organizations, and actors without the direct encouragement or support of the U.S. government 
shaped anti-communist policies during notable conflicts.27 
 Despite these crucial historiographical and methodological innovations, the literature on 
anti-communist opposition to Arévalo and Arbenz’s governments during the Guatemalan 
Revolution continues to focus on U.S. policy toward Guatemala and Operation PBSUCCESS. 
The discussion of the impact of Operation PBSUCCESS has spoken of the international 
repercussions of the fall of Arbenz’s government in such places as Chile and Uruguay.28 
Innovative research has even gone beyond the Western Hemisphere to examine 
Czechoslovakian-Guatemalan relations during Arbenz’s government and the Soviet Union’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2012): 69-88; Aragorn Storm Miller, “Precarious Paths to Freedom: The United States, the 
Caribbean Basin, and the New Politics of the Latin American Cold War, 1958-1968,” unpubl. 
PhD diss., University of Texas, 2012; Renata Keller, “A Foreign Policy for Domestic 
Consumption: Mexico’s Lukewarm Defense of Castro, 1959-1969,” Latin American Research 
Review 47.2 (2012): 100-119; William Michael Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: 
Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy toward Argentina (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2013); Garrard-Burnett, Lawrence, and Moreno, Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow; Thomas C. 
Field, Jr., From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the 
Kennedy Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). 
27 Ariel C. Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central 
America, 1977-1984 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1997); J. 
Patrice McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); Harmer; Margaret Power, “Who but a Woman? 
The Transnational Diffusion of Anti-Communism among Conservative Women in Brazil, Chile 
and the United States during the Cold War,” Journal of Latin American Studies 47.1 (2015): 93-
119; Luis Herrán Ávila, “Las guerrillas blancas: anticomunismo transnacional e imaginarios de 
derechas en la Argentina y México, 1954-1972,” Quinto Sol (Argentina) 19.1 (2015): 1-26; 
Aaron T. Bell, “A Matter of Western Civilisation: Transnational Support for the Salvadoran 
Counterrevolution, 1979-1982,” Cold War History (Available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2015.1019870#). 
28 Mark T. Hove, “The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 
U.S. Intervention in Guatemala,” Diplomatic History 31.4 (September 2007), 623-663; Roberto 
García Ferreira, “‘El caso de Guatemala’: Arévalo, Arbenz y la izquierda uruguaya, 1950-1971,” 
Mesoamérica 49 (2007): 25-58; Max Paul Friedman, “Fracas in Caracas: Latin American 
Diplomatic Resistance to United States Intervention in Guatemala in 1954,” Diplomacy & 
Statecraft 21.4 (2010): 669-689. 
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response to Operation PBSUCCESS.29 Still, inter-American analyses of regional anti-communist 
proponents during the Latin American Cold War have only examined events after 1959 and 
Castro’s movement. 
 As a result, dictators and exiles are relegated to asides briefly acknowledging that 
dictators were ‘enthusiastic’ supporters of Operation PBSUCCESS and that a few exiles lobbied 
for U.S. officials’ assistance. Piero Gleijeses in Shattered Hope finds that Somoza “was eager 
and enthusiastic” to participate in Operation PBSUCCESS, Nick Cullather in Secret History 
claims that “Somoza’s support became essential to PBSUCCESS,” and Richard Immerman and 
Stephen Streeter assume that Somoza and Trujillo’s actions in the early 1950s derived from 
Arévalo’s involvement with the Caribbean Legion in the late 1940s.30 No historian, though, has 
considered whether Somoza, Trujillo, or any other Caribbean Basin dictator attempted to 
undermine Arévalo’s government before becoming such ‘enthusiastic’ supporters of Operation 
PBSUCCESS. 
 Likewise, Guatemalan exiles are considered peripheral actors in every history of the 
Guatemalan Revolution and Operation PBSUCCESS. No work has examined how Castillo 
Armas, Barrios Peña, Luis Coronado Lira, general Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, Juan Córdova 
Cerna, José Luis Arenas, and other dissident Guatemalans built links and networked with anti-
communist leaders or organizations in the Caribbean Basin before the early 1950s and Operation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Lukás Perutka, “Arms for Arbenz: Czechoslovakia’s Involvement in the Cold War in Latin 
America,” Central European Journal of International & Security Studies 7.3 (September 2013): 
59-76; Michelle Denise Reeves, “Extracting the Eagle’s Talons: The Soviet Union in Cold War 
Latin America,” unpubl. PhD diss., University of Texas, 2014, Chapter 1. 
30 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 292-294; Cullather, 48; Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, 95-96; 
Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 25-26. Ameringer’s works on the Caribbean Legion 
focus on the anti-dictatorial left, Gleijeses, “Juan José Arévalo and the Caribbean Legion,” and 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 107-116, only examine how U.S. officials interpreted Arévalo’s 
support for the Caribbean Legion. 
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PBSUCCESS. Gleijeses notes that dictators favored certain exiles, and multiple experts on 
Operation PBSUCCESS admit that Castillo Armas, Ydígoras Fuentes, and other exiles lobbied 
for the U.S. government’s support in the early 1950s.31 Guadalupe Rodríguez de Ita’s work on 
the Mexican government’s asylum for Guatemalan exiles during the Guatemalan Revolution 
quickly moves past allegations and rumors of conspiracies by Guatemalan exiles against 
Arévalo’s government in order to discuss Operation PBSUCCESS.32 Those works that do 
discuss Guatemalan exiles have overlooked counter-revolutionary exiles opposed to the 
Guatemalan Revolution and have highlighted only the worldviews of anti-dictatorial exiles 
opposed to Ubico’s dictatorship and the regimes that followed Operation PBSUCCESS.33 
Coronado Lira, Córdova Cerna, Arenas, and other exiles only appear in the literature after their 
time in exile due to their joining Castillo Armas’s regime.34 Most historians of U.S. policy-
making have portrayed Castillo Armas as subservient to U.S. officials during Operation 
PBSUCCESS and during his subsequent regime from 1954 until his assassination in 1957, with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 220-221, 248-252; Cullather, 49-51; Immerman, The CIA in 
Guatemala, 141-143; Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 23-5. 
32 Guadalupe Rodríguez de Ita, La política mexicana de asilo diplomático a la luz del caso 
guatemalteco: 1944-1954 (México: Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora, 
Dirección General del Acervo Histórico Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 
2003). 
33 Jorge Ramón González Ponciano, “Guatemaltecos en la ciudad de México,” Amérique Latine 
Histoire et Mémoire 2 (2001), online at http://alhim.revues.org/590; Nathalie Ludec, “Voces del 
exilio guatemalteco desde la ciudad de México,” Amérique Latine Histoire et Mémoire 2 (2001), 
online at http://alhim.revues.org/599; Roberto García Ferreira, “La diplomacia liberacionista y el 
exilio guatemalteco en América del Sur, 1954-1960,” X Jornadas de Sociología (2013), online at 
http://www.aacademica.com/000-038/452; Guadalupe Rodríguez de Ita, “Exiliados 
guatemaltecos en México: Una experiencia recurrente,” Pacarina del Sur: Revista de 
Pensamiento Crítico Latinoamericano (noviembre 2014), online at 
http://www.pacarinadelsur.com/home/abordajes-y-contiendas/319-exiliados-guatemaltecos-en-
mexico-una-experiencia-recurrente. 
34 Francisco Villagrán Kramer, Biografía política de Guatemala, Volumen 1 (Guatemala: 
FLASCO, 1993), 171, 174, 187, 226; Rodríguez de Ita, La participación política en la primavera 
guatemalteca, 176, 227. 
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Guatemalanist literature reducing the new Guatemalan dictator to a tool of U.S. imperialism.35 
Alongside the numerous works published by the Secretaría de Propaganda y Divulgación 
[Secretary of Propaganda and Disclosure], later renamed Secretaría de Divulgación, Cultura y 
Turismo [Secretary of Disclosure, Culture, and Tourism] during Castillo Armas’s regime, his 
defenders have produced celebratory biographies that ignore his regime’s reliance on both U.S. 
resources and the network sponsored by Caribbean Basin dictators.36 
 As with the literature on U.S.-Latin American relations during the international Cold 
War, this is generally the result not of a lack of interest by historians but of the legacies of 
dictatorial regimes and revolutionary upheavals in Latin America during the international Cold 
War.37 My research, however, relies on the collections of the Secretaría de Estado de Relaciones 
Exteriores [Secretary of State for Foreign Relations, or SERREE] collection at the Dominican 
Archivo General de la Nación [National Archive, or AGN] in Santo Domingo that reveal how 
Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean Basin dictators conspired against the Guatemalan Revolution. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 250-251; Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 33-58. 
Zachary Karabell, Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold 
War, 1946-1962 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 92-135, attempts to 
argue that Castillo Armas did not merely follow U.S. officials’ orders, but Karabell does not 
provide any original research and does not produce a convincing argument in support of this 
thesis. 
36 Mario López Villatoro, Por qué fue derrotado el comunismo en Guatemala? (Guatemala: 
Talleres Gráficos Díaz Paiz, 1955); Emma Moya Posas, La Jornada épica de Castillo Armas 
vista desde Honduras (Tegucigalpa: Talleres la República, 1955); Guatemala y su dolor: Corona 
fúnebre sobre la tumba del coronel Carlos Castillo Armas (Guatemala: Tipografía Nacional de 
Guatemala, 1957); Manuel de la Guarda, Castillo Armas, libertador y mártir (Guatemala: 
Editorial Indoamérica, 1957); Guillermo Putzeys Rojas, Así se hizo la liberación (Guatemala: 
Tipografía Nacional de Guatemala, 1976). 
37 Natural disasters and the Sandinista Revolution damaged, destroyed, and lost essential 
materials in Nicaragua. Repositories such as the Honduran Archivo de Relaciones Exteriores in 
Tegucigalpa hold collections that remain unexamined. The staff at the AGN in Santo Domingo 
have faced numerous challenges in obtaining, organizing, and opening useful materials on the 
links between Trujillo, Caribbean Basin dictators, and Guatemalan exiles. 
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 My work provides the first insights into how dissident Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean 
Basin dictators opposed Arévalo and Arbenz’s governments and began a transnational counter-
revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution. Alleging that Mexican and Soviet communists 
had encouraged the Revolution, dissident Guatemalans conspired to prevent Arévalo from 
assuming the presidency. Similarly, Somoza, Carías, and Trujillo accused Arévalo’s government 
as the tool of Mexican, Soviet, and international communism since Arévalo and Guatemalan 
students, officials, and journalists welcomed and aided Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Dominican 
anti-dictatorial exiles. Due to their shared anti-communist ideology, Guatemalan exiles and 
Caribbean Basin dictators networked and plotted to undermine the consolidation of Arévalo’s 
government. This study reveals that by 1948 the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network was 
fully formed, though quite loosely, as Somoza, Carías, Trujillo, and their officials shared 
intelligence on Guatemalan exiles and provided financial support for exiles’ conspiracies. 
Deriving from their own anti-communist worldviews and independent of the international Cold 
War, Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean Basin dictators initiated an indigenous regional conflict 
with the Guatemalan governments and a transnational counter-revolution against the Guatemalan 
Revolution. 
 Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean Basin dictators nurtured their own indigenous anti-
communist ideology that conflated Mexican, Soviet, and international communism with leftist 
ideals and anti-dictatorial movements. At the dawn of the international Cold War, these leaders 
and groups were already putting forward an anti-communist worldview to denounce their 
opponents and legitimize their actions and regimes. By patronizing Guatemalan exiles, financing 
coup plots, and coalescing into the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network, Somoza, Carías, 
and Trujillo acted as regional anti-communist proponents without the endorsement and often 
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without the knowledge of U.S. officials. Guatemalan exiles played pivotal roles, too, as 
conspirators against the Guatemalan governments. Not only did the exiles’ conspiracies lead to 
heightened tensions inside Guatemala; the exiles helped bring together the patrons who would 
compose the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network. Most importantly, exiles and dictators 
transnationalized and Latin Americanized what would become one of the most defining episodes 
in Latin American history and set the foundation for what would become a Latin American Cold 
War conflict, ahead of and in most respects separately from the bipolar Cold War structure of the 
superpowers’ intervention and influence. Operation PBFORTUNE was only the climax of a 
process that started regionally in both its power and conceptual frameworks. 
 
B. Historiography of Operation PBFORTUNE 
 The difficulties in accessing sources on U.S. policy toward Guatemala in the early 1950s 
and the limited availability of sources regarding the conspiracies of Guatemalan exiles and 
Caribbean Basin dictators against the Guatemalan governments together have resulted in a 
historiographical gap surrounding the first CIA covert operation implemented during the Truman 
Administration in 1952 to overthrow Arbenz’s government, Operation PBFORTUNE. According 
to the existing literature, Somoza flew to Washington in the summer of 1952 and asked U.S. 
officials to support a plot to overthrow Arbenz’s government. Somoza mentioned this conspiracy 
during luncheons and conferences to various officials, including U.S. president Harry Truman, 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
Edward Miller, Jr., and Truman’s military aides general Harry Vaughan and colonel Cornelius 
Mara. Most State Department officials ignored Somoza’s suggestions. Flying to Managua, 
Somoza lobbied Mara who then convinced Truman to support the plot. Under Operation 
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PBFORTUNE, general Walter Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles, and the CIA provided money and 
weapons for an invasion of Guatemalan exiles led by Castillo Armas. Contrary to U.S. officials’ 
goals, Somoza shared details about Operation PBFORTUNE with other Caribbean Basin leaders. 
Because of Somoza’s indiscretions, State Department officials not included in the operation, 
such as Acheson, Miller, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
Thomas Mann, learned of Operation PBFORTUNE and believed the operation threatened the 
U.S. government’s adherence to the non-intervention ideal of U.S.-Latin American and Latin 
American international relations.38 These State Department officials terminated Operation 
PBFORTUNE in October 1952. 
 Operation PBFORTUNE occupies a nebulous place in the historiography due to the lack 
of sources and the scholarly focus on Operation PBSUCCESS. Operation PBFORTUNE has 
never received a thorough examination due to limited, and often conflicting, source material.39 
Historians originally relied upon and continue to consult journalist Herbert Matthews’s 1971 
memoir because crucial sources on U.S. policy toward Guatemala in the early 1950s were 
classified and unavailable. Matthews in A World in Revolution published “verbatim from the 
note” of a September 1953 “superconfidential” conversation with Miller. Matthews recorded 
Miller’s explaining that “Miller and the State Department were at all times ignorant of what was 
brewing,” but Mara, Bedell Smith, and the CIA with the approval of Truman arranged to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 In 1950, the “Office of Middle American Affairs” became the “Bureau of Inter-American 
Affairs,” so documents, references, and scholarship oftentimes interchange these terms in the 
early 1950s. 
39 “Editorial Note,” Document 11, in Susan K. Holly and David S. Patterson’s (eds.) Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 2003) (hereafter FRUS Guatemala), 20, highlights such difficulties, “Little 
documentation on the beginning of [Operation PBFORTUNE] was found.” The note then refers 
readers to only three known CIA-based documents, Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, and 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope. CIA reviewers redacted many of the documents and references on 
Operation PBFORTUNE in Cullather. 
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money and arms delivered for the operation. Miller, Mann, Acheson, and others in the State 
Department halted the operation upon learning of an arms shipment from the CIA to Somoza.40 
 Scholarship on the CIA and U.S. government-sponsored covert operations in the late 
1940s and early 1950s overlooks Operation PBFORTUNE in favor of Operation PBSUCCESS 
or discusses events outside of the Western Hemisphere. Because Operation PBFORTUNE only 
involved the CIA’s transfer of money and weapons to Latin American actors rather than the 
psychological warfare and number of U.S. operatives involved in Operation PBSUCCESS or in 
known CIA operations outside the Western Hemisphere, there are no memoirs or recollections of 
CIA personnel involved in it. This is a contrast to the accounts and memoirs of Operation 
PBSUCCESS from Howard Hunt, David Atlee Phillips, and William Pawley.41 Richard Helms’s 
role in Operation PBFORTUNE, as well as Operation PBSUCCESS, is repeatedly overlooked in 
Helms’s memoirs, and studies on him focus on his tenure as Director of the CIA.42 Examinations 
of general Walter Bedell Smith’s tenure as the CIA Director in the early 1950s do not provide 
insights into Operation PBFORTUNE.43 CIA official Richard Bissell, Jr., does not share any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Herbert L. Matthews, A World in Revolution: A Newspaperman’s Memoir (New York, NY: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 262-264. 
41 E. Howard Hunt, Undercover: Memoirs of an American Secret Agent (New York, NY: 
Putnam, 1974); E. Howard Hunt, American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate and 
Beyond (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2007); David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch (New York, 
NY: Ballantine, 1977); Max Holland, “Private Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy: William Pawley 
and the 1954 Coup d’État in Guatemala,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7.4 (Fall 2005): 36-73. 
42 Robert M. Hathaway and Russell Jack Smith, Richard Helms: Director of Central Intelligence, 
1966-1973 (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 
1993); Richard Helms and William Hood, A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central 
Intelligence Agency (New York, NY: Random House, 2003). 
43 Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence: 
October 1950-February 1953 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Press, 1992). Daniel 
K.R. Crosswell in Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith (Lexington, KT: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2010), 53-54, only touches upon Operation PBFORTUNE and repeats 




information on Operation PBFORTUNE in his memoirs.44 Other studies of the CIA quickly 
move past Operation PBFORTUNE to discuss Operation PBSUCCESS, as when Tim Weiner 
relegates it to a brief discussion in the “Notes” section of Legacy of Ashes.45 Studies on Allen 
Dulles and his brother John Foster Dulles highlight events outside Guatemala, whereas works 
specifically on the Dulles brothers and Guatemala emphasize their tenure as lawyers for UFCO 
through the firm Sullivan and Cromwell in the 1930s or roles in Operation PBSUCCESS.46 As a 
result, scholars have not incorporated Operation PBFORTUNE into a larger discussion on the 
CIA’s formative years. 
 Specialists on U.S.-Latin American relations have only assessed Operation 
PBFORTUNE to gauge the impact of the international Cold War upon U.S. policy toward 
Guatemala. Richard Immerman in The CIA in Guatemala utilizes Miller’s account to argue that 
Operation PBFORTUNE demonstrates how, “by the end of the Truman administration, at least 
some officials as well as the CIA had become convinced that a policy of conciliation toward 
Guatemala was unproductive.” Truman officials with Operation PBFORTUNE approved of “a 
clandestine operation in conjunction with Guatemala’s surrounding dictatorships,” as would 
Eisenhower officials with Operation PBSUCCESS. Immerman alleges, “The stillborn project [of 
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Operation PBFORTUNE] foreshadowed the events of two years later” in Operation 
PBSUCCESS “and represents the continuity of the cold war ethos.”47 Bryce Wood in The 
Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy agrees with Immerman. Wood finds that Latin 
Americanist policy-makers under the Truman Administration such as Miller and Mann adhered 
to “the twenty-year-old tradition of nonintervention in the American republics” and opposed 
suggestions by CIA officials in 1952 to overthrow the Guatemalan government in Operation 
PBFORTUNE. CIA officials from Operation PBFORTUNE, including Dulles and Bedell Smith, 
rose to positions of influence during the Eisenhower administration and received support from 
Eisenhower, the new Secretary of State Foster Dulles, and other policy-makers “uncommitted to 
the Good Neighbor Policy” who replaced Acheson, Miller, and Mann. For Wood, this 
bureaucratic shift in the State Department facilitated Operation PBSUCCESS under veterans of 
Operation PBFORTUNE.48 
 Where Immerman locates similarities between the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations regarding Operation PBFORTUNE, Stephen Rabe claims that Acheson, 
Undersecretary of State David Bruce, and other State Department officials’ opposition to 
Operation PBFORTUNE illustrates important differences between the Truman Administration’s 
reluctance to employ covert operations and the Eisenhower Administration’s willingness, due in 
large part to Foster Dulles’s serving as Secretary of State and his brother Allen Dulles as the 
head of the CIA, an argument akin to that of Wood.49 Rabe supports his conclusion by quoting 
from an October 03 report from Mann to Acheson in the incomplete compilation, the 1983 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: The American Republics, in which, following 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, 122. 
48 Wood, 157-159. 
49 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 48-49. 
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a conversation with Nicaraguan Ambassador in Washington Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa regarding 
the conspiracy, Mann reported that he and Miller affirmed to the ambassador “that the United 
States could never condone military intervention on the part of an American State against one of 
its neighbors.”50 Rabe’s contrast between Acheson, Bruce, Mann, Miller, and the State 
Department under the Truman Administration and Foster Dulles and the State Department under 
the Eisenhower Administration resembles Robert Beisner’s 2006 conclusion that Acheson was 
never informed about Operation PBFORTUNE. Beisner argues that Acheson “persuade[d] 
Truman to halt” it.51 Acheson after the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco reminded Truman of their having 
prevented “similar suggestions for Iran and Guatemala” in the early 1950s.52 Beisner, as do 
Wood and Rabe, stresses that “Eisenhower and [Foster] Dulles obeyed different impulses and 
ousted Arbenz in a coup in 1954.”53 Nelson Lankford, Burton Hersh, and Stephen Kinzer allege 
that Bruce played a central role in notifying Acheson of CIA actions and terminating Operation 
PBFORTUNE.54 
 The declassification of some sources on U.S. policy toward Guatemala in the early 1950s 
has allowed historians to reaffirm Beisner’s assessment of Acheson’s opposition to Operation 
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[Washington,] 03 October 1952, in N. Stephen Kane and William F. Sanford, Jr. (eds.), Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: The American Republics, Volume IV (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1983) (hereafter FRUS 1952-1954), 1043. 
51 Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 576. 
52 Dean Acheson to Harry S. Truman, 03 May 1961, quoted in Beisner, 584-585. 
53 Beisner, 576. 
54 Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (New York, NY: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992), 338; Nelson D. Lankford, The Last American Aristocrat: The 
Biography of David K. E. Bruce, 1898-1977 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 
249; Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World 
War (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2013), 101-102. 
 
 23 
PBFORTUNE and refine Rabe’s presentation of a State Department unaware of the plot.55 
Similar to Immerman’s argument for similarities between the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations, Gleijeses in Shattered Hope claims that Truman approved Operation 
PBFORTUNE and that both administrations conspired against the Arbenz government. No 
evidence except for second-hand references from State Department and CIA officials have 
directly linked Truman to the project, but Gleijeses references his interview with Helms who 
claimed, “Truman okayed a good many decisions for covert operations that in later years he said 
he knew nothing about.”56 Cullather’s Secret History, a redacted account from the Agency’s 
commissioned history of Operation PBSUCCESS built from CIA records unavailable to the 
public, touches upon Operation PBFORTUNE to note how the AGency believed they had 
obtained Truman and the State Department’s approval to overthrow the Arbenz government. 
Cullather claims Miller and the State Department only terminated Operation PBFORTUNE 
when the plot risked becoming a publicized scandal among Latin American leaders “alert for 
signs of backsliding on [the U.S. government’s adherence to] the nonintervention pledge.”57 
 Operation PBFORTUNE remains on the margins of the historiography on U.S. policy 
toward Guatemala in the 1940s and Operation PBSUCCESS in the early 1950s despite new 
historiographical suggestions and methodological innovations regarding the Latin American 
Cold War, the global Cold War, and internationalizing U.S. foreign relations. Historians have not 
placed Operation PBFORTUNE into a regional or international context that considers how U.S. 
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officials’ decisions intersected with those of regional actors or resonated in the Caribbean Basin 
and the rest of Latin America. This dearth of research on it is a stark contrast to that on the 
regional and international consequences resulting from Operation PBSUCCESS noted earlier. 
Scholars continue to present the CIA as the primary actor in the conspiracy, and Castillo Armas, 
Somoza, Trujillo, and other Caribbean Basin leaders receive supporting roles. Scholars of U.S. 
policy during the international Cold War only refer to Operation PBFORTUNE to note that the 
Agency as early as 1952 began to consider assassination proposals.58 Works discussing 
Operation PBSUCCESS, U.S.-Nicaraguan relations, or other U.S. interventions in Latin America 
or the Third World merely reference Operation PBFORTUNE and repeat the claims of 
Immerman, Gleijeses, and Cullather.59 
 This dissertation argues that Operation PBFORTUNE was the point in time when U.S. 
Cold War-oriented policy toward Guatemala intersected with the transnational counter-
revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution. Somoza and Castillo Armas lobbied U.S. officials 
to support what originally appeared as one of the many conspiracies that Guatemalan exiles and 
members of the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network had organized since the mid-1940s. 
Truman’s military aides and the CIA agreed that the U.S. government would provide material 
assistance to the conspiracy, bolstering the network’s support. This ‘green light’ from the CIA, 
however, radicalized the network’s dynamics as the network’s intelligence-sharing accelerated 
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and expanded. Somoza and Castillo Armas expected U.S. officials to participate in the 
conspiracy, incorporated additional Caribbean Basin anti-communist leaders into the conspiracy, 
and even discussed the conspiracy with State Department officials. Despite their having 
approved a policy that allowed for the U.S. government to encourage indigenous counter-
revolutionary opposition to Arbenz’s government, Miller, Mann, and others in the State 
Department feared the network’s radicalized intelligence-sharing threatened the public image of 
the U.S. government’s adherence to the non-intervention ideal and halted Operation 
PBFORTUNE. CIA and State Department officials, rather than acknowledging or understanding 
the network’s intelligence-sharing or the links between the U.S. government and the network’s 
actions, resorted to racist and paternalistic constructions to cast blame upon ‘the latinos.’ 
 This dissertation’s presentation of Operation PBFORTUNE speaks to several 
historiographical debates. This dissertation challenges how historians of U.S. policy toward 
Guatemala have presented Miller and Mann as devoted adherents to the non-intervention ideal 
and on the sidelines during Operation PBFORTUNE.60 Instead, this dissertation argues that 
Miller, Mann, and the State Department in the early 1950s approved a new U.S. Cold War-
oriented policy toward Guatemala that allowed the U.S. government to encourage indigenous 
counter-revolutionary movements against Arbenz’s government as long as the public image of 
non-intervention remained intact. It was this U.S. Cold War-oriented policy toward Guatemala 
that shaped the State Department’s discussions when first evaluating Castillo Armas and 
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Somoza’s conspiracy as a viable possibility to overthrow Arbenz’s government. This chapter 
reinforces Beisner’s claim that Acheson was unaware of Operation PBFORTUNE but proves 
Cullather’s assumption by identifying how Miller and Mann’s lack of support derived not from 
their commitment to non-interventionism but from their fear that exposure of U.S. involvement 
jeopardized the image of non-intervention. This chapter reconsiders Miller’s actions during 
Operation PBFORTUNE. Miller in Matthews’s memoir and State Department documents 
claimed that he was never aware of the conspiracy’s details and opposed Operation 
PBFORTUNE. Never-before-utilized Dominican reports and recently-declassified CIA files 
implicate Miller as one of the members of the State Department who discussed and even 
encouraged the conspiracy. Whereas Mann considered but ultimately opposed any U.S. 
government-based involvement in the conspiracy, Miller only opposed Operation PBFORTUNE 
due to the network’s radicalized intelligence-sharing. This dissertation also finds that U.S. 
officials’ racism toward Latin America shaped Operation PBFORTUNE’s conclusion.61 
Members of both the State Department and the CIA called upon racist and paternalistic images 
of Latin Americans in order to remove blame from U.S. officials and denigrate ‘the latinos’ for 
what U.S. officials decided to portray as ‘rumors’ of the U.S. government’s involvement in a 
conspiracy to overthrow Arbenz’s government.	  
 This dissertation’s treatment of Operation PBFORTUNE contributes to important 
historiographical discussions regarding the global Cold War and the Latin American Cold War. 
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This dissertation internationalizes U.S. policy toward Guatemala by presenting Operation 
PBFORTUNE as the product of both U.S. Cold War-oriented policy toward Guatemala and the 
transnational counter-revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution. Guatemalan exiles and 
members of the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network transnationalized and Latin 
Americanized U.S. policy toward Guatemala by shaping the conspiracy, lobbying U.S. officials, 
incorporating U.S. resources, and sharing intelligence. Reaching into the international Cold War, 
the exiles and dictators presented their opposition to the Guatemalan Revolution in a manner 
similar to U.S. officials’ interpretations of Arbenz’s government, a common technique employed 
by Third World elites and leaders toward the superpowers during the global Cold War. Since 
prominent U.S. officials, Guatemalan exiles, and Caribbean Basin leaders’ goals to overthrow 
Arbenz’s government converged, this dissertation identifies Operation PBFORTUNE as the 
moment when the international Cold War overlapped with the longstanding and indigenous 
regional conflict between Guatemalan exiles, the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network, and 
the Guatemalan governments to become a global Cold War and a Latin American Cold War 
conflict. Exiles and dictators had organized conspiracies since the mid-1940s without any 
consideration of the international Cold War, but the exiles and dictators’ lobbying and U.S. 
officials’ decisions brought together the transnational counter-revolution and the Cold War 
during Operation PBFORTUNE. The Cold War’s impact manifested as the CIA’s ‘green light’ to 
provide material assistance transformed the conspiracy into the Agency’s first covert operation to 
overthrow Arbenz’s government, so this dissertation examines how the network’s members 
increased their support and how the network’s intelligence-sharing expanded and accelerated. In 
effect, this plot no longer represented one of those conspiracies that proliferated throughout the 
Caribbean Basin since 1945. Under Operation PBFORTUNE, the plot became a Latin American 
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Cold War conflict organized by Caribbean Basin anti-communist actors and radicalized by the 
U.S. government, and the transnational counter-revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution 
joined U.S. Cold War-oriented policy and the international Cold War to become a global Cold 
War conflict. 
 
C. Chapter Outline 
 Chapter 1 examines how Guatemalan exiles and Central American dictators from 1944 
into 1947 opposed the Guatemalan Revolution when U.S. officials did not interpret the 
Revolution or Arévalo’s government as communist or threats to regional stability. Guatemalan 
exiles’ letters and writings detail the emergence of an anti-Mexican, anti-Soviet, anti-communist 
ideology, while State Department files from U.S. embassies in Central America recreate the 
movements and networking of prominent Guatemalan exiles. While not exhaustive, these two 
sets of documents, plus the Dominican SERREE items, together demonstrate how Somoza and 
Carías espoused the same anti-communist ideology as the exiles, interpreted the associations 
between anti-dictatorial exiles and the Guatemalan Revolution as threats to their respective 
regimes, welcomed Guatemalan exiles into Nicaragua and Honduras, and were implicated in 
various conspiracies against Arévalo’s government. 
 Chapter 2 provides a case study of the development of Trujillo’s opposition between 
1944 and 1947 to the Guatemalan Revolution and Arévalo’s government. Dominican SERREE 
files show that Trujillo held a foreign policy of ‘imperialismo dominicano’ in which the 
Caribbean Basin dictator aimed to stifle and undermine any anti-dictatorial sentiments or 
movements that questioned or challenged his regime. The Guatemalan Revolution evolved from 
a point of irritation to a central issue in Dominican officials’ discussions due to the growing 
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prevalence of anti-dictatorial propaganda in Guatemala, numerous denunciations of the despot, 
and the links between Arévalo, leading anti-Trujillo democratic leaders in the Caribbean Basin, 
and anti-Trujillo Dominican exiles. In 1947, Arévalo’s government broke diplomatic relations 
with the Dominican dictatorship, and the Guatemalan president assisted exiles who sought to 
overthrow Trujillo during the Cayo Confites expedition. The dictator, for his part, utilized anti-
communism to criticize Arévalo’s government and presented Arévalo’s support for anti-
dictatorial exiles as manifestations of Mexican and Soviet communism in the Caribbean Basin. 
 Chapter 3 provides a case study of how Guatemalan exiles coopted Trujillo to become a 
regional proponent against the Guatemalan Revolution and aid their conspiracies against 
Arévalo’s government. In contrast to the limited materials on Somoza and Carías, Dominican 
SERREE files reveal how colonel Arturo Ramírez, general Federico Ponce, general Miguel 
Ydígoras Fuentes, and Juan Pinillos utilized Dominican-Guatemalan relations, alongside their 
real concerns and instrumental arguments, to support their anti-communist campaign and gain 
Trujillo’s help. 
 Chapter 4 reveals how Somoza, Trujillo, Carías, and their officials came together from 
1948 into the early 1950s as a Caribbean Basin anti-communist network. Following scholarship 
on right-wing Latin American and trans-Atlantic anti-communist networks, this chapter 
examines how these dictators together opposed the Guatemalan Revolution.62 Due to the 
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solicitations of multiple Guatemalan exiles on behalf of plots against Arévalo’s government, the 
dictators ordered their officials to convene and discuss the exiles’ conspiracies. Without the 
knowledge of U.S. officials, the network participated in a system of intelligence-sharing in which 
members debated and subsequently provided various degrees of support to Ponce, Luis 
Coronado Lira, Manuel Melgar de la Cerda, general Roderico Anzueto, Ramírez, and ultimately 
Castillo Armas. 
 Chapters 5 through 7 focus on Operation PBFORTUNE. Chapter 5 considers the 
foundations of Operation PBFORTUNE. In the early 1950s, Miller, Mann, and Latin 
Americanist officials in the State Department constructed a Cold War-oriented policy toward 
Guatemala that allowed the U.S. government to encourage opposition against Arbenz’s 
government while protecting the image of the U.S. government’s adherence to the non-
intervention ideal. Guatemalan exiles and the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network directly 
and indirectly shaped U.S. policy toward Guatemala, and Guatemalan exile doctor Carlos Padilla 
y Padilla, Somoza, and Trujillo formed cordial relationships with Truman’s military aides 
general Harry Vaughan and colonel Cornelius Mara. Somoza in early 1952 began to lobby for a 
visit to Washington in order to solicit the U.S. government’s assistance for Castillo Armas. 
 This maneuvering truly took off, as shown in Chapter 6, when Somoza and Castillo 
Armas encouraged U.S. officials to endorse the conspiracy and brought such pressure in 
Washington as to create bureaucratic conflicts between the White House, the State Department, 
and the CIA. Tapping into U.S. Cold War-oriented policy toward Guatemala, Somoza argued 
that his plans would not undermine the U.S. government’s ostensible adherence to non-
interventionism. Vaughan and Mara endorsed the conspiracy while the State Department and the 
CIA debated the merits of the U.S. government’s involvement. Finally, the Agency issued a 
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‘green light’ for Operation PBFORTUNE and began preparing material assistance for the 
conspiracy. 
 Operation PBFORTUNE thus displayed the intersection between U.S. Cold War 
constructs and the region’s transnational counter-revolution, the focus of Chapter 7. CIA support 
not only bolstered the network; it radicalized the network’s intelligence-sharing. Somoza 
incorporated Colombian ambassador Eduardo Zuleta Ángel into the plot, and the network’s 
members discussed the U.S. government’s involvement. Learning of this accelerated and 
expanded intelligence-sharing regarding the U.S. government’s complicity in an indigenous 
conspiracy to overthrow Arbenz’s government, Miller, Mann, and the State Department feared 
the intelligence-sharing would endanger the image of the U.S. government’s adherence to the 
non-intervention ideal. Upon canceling Operation PBFORTUNE, the State Department and the 




II. Chapter 1: Guatemalan Exiles and Central American Dictators, 1944-1947 
 Doctor Carlos Padilla y Padilla was quite busy in mid-1945 attempting to put an end to 
the Guatemalan Revolution. Earlier in March of that year, the Guatemalan physician collaborated 
in an abortive coup to prevent newly-elected president Juan José Arévalo from taking office. 
Sent into exile in Costa Rica, Padilla only continued plotting. First, the Guatemalan in May met 
with Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza. Padilla flew next to El Salvador for various 
reunions with leading officials under Salvadoran military president-dictator Salvador Castaneda 
Castro and then to Honduras for time with advisors to Honduran dictator Tiburcio Carías. The 
exile’s networking throughout Central America realized its goal, as confirmed by the U.S. 
government’s intelligence-gathering and censorship system installed in the early 1940s to 
monitor fascists and Nazi-sympathizers during the Second World War. Intercepted and copied by 
U.S. censors, radiograms to Padilla included what was “undoubtedly double talk” confirming 
“that the promises of money and arms ha[d] materialized.”63 On his own initiative, Padilla 
succeeded in lobbying for the support of multiple Central American dictators to organize a 
conspiracy to overthrow Guatemalan president Arévalo and stop the Guatemalan Revolution. 
 This chapter examines how in the mid-1940s dissident Guatemalan exiles and Central 
American dictators initiated a transnational counter-revolution against the Guatemalan 
Revolution and conspired against the Guatemalan government of Juan José Arévalo. Prominent 
exiles, including general Federico Ponce, general Roderico Anzueto, colonel Arturo Ramírez, 
Juan Pinillos, doctor Carlos Padilla y Padilla, Luis Coronado Lira, and Carlos Salazar, Jr., held 
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an ideology that reduced the Guatemalan Revolution and Arévalo’s government to products of 
the Mexican Revolution, the Soviet Union, and international communism. The exiles’ anti-
Mexican, anti-Soviet, anti-communist worldview resonated not with U.S. officials but with 
Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza and Honduran dictator Tiburcio Carías, for the two 
Central American dictators conflated anti-dictatorial, anti-fascist, and leftist movements against 
their regimes into manifestations of Mexican, Soviet, and international communism. This 
constructed ‘triptic’ facilitated the exiles and dictators’ networking, organizing conspiracies 
against Arévalo’s government, and setting into motion the transnational counter-revolution 
against the Guatemalan Revolution. 
 As the Revolution diverged from the established social and political order in Guatemala, 
dissident Guatemalan exiles defended the previous status quo and denigrated the Revolution as 
the outgrowth of communism. As Pierre Bourdieu argues, “Social identity lies in difference, and 
difference is asserted against what is closest, against that which represents the greatest threat.”64 
By tapping into anti-communist ideas, these exiles sought to both legitimate their opposition to 
the Revolution and create an identity that placed the exiles against the transformations brought 
about by the Revolution. Their self-positioning dovetailed with the worldview held by Central 
American dictators, thus establishing a transnational network of government and non-
government groups. Micol Seigel summarizes, “Transnational history examines units that spill 
over and seep through national borders, units both greater and smaller than the nation-state.”65 
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Guatemalan exiles and Central American dictators conflated anti-dictatorial, anti-fascist, and 
leftist ideals in Guatemala and elsewhere as the alleged infiltration of communism into the 
Caribbean Basin. Reflecting “the complex dynamics of interconnected histories and 
transnationalism cutting across distinct nation-state identities,” these actors constructed a 
collective identity through the anti-Mexican, anti-Soviet, anti-communist ideology and conspired 
against Arévalo’s government well before the Cold War set in.66 In most respects, this chapter 
welcomes the challenge posed by Greg Grandin, who called for historians to “historicize political 
violence” during the Latin American Cold War with its locating a transnational and indigenous 
anti-communist ideology that bolstered counter-revolutionary political violence in the Caribbean 
Basin from as early as the mid-1940s.67  
 
A. Dissident Guatemalan Exiles and the Anti-Mexican, Anti-Soviet, Anti-Communist 
Ideology 
 Dissident Guatemalan exiles put forward an anti-Mexican, anti-Soviet, anti-communist 
ideology that aimed to unite opponents of the Guatemalan Revolution, criticize Arévalo’s 
government, and legitimate their actions to overthrow the Revolution and Arévalo. At its onset, 
the Revolution challenged the conservative nature that had defined Guatemalan society for 
decades. Beneficiaries of previous regimes, most notably that of Guatemalan dictator Jorge 
Ubico, interpreted the Revolution as a threat to the prevailing social and political order. In their 
descriptions of the Revolution and Arévalo’s government, notable dissidents tapped into 
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conservative Guatemalans’ longstanding opposition to the Mexican Revolution, the Soviet 
Union, and international communism, forming not just a conspiring group but also a collective 
identity that crossed sovereign boundaries. 
 The early programs and anti-fascist potential of the Guatemalan Revolution brought 
widespread acclaim and support from marginalized and oppressed peoples in Guatemala. 
Epitomized in the 1898-1920 dictatorship of Manuel Estrada Cabrera and 1931-1944 dictatorship 
of Ubico, Guatemalan classic liberalism had faced only a handful of challenges, and these 
regimes and their adherents ensured that debt peonage and strict vagrancy laws, severe 
curtailment of political freedoms, complete restrictions against labor activity, and enforced 
subservience of indigenous peoples defined Guatemalan society into the 1940s.68 In 1944, 
dissatisfaction with Ubico’s reign intermixed with the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and 
other anti-fascist symbols of the Second World War, prompting students, laborers, middle-class 
leaders, and reformist military officers to push for the expulsion of Ubico and his associates.69 
Despite treatments that depict Arévalo’s tenure as more moderate than that under Jacobo Arbenz, 
historical and scholarly accounts agree that the Guatemalan Revolution was “ten years of spring 
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in the country of eternal tyranny,” in the words of Guatemalan intellectual Luis Cardoza y 
Aragón, and a “sociological awakening,” in U.S. anthropologist Richard Adams’s description.70 
As a result, dissident Guatemalans such as Ubico’s political supporters and sycophants saw 
Guatemala’s 1945 Constitution, 1947 Labor Code, and other policies implemented by Arévalo’s 
government as overturning Guatemala’s traditional social and political order and emblematic of 
the infiltration of Mexican, Soviet, and international communism into Guatemala. Regional 
conservatism thus targeted reformism with instant references to the communist monolith. 
 Although there is little work on Guatemalan anti-communism at the dawn of the 
Guatemalan Revolution, the exiles’ worldview shared many tropes found in anti-communist 
strains elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin. Central American elites conflated the Mexican 
Revolution with labor activism, anti-imperialism, and nationalism, as with Augusto Sandino’s 
movement in Nicaragua.71 Agents for Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista believed Mexican 
communist leader Vicente Lombardo Toldano and Russian agents coordinated regional 
opposition against Batista’s regime, the Mexican and U.S. Communist Parties provided 
economic and intellectual assistance to Batista’s opponents, and the Mexican government under 
Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas offered resources and havens to various anti-Batista 
organizations.72 Soviet communism and the Communist International did receive some support 
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in Central America, but political and ideological disagreements undermined many relationships 
such as those between Mexican and Soviet communists in the 1920s.73 Meanwhile, notable 
reformers, such as Venezuela’s Rómulo Betancourt, broke with international communism.74 Still, 
Guatemalan officials during Ubico’s regime feared that Mexican president Cárdenas sought to 
“export revolution” to Guatemala based on the model of the Mexican Revolution, and officials 
such as Guatemalan Secretary of Foreign Relations Enrique Muñoz Meany in the first years of 
Arévalo’s government spoke of “the anti-Mexican policy which arose in the dictatorial systems 
of Ubico.”75 Communist labor organizations did appear in El Salvador and Guatemala, but 
Salvadoran dictator Maximiliano Hernández Martínez and Ubico violently suppressed these 
movements during the ‘Red Scare’ of the early 1930s and sent numerous anti-dictatorial leaders 
into exile in Mexico.76 As U.S. Ambassador in Guatemala City Boaz Long described in the mid-
1940s, the Revolution saw “waves of leftist individuals . . . come down from Mexico,” most of 
whom had been “exiles for years” although they were joined by a “few fellow travelers.”77 That 
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identification came easy to dissident Guatemalan exiles who often originated from Guatemala’s 
upper class and conservative groups allied with Ubico. 
 Many dissident Guatemalan exiles were prominent military or political officials during 
the thirteen-year regime of Jorge Ubico while others came from Guatemala’s upper class. A 
Guatemalan military officer and jefe político [political chief], general Federico Ponce rose in 
Ubico’s ranks to become the dictator’s trusted associate.78 When the Revolution deposed Ubico, 
Ponce served as a member of the resulting three-man junta, installed himself as the new 
president, and attempted to suppress popular dissent. As against Ubico, students and middle-
class reformers protested Ponce, and reformist military officers under Arbenz and major 
Francisco Arana removed Ponce in October 1944.79 Embodying the repressive capacities of 
Ubico’s regime, general Roderico Anzueto headed the dictator’s secret police and was, not 
surprisingly, one of the first officials expelled when the Revolution broke.80 Colonel Arturo 
Ramírez took up various capacities under Ubico’s regime until serving as the dictator’s consul in 
New Orleans. During the first days of the Revolution, Ramírez was charged with a protester’s 
death but evaded trial thanks to his exile after the abortive conspiracy in March 1945.81 
Unexamined in the historical literature, Juan Pinillos moved between Ubico’s Secret Service and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 There is no work on general Federico Ponce, but details of Ponce’s service under Ubico and 
ascent from jefe político to Ubico’s second-in-command can be found in reports from U.S. 
officials in Guatemala City. 
79 The most succinct discussion of Ponce’s regime is in Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 26-29. 
80 There is no work on general Roderico Anzueto, but he repeatedly appears in accounts and 
memoirs detailing Ubico’s regime. See Galich, Del pánico al ataque. 
81 There is no work on colonel Arturo Ramírez. While Ponce and Anzueto receive marginal 




Foreign Service.82 U.S. and Dominican reports placed Pinillos in the early 1940s as “Chief of 
Secret Service” under Ubico capable of “interven[ing]” in cases before the National Police and 
representing Ubico, and subsequently Ponce, in Honduras to lobby for regional support against 
the Revolution.83 Doctor Carlos Padilla y Padilla worked as a physician at Guatemala City’s 
Military Hospital. In contrast to other dissident exiles, Padilla was expelled during Ubico’s 
regime for reasons including his involvement in a murder and a plot to assassinate the very 
dictator himself. Padilla returned to Guatemala by early 1945 only to be expelled during the 
abortive March 1945 conspiracy.84 Luis Coronado Lira and Carlos Salazar, Jr., were notable 
lawyers during Ubico’s regime. Salazar’s father served as Ubico’s foreign minister, and both 
lawyers represented wealthy German coffee barons and bankers during disputes over the 
dictator’s seizing German fincas [plots of land] during the Second World War.85 
 Upon their exile, these dissident Guatemalans immediately denounced the Guatemalan 
Revolution and Arévalo’s government as influenced by foreign ideologies. From exile in Mexico 
City, Ponce initially charged Arévalo as both a Nazi and a communist. In an August letter to U.S. 
president Harry Truman, Ponce warned that U.S. officials should “fix [their] attention on the 
American continent and particularly on the strategic zone of the Caribbean and Guatemala where 
the Nazi-Fascist claws have been imbedded taking advantage of the time when the United States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 There is no work on Juan Pinillos. However, Pinillos appears in memoirs by Guatemalans, and 
even Venezuelans, who worked with Caribbean Basin dictators and opposed the Guatemalan 
Revolution. 
83 “RE: JUAN PINILLOS,” 28 July 1944, NARAII, RG84, “Guatemala, U.S. Embassy, 
Guatemala City, Classified General Records, 1937-1961” (hereafter US Embassy Guatemala 
City), Box 11. 
84 There is no work on doctor Carlos Padilla y Padilla. Information on Padilla comes from U.S. 
files. 
85 There are no works on Luis Coronado Lira or Carlos Salazar, Jr. Information on the two anti-
communist lawyers comes from U.S. and Dominican files, as their own writings do not shed 
light into their occupations. 
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was absorbed with the preoccupations of the gravest stages of the war.”86 The following month, 
he depicted Arévalo as a “well-known Nazi-communist agent.” As in the letter to Truman, the 
exile stressed his belief that Arévalo’s government threatened the “security of the United States 
of America and Central America in particular.”87 Although a cursory read of correspondence 
from Ponce to U.S. officials might give the impression that the Guatemalan summoned Nazism, 
anti-communism, and anti-Americanism in order to manipulate U.S. officials, dissidents utilized 
these references in their communications with their compatriots and, as will be shown, Caribbean 
Basin leaders. For example, in a letter to Anzueto intercepted by U.S. censors, Padilla too 
claimed that Guatemala needed to “shake off the Nazi-Communist and anti-American yoke.”88 
 Tactically, dissident exiles decried that the Revolution transformed Guatemala into a 
Soviet state. Coronado Lira incorporated this trope throughout his writings. In 1946 while in 
Costa Rica, the Guatemalan decried that Arévalo’s government sought to build “a totalitarian 
state equal to that of Russia.”89 In El Salvador’s Diario de Hoy the next year, Coronado Lira put 
out a similar statement and “declared [Arévalo] to be a servant of Sovietism.”90 From Honduras, 
he pleaded that the Guatemalan people “not allow the washing away of the colors [of the 
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en la Ciudad de México, Ciudad de México, 04 octubre 1945, with Sidney E. O’Donoghue, First 
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San José, 11 April 1945, with No. 273 “Subject: Activities of Guatemalan political exiles,” San 
José, 11 April 1945, NARAII, RG84, US Embassy Guatemala City, Box 12. 
89 Luis Coronado Lira, Totalitarismo espiritualista: Tres panoramas y un caso de nacionalidad 
(San José: Alajuela, 1946), 16. 
90 Albert F. Nufer, U.S. Ambassador in San Salvador, to Secretary of State, No. 1818 “Subject: 
Guatemalan Revolutionaries in El Salvador,” San Salvador, 30 October 1947, 814.00/10-3047, 
NARAII, RG59, DF814, M1527, Roll 1. 
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Guatemalan flag, sky blue and white,] to become red or the symbolic Quetzal of our freedoms to 
change into the sickle and hammer of communist totalitarianism.”91 He was not the only one to 
voice such claims, evidenced in a compilation of anti-Arévalo articles from Guatemalan exiles. 
There, Coronado Lira blamed Mexican communist Vicente Lombardo Toledano for violating 
Guatemalan sovereignty as fellow exiles blamed the Mexican for planting “the exotic seed of 
communism” in the “soil of America” and operating as the “instrument of Russia.”92 
 Guatemalan exiles incessantly conflated Mexico, the Soviet Union, and international 
communism with the allegation that Lombardo Toledano manipulated events in Guatemala in 
order to spread international communism throughout the Americas. In various letters and 
petitions to U.S. officials, Pinillos’s writings epitomized this worldview. In May 1945, the 
Guatemalan claimed that the “Mexican Embassy in Guatemala [had] organized all the 
movements” that overthrew Ubico. Pinillos believed Lombardo Toledano commanded various 
communist agents in Guatemala “in the service of Russian communism.” With weapons flowing 
into Guatemala from Mexico, these agents were behind the revolutionary movements aimed 
against Carías in Honduras. Pinillos concluded that Arévalo’s government was a “communist 
regime” behind the “overt INTERVENTION of Mexican communism in the affairs of 
Guatemala and Central America.”93 Exactly a year later, he repeated these allegations. After 
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Plutarco, 1946), 16. 
92 Marco Archila C., “Un liberal y militar guatemalteco,” en La Tribuna de la libertad, 24; 
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Mexicanos,” en La Tribuna de la libertad, 21. 
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23 mayo 1945, NARAII, RG84, “Honduras, Tegucigalpa Legation and Embassy, Classified 




praising the U.S. government’s preparations to provide economic aid to Europe, the Guatemalan 
pronounced that Arévalo had revealed his “clearly communist affiliation.” Pinillos argued that 
Arévalo sent Guatemalan delegates to events in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa 
Rica as part of a “communist campaign” to bring “unease” and “agitation” throughout Central 
America. He summarized this supposed conspiracy, “Arévalo is determined to move forward 
with this plan that was originally planned by the communist leader, Vicente Lombardo 
Toledano.” Consequently, Pinillos believed this design had only one outcome: “to establish a 
small dependency of the Soviet Union toward the Panama Canal.”94 Later that same year, he 
again alleged that Arévalo’s government, “with the necessary resources that had been provided 
by the Soviet government through Lombardo Toledano,” intervened in the “internal affairs” of 
Honduras and allowed Honduran exiles to conspire against Carías’s regime.95 Other exiles 
disseminated the same tropes held by Pinillos. First Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico 
City Walter Washington in November 1946 received a letter from an unnamed Guatemalan exile. 
The exile blamed “strong cells” in Guatemala inspired by “International Communism” for trying 
to take over radio and railroad properties and linked all labor strikes by Guatemalan unions to the 
Soviet Kremlin.96 Similarly, in a memorandum handed to U.S. officials in Tegucigalpa, Padilla 
summarized that Arévalo’s government was “a totalitarian tyranny with communist tendencies,” 
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96 Memorandum, Ciudad de México, 26 noviembre 1946, with S. Walter Washington, First 
Secretary of U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, to Secretary of State, No. 1,961 “Subject: 
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influenced by “Mexican expansionism,” and designed “to sow confusion” in the Americas “in 
the event of a future war between the United States and Russia.”97 
 The shared identity that united Guatemalan exiles began to take shape as early as May of 
1945. Guatemalan exiles of the Frente Nacional Democrático de Guatemala en México [National 
Democratic Front of Guatemala in Mexico] and the Unión Democrática Nacional de Guatemala 
[National Democratic Union of Guatemala] organized demonstrations in front of the Guatemalan 
Embassy in Mexico City to protest Arévalo’s government’s expelling Guatemalans who 
participated in the abortive March 1945 conspiracy.98 Two months later, the Frente Nacional 
Democrático de Guatemala en México alleged that the “Communist Party . . . actually holds 
public power” in Guatemala.99 In response, the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City noted that 
the Frente Nacional Democrático de Guatemala was composed of those that sought “to build 
systems of Government [in Guatemala] equal to those of generals Ubico and Ponce.”100 
 Committees of Guatemalan exiles played an important role in publishing counter-
revolutionary propaganda. Padilla and Coronado Lira formed the Comité de Defensa Patria 
[Committee for Homeland Defense] that issued radio transmissions and published articles in 
Managua, Tegucigalpa, and San Salvador. In the book La Tribuna de la libertad: Voz de los 
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Chargé d’Affaires ad interim at U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Memorandum “Subject: 
Memorandum left by Dr. Carlos Padilla November 21,” Tegucigalpa, 02 December 1947, 
NARAII, RG84, US Embassy Tegucigalpa, Box 34. 
98 George S. Messersmith, U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City, to Secretary of State, A-1140, 
Mexico City, 10 April 1945, 814.00/4-1045, NARAII, RG59, DF814, M1527, Roll 1. 
99 “Los liberales no complotan,” Novedades (Ciudad de México) 22 mayo 1945, with Robert F. 
Hale, Third Secretary of U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, to Secretary of State, No. 24,617 
“Subject: Embassy of Guatemala in Mexico Refutes Charges of ‘Frente Nacional Democrático 
de Guatemala,’” Mexico City, 24 May 1945, 814.00/5-2445, NARAII, RG59, DF814, M1527, 
Roll 1. 
100 “En Guatemala no ha habido ‘purga,’” El Nacional (Ciudad de México) 23 mayo 1945, with 
Robert F. Hale to Secretary of State, No. 24,617, Mexico City, 24 May 1945, 814.00/5-2445, 
NARAII, RG59, DF814, M1527, Roll 1. 
 
 44 
Guatemaltecos en el destierro [Freedom’s Tribune: Voice of Guatemalans in Exile], their group 
claimed to represent the “voice of thousands of Guatemalans in exile” opposed to Arévalo’s 
government. The book reproduced numerous newspaper articles and radio speeches from 
Coronado Lira and other Guatemalan exiles that recited the anti-Mexican, anti-Soviet, anti-
communist ideology. Among the included items were “Violación constitucional y fracaso 
rotundo de un régimen [Constitutional Violation and Round Defeat of a Regime],” “La Prédica 
imperialista de Lombardo Toledano [The Imperialist Preaching of Lombardo Toledano],” and 
“Denunciando la tiranía de Arévalo Bermejo [Denouncing the Tyranny of Arévalo].”101 The 
Comité Patriótico Guatemalteco [Guatemalan Patriotic Committee] helped publish Catholic and 
anti-communist Guatemalan exile José Calderón Salazar’s pamphlet, Guatemala bajo el signo 
rojo [Guatemala under the Red Sign]. He contrasted the “chaos of a Revolution promoted by the 
Soviet Union” against Guatemala’s “national and Christian tradition,” a technique that would be 
emulated by numerous opponents of the Revolution.102 Forming committees around their 
opposition to the Revolution also enabled exiles to make their voice known beyond the 
Caribbean Basin. In November 1947, the Comité de Ayuda a los Exiliados Guatemaltecos 
[Committee for Support to Guatemalan Exiles] sent an open letter to the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. In the letter, the committee listed 20 
Guatemalan exiles in the United States, 103 in Mexico, 82 in El Salvador, 11 in Honduras, 9 in 
Nicaragua, and 12 in Costa Rica. Among the exiles were Ponce, Anzueto, Ramírez, Padilla, 
Coronado Lira, and many more. The Committee claimed there did not “exist freedom,” “the free 
operation of political parties,” or “the freedom of expression of thought” in Guatemala and 
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102 José Calderón Salazar, Guatemala bajo el signo rojo (México: Comité Patriótico 
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described Arévalo’s government as “exactly the type of sovietizante regime in its tactics and 
goals.” They even compared Arévalo’s government’s depicting exiles as “reactionaries” to 
policies under communist regimes in Romania and Poland.103 Alongside these open letters and 
publications, Ponce, Ramírez, and Coronado Lira at various points of time were involved in the 
production and distribution of a forged letter between Arévalo and the Soviet chargé d’affaires in 
Mexico City, Vasili Yakubovsky, that would make its way throughout the Caribbean Basin.104	  
 
B. The U.S. Government, Anastasio Somoza, Tiburio Carías, and the Guatemalan 
Revolution 
 Dissident Guatemalans, especially exiles, directed to U.S. officials much of their writing 
on the alleged Mexican and Soviet communist infiltration of Guatemala, yet U.S. officials rarely 
took such charges seriously in the mid-1940s. The literature on U.S. Cold War-oriented policy 
toward Guatemala highlights U.S. officials’ concerns in the late 1940s and early 1950s that the 
Guatemalan Revolution provided inroads for international communism. However, such fears 
only escalated in the late 1940s.105 In the first years of the Revolution, Washington tried to make 
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sense of the conflicting charges of Arévalo’s fascist, socialist, and communist proclivities. 
Consequently, U.S. officials publicly reiterated their government’s non-interventionist policy 
while privately remarking on their limited belief in the words of dissident Guatemalan exiles. 
Whereas Guatemalan exiles found little response from Washington, their worldviews intersected 
with those held by Central American dictators Anastasio Somoza and Tiburcio Carías, for the 
Nicaraguan and Honduran dictators too believed that Guatemala served as a bastion for Mexican, 
Soviet, and international communism. 
 U.S. officials recorded numerous allegations of Mexican and Soviet communism in 
Guatemala. Reporting on the Guatemalan Army and opposition to the Revolution, U.S. 
Ambassador in Guatemala City Boaz Long in March 1945 explained how dissidents “were 
alarmed at the present tendency [of Arévalo’s government] toward ‘too close [a] friendship’ with 
Mexico.” He believed that such a “fear, which is shared by many Guatemalans, appear[ed] to be 
based on the reasoning that any opportunity given to [the] infiltration of Mexican ideas w[ould] 
eventually bring about socialistic and communistic developments that w[ould] be disastrous to 
established interests in Guatemala.”106 Before his eventual exile, Jorge Toriello in multiple asides 
to U.S. Ambassador in Guatemala City Edwin Kyle claimed that Guatemala was “going 
Communistic fast under the influence of the Mexican Government.”107 Otto Dorion, a director of 
Guatemala Central Bank, admitted that the Revolution “was extremely popular and has the 
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support of practically everyone in the country,” but he was “afraid of Mexican influence in 
Guatemala” that, according to “a Mexican friend of his, was being fomented by and at the 
instigation of the Russian Embassy” in Mexico City.108 
 In Argentina, U.S. officials also reported on the claims of Arévalo’s alleged fascist or 
communist sympathies. Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires Edward Reed 
described how former Vice Consul in Mendoza Richard Post held interviews regarding 
Arévalo’s political background with a variety of professors, “including conservatives, liberals[,] 
and socialists.” According to Post, all agreed that Arévalo “desired a moderately liberal and 
constitutionally stable form of government for his country” and “maintained no close relations 
with extremists and gave no signs of having sympathy for either Communists or Fascists.”109 In 
fact, John Griffiths, a special assistant at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, believed any 
“suspicions that might be had about Arévalo and his supposed Communist leanings” were “so 
utterly without real foundation as to call for no response.” He even warned, “I think we are 
sufficiently accustomed to the local practice of listing as Communists all those who are opposed 
to the present Government,” concluding “I cannot imagine the existence of any other basis for 
attributing to Arévalo Communist sympathies.”110 
 Whether in Guatemala City, Mexico City, or Washington, U.S. officials referred to this 
frequent habit in which opponents of Arévalo and the Revolution summoned unsupported 
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charges of Mexican, Soviet, and international communist infiltration in Guatemala. In mid-1946, 
the Office of the Legal Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City submitted a report, “RE: 
COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA,” that opened, “There is no evidence to prove that there 
exists in Guatemala at the present time a Communist party or other type of Communist 
organization.” The report highlighted that various “charges of ‘Communist’ [were] thrown by the 
opposition at Government and labor leaders” although these opponents could never “prove their 
statements.” The report also concluded that the Arévalo-Yakubovsky letter was “felt to be 
forged” due to the letter’s “tone,” “contents,” and “a superficial comparison of the signature with 
a known signature” of Arévalo.111 The next month, the Office of Central America and Panama 
Affairs sent a memorandum devoted to the Arévalo-Yakubovsky letter. The Office repeated the 
opinion of the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City that the letter was not “‘anything more than a 
forgery which ha[d] been very poorly prepared.’” Among the seven reasons that the letter was a 
forgery, including the misspelling of Yakubovsky’s name and the inane reasoning in Arévalo’s 
writing any confidential communication to Yakubovsky, the Office believed, “The tone of the 
letter fits more appropriately the warped propaganda of General Ponce and other [Guatemalan] 
exiles in Mexico who place much emphasis on the charge that Arévalo is a Communist.”112 
 Despite their meetings with or receiving materials from dissident Guatemalan exiles, U.S. 
officials adhered to a policy of non-intervention in Guatemalan affairs. In October 1945, Kyle 
directly told Toriello, “I cannot mix up in your internal political affairs” which “would be against 
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my country’s wishes and certainly against my own desires.”113 Due to the multiple entreaties by 
Guatemalan exiles in El Salvador for conferences with U.S. officials, U.S. Ambassador in San 
Salvador Albert Nufer ordered U.S. officials to act “courteously [while] carefully avoid[ing] any 
statement that might be construed as an encouragement” of the dissidents’ activities.114 When 
Coronado Lira asked Robert Wilson of the Office of Central America and Panama Affairs to 
meet with him and Salazar, Wilson brought along another U.S. official and insisted that his 
“presence would not imply that [Wilson] was expressing any preference in these local political 
issues.”115 In early 1945, First Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City Sidney 
O’Donoghue reported “that the Mexican Government had joined with us in urging the other 
Governments of Central America not to intervene in each other’s internal affairs.”116 
 U.S. officials’ adherence to a non-interventionist policy toward Guatemala was bolstered 
by the officials’ obvious lack of trust in Guatemalan exiles. Kyle admitted his “fear [that 
Toriello] may not be sincere,” “might be an ingrate,” and “might, by spreading rumors against 
[Arévalo], gradually destroy the confidence of the people” in Arévalo.117 In late 1947, U.S. 
officials believed Toriello’s claims that Arévalo’s government was dominated by communists 
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“should not be taken too seriously” since Toriello “very definitely ha[d] an axe to grind and d[id] 
not have a record for reliability himself.”118 Walter Washington at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico 
City identified Ponce, while distributing the Arévalo-Yakubosvky letter, as “so embittered and 
prejudiced in his conversation and giv[ing] forth so much unreliable and inaccurate information 
that the [U.S.] Embassy place[d] little confidence in the material which he distribute[d].”119 In 
October 1945, Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa John Faust forwarded to 
First Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City Robert Woodward a copy of a letter from 
Pinillos. Faust sarcastically described Pinillos as his “old sporting pal” and, upon summarizing 
how Pinillos believed “the red hand of Moscow may soon be around their gullets,” joked, “Well, 
it’s no skin off Honduran noses,” and suggested “mention[ing] the name of the wide awake 
laddie” to the State Department.120 Upon receiving Padilla’s late 1947 memorandum, Chargé 
d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa Harold Montemat concluded that the 
Guatemalan’s charges were “probably old hat and of very little, if any, importance.”121 
 In contrast to U.S. officials, Somoza and Carías issued the same charges against the 
Guatemalan Revolution as did the Guatemalan exiles. The Nicaraguan and Honduran dictators 
nurtured their own anti-Mexican, anti-Soviet, anti-communist ideology when interpreting events 
in Guatemala. In public writings and communications with U.S. officials, Somoza, Carías, and 
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their representatives summoned the same tropes utilized by Guatemalan exiles, such as the 
spread of Soviet communism and influences of Mexican communist Lombardo Toledano, to 
denounce events in Guatemala. Also, Somoza and Carías focused much of their attention on 
Nicaraguan and Honduran exiles who opposed the dictators’ regimes. Here, the two dictators 
saw the Guatemalan Revolution and anti-dictatorial exiles as the byproduct of Mexican, Soviet, 
and communist machinations. 
 Somoza dwelled upon the supposed spread of Mexican communism into Guatemala. In 
January 1945, the Nicaraguan dictator already claimed the Guatemalan Revolution was “inspired 
by Mexico.”122 Intertwining labor activity and international communism, Somoza believed such 
ideas “had come from Mexico to Guatemala.”123 U.S. officials such as Ambassador in Managua 
Fletcher Warren knew that the dictator’s worries stemmed from his opposition to the Mexican 
Revolution. In June 1945, Warren reported that Somoza’s “well-known fear and distrust of 
Mexico” led to the dictator’s “see[ing] the hand of Mexico” in Guatemalan affairs. The dictator 
was “vehemently opposed to the spread of Mexican radicalism in Nicaragua and believe[d] it to 
stem from Moscow.” Due to this worldview, Somoza believed Arévalo was “acting at the 
instigation of Mexico and, ultimately, the Soviet Union.”124 For the dictator, Mexican 
communism remained the most dangerous threat and greatest influence in Guatemala. In early 
1945, he warned U.S. officials that the Mexican government was selling machine guns, rifles, 
and ammunition to the Guatemalan government. After various exchanges regarding the arms 
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sale, U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City George Messersmith explained that the “Government of 
Nicaragua has its own private quarrel with the Government of Mexico,” so he did “not believe 
that any great value can be given to information which the Nicaraguan Government may give 
with respect to such arms sales by Mexico.”125 Following up on Messersmith’s reports, Chargé 
d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City Herbert Bursley added that the Mexican Foreign 
Office had actually contacted the State Department about the arms sales.126 Furthermore, later 
reports found that the Mexican government had sold the arms and ammunition to the Guatemalan 
government following warnings concerning Ponce’s organizing conspiracies from Chiapas and 
Tabasco to invade Guatemala and overthrow Arévalo’s government.127 Not only did Somoza 
ignore such claims and not send any representatives to Arévalo’s inauguration.128 During a coup 
attempt against Arévalo’s government in October 1945, the dictator told U.S. officials that the 
Mexican Government was “sending three officials of the Mexican Army to Guatemala to assist 
Arévalo in maintaining control.”129 U.S. Ambassador in Guatemala City Edwin Kyle replied that 
there was “no indication” of Mexican army officers in Guatemala and found it “difficult to 
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understand how they could be of assistance” to Arévalo’s government.130 Finally, Somoza’s 
newspaper Novedades, among its litany of propaganda directed against the Guatemalan 
Revolution, published the Arévalo-Yakubovsky letter as evidence of Soviet communism in 
Guatemala.131 
 Carías’s regime nurtured an identical ideology. As had Somoza, Honduran Ambassador 
in Washington Julián Cáceres in 1945 discussed “the dangers of increasing the communist 
influence in Central America.”132 Over two years later, he again “stated that there was little 
question but what [sic] the Arévalo Government was taking orders from outside the country.” He 
implored U.S. officials to see that Arévalo’s government “was communistic and that the orders 
were coming from Soviet Russia.”133 As early as 1944, Honduran Foreign Minister Silverio 
Laínez warned U.S. Ambassador in Tegucigalpa John Erwin of “a movement with communist 
background . . . being established in Central America [and] originating in Mexico.”134 Erwin’s 
response to these warnings mirrored those given to Guatemalan exiles. When Laínez the 
following year complained about communism in Central America, the U.S. official reported, “It 
should be observed that Dr. Laínez . . . probably looks under his bed each night for a 
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Communist.”135 Carías suppressed all labor organizations, communist literature, and news 
bulletins from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico from entering Honduras.136 Nevertheless, the 
dictator believed “Toledano’s agents [were] busy in Central America” and felt that “the agitation 
is closely connected with the new regime in Guatemala.”137 In March 1945, Laínez insisted that 
communist propaganda in Honduras came from the Mexican government and Lombardo 
Toledano, “perhaps through persons connected with the present Government of Guatemala” 
under Arévalo.138 As did Somoza, Carías had Honduran newspapers claim that the Soviet 
Embassy in Mexico City and Lombardo Toledano shaped the direction of the Guatemalan 
Revolution.139 Furthermore, his son in 1945 told U.S. officials “that Communism in Central 
America has received its impetus by Arévalo’s action” in Guatemala.140 The next year, the son 
repeated that Guatemala was “already in the hands of the Communists” and receiving “help from 
Mexico” while handing U.S. officials a copy of the Arévalo-Yakubovsky letter.141 In 1947, 
Laínez issued the same charges that communists “were becoming increasingly active in many 
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other countries of the world” outside of the Soviet Union and alleged that constitutional 
suspensions in Guatemala, actually the result of dissident exiles’ conspiracies as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, were “intimately tied up with the communist problem there.”142 
 Escalating Somoza and Carías’s self-proclaimed anti-communist opposition to the 
Guatemalan Revolution was the association between Arévalo’s government and anti-dictatorial 
exiles in Central America. U.S. officials noted that the Nicaraguan and Honduran governments 
“consider[ed] Arévalo and [his] associates [as] communist” and Somoza and Carías feared “that 
Russia expect[ed] soon to place diplomatic representatives in all Central American countries.”143 
However, the two dictators conflated communism with the myriad anti-fascist and leftist 
challenges to their respective regimes in the postwar years.144 For them, Guatemala’s open 
reception of, and frequent support for, anti-dictatorial exiles merely confirmed the dictators’ 
denouncements of the infiltration of Mexican, Soviet, and international communism into 
Guatemala. 
 In the first days of the Guatemalan Revolution, anti-Somoza exiles turned to Arévalo’s 
government and like-minded allies there. Nicaraguans constantly fled to the Guatemalan 
Embassy in Managua in order to escape Somoza’s Guardia Nacional [National Guard]. When 
Nicaraguan students during an anti-Somoza protest in October 1945 entertained officials from 
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the Guatemalan Embassy in Managua, Somoza ordered his Guardia Nacional to suppress the 
event. In the aftermath, the Guatemalan minister in Managua gave asylum to almost 50 of the 
dictator’s opponents while Somoza’s regime criticized the minister.145 Despite this repression, 
students continued joining other opponents of the regime, participated in strikes, received asylum 
at the Mexican Embassy in Managua, and departed for Guatemala.146 There, Nicaraguan exiles 
openly associated with Guatemalan officials, students, and journalists.147 The links between anti-
Somoza activists, the Guatemalan Revolution, and the Mexican government fueled Somoza’s 
hatred of Arévalo’s government. In January 1945, he claimed Arévalo’s government was “letting 
Central American exiles have a free hand” in Guatemala.148 As the government defended itself 
against various conspiracies in late 1947, Somoza’s Novedades claimed the Guatemalan 
president was “taking his turn in these abuses” from Guatemalan exiles after intervening in 
Nicaraguan affairs.149 The newspaper went so far as to call out Nicaraguan exiles’ editorials and 
publications in Guatemala’s Mediodía. One Novedades article mocked the Guatemalan 
Revolution for accepting Nicaraguan exiles while sending out dissident Guatemalan exiles and 
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described “a democratic Guatemala from where numerous exiles have left, many of whom have 
had a brotherly reception in Nicaraguan soil.”150 
 Carías also decried the links between anti-dictatorial exiles, the Guatemalan Revolution, 
and sometimes the Mexican government. In Guatemala, anti-Somoza Nicaraguan exiles and anti-
Carías Honduran exiles published articles, pamphlets, and books that lambasted the dictatorial 
regimes.151 In Honduras, Carías’s regime in August 1947 sought the retirement of Guatemalan 
Minister in Tegucigalpa Carlos Zachrisson. Akin to his counterparts in Managua, Zachrisson 
constantly was “speaking poorly” of the dictatorship,” “giv[ing] asylum” to Carías’s enemies, 
and “shamelessly encourag[ing] opponents.”152 In 1944, Laínez outlined “his belief that certain 
activities of the Honduran and other Central American exiles in Mexico [were] being financed by 
the Government of that country.”153 Honduran officials soon complained that anti-Carías exiles 
based in Guatemala frequently moved into Honduras with weapons obtained in Guatemala.154 
Carías and Honduran Minister in Guatemala City Luciano Milla Cisneros reported similar 
attacks from Honduran exiles in Guatemala with Arévalo’s government allegedly giving orders 
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“to supply the [exiles] with Red Cross material, mortars, and arms.”155 In December 1946, the 
dictator discussed various reports of “future armed movements in Central America to be 
instigated by” Arévalo.156 Into late 1947, Arévalo’s military officials, such as Arana, explained 
how their government “ha[d] been accused of harboring Central American exiles and of giving 
them employment.” To U.S. officials, he “maintained that this was done only as a humanitarian 
gesture and that the employment was of a minimum nature, only sufficient for the immediate 
economic necessities of the persons concerned.” The Guatemalan highlighted how he had 
“issued orders for the removal of all Honduran exiles from the immediate vicinity of the 
Honduran frontier.”157 Regardless, the association of Arévalo’s government and anti-dictatorial 
exiles persisted into the late 1940s and, in the Somoza and Carías’s worldviews, served as further 
evidence of the Guatemalan Revolution’s threat to the region’s stability. 
 
C. Guatemalan Exiles, Central American Dictators, and the Transnational Counter-
Revolution 
 Sharing an anti-communist ideology and hatred of the Revolution, Guatemalan exiles and 
Central American dictators began networking and organizing conspiracies to overthrow 
Arévalo’s government. U.S. officials found themselves inundated with reports that Pinillos, 
Padilla, Coronado Lira, and other exiles found a warm reception in Nicaragua, Honduras, and 
even El Salvador for an audience to discuss methods to remove Arévalo’s government. The 
patronage of Central American dictators financed the exiles’ networking in the Caribbean Basin. 
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In their turn, exiles’ conspiracies offered dictators the opportunity to destabilize an allegedly 
communist government that supported their own countries’ exiles. Therefore, a combination of 
ideological and geopolitical concerns brought together exiles and dictators, beginning the 
transnational counter-revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution. 
 The archival material on these links provides only perfunctory details. The reports 
provided by U.S. officials, however, suggest that transnational factors, a common ideology and 
shared opposition to the Guatemalan Revolution, facilitated their networking. At the 
Revolution’s onset, Guatemalan dissidents cooperated in plots to overthrow Arévalo’s 
government and repeatedly denounced the links between the Guatemalan Revolution and anti-
dictatorial exiles, depicting that opposition as a mere attempt to spread communist influence in 
Central America. This was the case with the correspondence by Guatemalan exiles Adán 
Manrique Rios and José Miranda with the representatives of the American governments who 
were meeting for the Río de Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and 
Security in August and September of 1947. The two exiles held Arévalo’s government 
responsible for aiding opponents of Somoza and Carías and “intervening in the countries of 
Central America.”158 These allegations intersected with the dictators’ goals, for they considered 
regional cooperation to deter support for anti-dictatorial exiles. In February 1944, Carías and 
Laínez first debated “the possibility of approaching” Somoza and other dictators “to persuade 
them to join with the Government of Honduras in bringing to the attention of the Mexican 
Government the activities of certain Central American exiles now in Mexico.”159 By 1945, 
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Somoza and Carías together lobbied other Central American leaders in Costa Rica and El 
Salvador to join conferences and exert diplomatic pressure to discourage Arévalo’s open support 
for anti-Somoza and anti-Carías exiles. They hoped these mechanisms “would cause Arévalo to 
cease his alleged interference with other Central American affairs.”160 For these reasons, 
dissident Guatemalan exiles and Central American dictators came together and put into motion 
the transnational counter-revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution. 
 Pinillos was one of the first exiles to build transnational ties with Central American 
regimes opposed to the Guatemalan Revolution. Upon Ubico’s ousting from power, U.S. 
Ambassador in Guatemala City Boaz Long requested that the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa 
monitor Pinillos upon his leaving Guatemala for Honduras.161 U.S. Ambassador in Tegucigalpa 
John Erwin placed an agent on him who reported that he had called upon Carías on behalf of 
Ponce’s junta. With this information, Erwin met with Laínez. Apparently, Guatemalan Foreign 
Minister Carlos Salazar had “suggested to [Laínez that] a confidential agent of the Guatemalan 
Government be sent to [Tegucigalpa] to ascertain for himself the political conditions” there. 
Furthermore, Erwin noted that Honduran Minister in Guatemala City Luciano Milla Cisneros 
“ha[d] been around with” Pinillos. During a conversation with Erwin, United Fruit Company 
[UFCO] official William Tailion mentioned having invited Pinillos and Cisneros to a UFCO 
event.162 Subsequent reports from Erwin and the Legal Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in 
Guatemala City recreated Pinillos’s time in Guatemala City. Cisneros had reserved Pinillos’s 
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room, Cisneros and Laínez had met with the exile, and he visited many of Carías’s officials.163 In 
exile following Ponce’s removal, he frequently visited the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa to 
discuss regional affairs and deliver reports on Guatemala, as discussed above. 
 While U.S. reports do not provide further insight into Pinillos’s interactions with Carías’s 
regime, other sources reveal the extent to which he nurtured his relations with Honduran, and 
even Nicaraguan, officials during his exile. In Tegucigalpa, he served as a leading propagandist 
against Arévalo’s government. His networking with Honduran officials was even more 
significant. In September 1947, Dominican Chargé d’Affaires in Tegucigalpa Víctor Antonio 
Fernández explained that Pinillos met frequently with Cisneros.164 In another report, Fernández 
described Pinillos as “the leader of the Guatemalan exiles [in Tegucigalpa], keeping up-to-date 
on events” in Guatemala.165 As will be examined in Chapter 3, Pinillos also assisted fellow 
Guatemalan exiles. When questioned about his opposition to Arévalo’s government and claiming 
to have “turned down three requests by Carías to assist in Arévalo’s overthrow,” Somoza showed 
Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Managua Maurice Bernbaum a letter from Pinillos to 
Guatemalan exile colonel Arturo Ramírez.166 Through this combination of anti-communist 
activities and relationships with Honduran officials, Pinillos emerged as an important link 
between Caribbean Basin regimes and dissident Guatemalan exiles. 
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 Along similar lines, Padilla maneuvered between Guatemalan exiles and the region’s 
dictatorial regimes. In Guatemala, he helped organize the abortive March 1945 conspiracy. The 
plot aimed to prevent Arévalo from taking office by bribing the Guatemalan Army, even offering 
Arana $2,000 a month if Arévalo were removed. He served as the principal financier of the 
conspiracy, but Ramírez and others from the Guatemalan Army joined. Though the plot was 
aborted, Arévalo’s government had to suspend constitutional rights in early April during its 
investigations and exile Padilla, Ramírez, and their collaborators.167 Over the next months, 
Padilla remained in contact with Ramírez and general Roderico Anzueto. For almost a year, U.S. 
censors intercepted letters and telephone calls between Padilla and Anzueto, leading U.S. 
officials to believe “plans were definitely afoot for a political coup in Guatemala.”168 By mid-
1945, the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] reported that Padilla’s movement in Guatemala 
was “still intact” but failed to raise the necessary funds to bribe the appropriate military 
officers.169 
 It is likely that these financial difficulties led to Padilla’s lobbying Somoza and Carías for 
assistance. In the summer of 1945, the exile began traveling throughout Central America. In 
May, he met with Somoza, a former editor of Novedades, and members of the Guardia Nacional. 
By June, he claimed to have received support from both Somoza and Carías, yet FBI sources 
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could not confirm this.170 In mid-June, Erwin doubted that either dictator would support 
conspiracies against Arévalo’s government and described such a possibility as “too fantastic for 
credence,” yet the U.S. official who read Erwin’s report sarcastically wrote, “O yeah?”171 The 
next week, Padilla again claimed to have received the dictators’ support, and Somoza welcomed 
20 Guatemalan exiles into Managua.172 U.S. Ambassador in Managua Fletcher Warren 
approached Somoza to discuss Padilla. The dictator “said that he had seen him for a few 
minutes,” Warren reported, but “Somoza did not comment further.” As the ambassador admitted, 
it was “the first time since my arrival [Somoza] has shown any apparent reluctance in discussing 
any matter.”173 As had Erwin when reporting on Carías, Warren believed that Somoza would not 
intervene against Arévalo, though he did not rule out that the dictator was deceiving him.174 In 
early August, Padilla informed an FBI source that, together with another exile, colonel José 
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Enrique Ardón Fernández, and others, he had worked with officers of the Guardia Nacional to 
secure visas and other items for exiles in Managua.175 
 Padilla remained an active conspirator in Central America over the next couple of years. 
In July 1946, he had joined various exiles as part of a conspiracy organized by Jorge Palacios to 
overthrow Arévalo’s government.176 At the end of the year, Padilla, Jorge Toriello, Anzueto’s 
son, and others assisted a conspiracy involving dissidents within the Guatemalan Army.177 As 
opposition groups in Guatemala prepared a march to protest the Labor Code in March 1947, 
Guatemalan Foreign Minister Eugenio Silva Peña approached U.S. officials and showed a 
telegram with information provided by Salvadoran military president-dictator Salvador 
Castaneda Castro. Castaneda “had received reliable information to the effect that Guatemalan 
exiles under the leadership of Padilla in Honduras intended to fly over Guatemala City during the 
manifestation and drop bombs.” Silva Peña then shared another telegram and more reports that 
Luis Coronado Lira had purchased a plane in Honduras with the help of Padilla, so the 
Guatemalan Air Force and Guatemalan Army prepared their forces “to intercept” the plane. First 
Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City Andrew Donovan, as he would during Ponce’s 
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air-bombing conspiracy later the same year, described the plot as “improbable.”178 Over the next 
months, Arana met with Donovan to warn about Padilla’s activities abroad.179 
 Into the end of 1947, Padilla deepened his relationships with fellow exiles and Central 
American regimes but became a nuisance to U.S. officials unable to properly determine the 
extent of the exile’s activities. In August, the State Department warned that he was “now in 
Washington engaging in political maneuvering” and “allegedly acting as a confidential agent” of 
Carías but had not registered with the Foreign Agents Registration Act.180 U.S. Ambassador in 
Tegucigalpa Paul Daniels approached Laínez to investigate the exile’s claims. Not surprisingly, 
Laínez assured Daniels that Carías “himself had told [Laínez] that Padilla was not [Carías’s] 
agent.” Instead, Laínez shifted the blame for Padilla’s activities from the dictator to another of 
Carías’s officials, Fernando Zepeda Durón. According to Laínez, the exile could have 
“receive[d] some payment” from Zepeda Durón, the director of Carías’s newspaper La Época 
and an influential advisor close to Carías.181 Although Daniels could not verify this, he and the 
Office of Central America and Panama Affairs utilized the potential links between Padilla and 
Zepeda Durón and decided it would “probably be right in not encouraging Padilla to visit the 
Department” anymore and treat Padilla “as a completely private individual.”182 
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 Even as the State Department distanced itself from Padilla, reports continued to arrive 
that placed Padilla in the midst of political intrigues against Arévalo’s government. In 
September, U.S. Ambassador in San Salvador Albert Nufer warned that Padilla’s “principal 
associate” in El Salvador was Luis Coronado Lira.183 When Robert Wilson of the Office of 
Central America and Panama Affairs met with Coronado Lira the next month, the exile described 
working with Padilla, Carlos Salazar, Jr., and other exiles while hoping to contact Ponce.184 
Nufer confirmed for Wilson that Coronado Lira and Padilla were networking, but U.S. officials 
did not receive any further information on Padilla until the next year.185 By that time, Coronado 
Lira, possibly through Padilla’s contacts, was already preparing a conspiracy with the assistance 
of Caribbean Basin regimes, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 While U.S. officials’ main attention remained elsewhere, a transnational counter-
revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution had emerged in the Caribbean Basin in the mid-
1940s in the form of networking between dissident Guatemalan exiles and Central American 
dictators Anastasio Somoza and Tiburcio Carías. Tapping into their own worldviews, exiles and 
dictators constructed their anti-Mexican, anti-Soviet, anti-communist ideology to denounce 
reformist projects and anti-dictatorial exiles tied to Arévalo’s Guatemalan government. Whether 
in Ponce’s telegrams, Coronado Lira’s writings, or the dictators’ warnings to U.S. officials, 
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proclamations that the Mexican Revolution, the Soviet Union, and international communism 
dominated Guatemala predated any fears on the part of U.S. officials. With their own ideology, 
exiles such as Pinillos and Padilla traveled throughout Central America, disseminated their ideas, 
influenced plots and conspiracies in Guatemala, and began networking with Central American 
dictators who sought to undermine Arévalo’s government for their own ideological and strategic 
reasons. As will be seen in Chapters 4 through 7, the transnational forces behind the exiles’ 
maneuverings would continue into the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the meantime, the exiles 
would soon take advantage of another regional conflict in the Caribbean Basin and find in the 




III. Chapter 2: Rafael Trujillo and the Guatemalan Revolution, 1944-1947 
 In January 1948, Rudy Unger Colorao with the Dominican Film Company in Ciudad 
Trujillo wrote to the Assignment Director for Paramount News with Paramount Pictures, E. P. 
Genock. Arévalo over the past year had not only broken relations with the Dominican 
dictatorship but assisted a group of anti-Trujillo exiles in an abortive coup to topple the despot. 
By mid-1947, Trujillo’s regime in newspapers and radio throughout the Caribbean Basin 
denounced these efforts as the products of international communism. To bolster this propaganda 
campaign, Dominican officials such as Unger were now turning to film. Speaking for Paramount 
News, Genock asked Unger to “advise urgently what pictures can be secured in the [Dominican] 
Republic at this time and what preparations are being made to prevent [a] Communist invasion 
of your Republic.”186 By February, Unger was ready to expand the campaign.187 Akin to Somoza 
and Carías, Trujillo had come to oppose the Guatemalan Revolution. 
 This chapter utilizes the emergence of a regional conflict between Dominican dictator 
Rafael Trujillo, Arévalo’s government, and anti-Trujillo exiles and groups in the mid-1940s as a 
case study into how a Caribbean Basin dictator emerged as a vocal, self-proclaimed anti-
communist opponent of the Guatemalan Revolution. Following a policy of imperialismo 
dominicano [Dominican imperialism], Dominican officials throughout the Caribbean Basin 
confronted propaganda, exiles, and governments opposed to the dictatorship and denounced all 
such opposition as communist-inspired. In the first years of the Revolution, the dictator and his 
officials grew steadily frustrated as the Guatemalan people allowed the dissemination of anti-
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Trujillo propaganda and Arévalo drew close to Venezuela’s democratic leader and critic of the 
despot, Rómulo Betancourt. When Arévalo in 1947 suspended diplomatic relations with the 
regime and aided an expedition of anti-Trujillo exiles who attempted to overthrow the dictator, 
the despot began to charge Arévalo’s government as communist-inspired, guilty for supporting a 
‘brigada internacional comunista [international communist brigade],’ and a threat to inter-
American stability. 
 Following the inter-American trail, this chapter departs from traditional examinations of 
U.S.-Latin American relations to reveal how the dictator’s regime devoted attention and 
resources toward transnational points of contact throughout the Caribbean Basin that included 
anti-Trujillo exiles, students, journalists, politicians, and governments. Recent works on the 
despot continue to explore how he inserted himself throughout the country’s life, but little has 
been done to examine how his influence or goals spread beyond the borders of the Dominican 
Republic.188 Instead, research on Dominican foreign relations during his reign has focused on 
Dominican-U.S. relations due to Trujillo’s presenting his anti-communist dictatorship as 
compatible with U.S. Cold War-oriented policies in Latin America.189 Although a handful of 
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works have begun to analyze his foreign policy toward Haiti, Venezuela, and Cuba, there is no 
work on Dominican-Guatemalan, Dominican-Caribbean, Dominican-Central American, or 
Dominican-Latin American relations.190 Additionally, scholarship on the 1947 anti-Trujillo plot 
from Cuba spearheaded by Dominican exiles, known as the Cayo Confites expedition, has not 
assessed how the dictator responded to the links between anti-Trujillo exiles and governments or 
how the expedition influenced regional affairs in the Caribbean Basin.191 
 In examining inter-American relations in the Caribbean Basin in the mid-1940s, this 
chapter expands upon the concept of imperialismo dominicano, mentioned in 1949 by the Cuban 
government of Carlos Prío Socarrás and briefly noted in Eliades Acosta Matos’s La Telaraña 
cubana de Trujillo [The Cuban Spider Web of Trujillo], to describe how the dictator sought to 
influence Cuban affairs.192 Thanks to previously-untapped sources on his foreign policy, my 
purpose is to illustrate how the Dominican regime attempted to influence affairs not merely in 
Cuba but throughout the Caribbean Basin. As imperialismo dominicano targeted Guatemala, 
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Trujillo did what the other regional dictators contemplated, with identical arguments and 
justifications: the regional conflict between Trujillo and Arévalo, for the former, signified an 
international struggle that conflated anti-dictatorial and anti-fascist opposition as communist 
threats to his regime and to regional stability, best preserved by his own hegemony. Thus, these 
Caribbean Basin affairs followed their own logic independent of the superpowers’ emerging 
tensions during the Cold War. 
 
A. Rafael Trujillo and Imperialismo Dominicano in the Caribbean Basin 
 Imperialismo dominicano had several dimensions. Although the dictator repressed most 
sources of opposition within the country, he and his officials closely monitored anti-Trujillo 
exiles’ activities and propaganda elsewhere. At the end of the Second World War, these exiles 
tapped into anti-fascist ideals and networked with allies, as in Venezuela, to criticize the regime. 
With increased criticism emanating from transnational networks in the Caribbean Basin, the 
dictator’s officials escalated their attempts to suppress such groups. 
 In the Dominican Republic, Trujillo’s regime relied upon a combination of state-
sponsored force and cultural coercion, well-documented in the historical literature and by various 
memoirs. Numerous works, especially first-hand accounts from the dictator’s own officials, 
identify how the dictator utilized his control over the Dominican military, employment of a 
police force, and brutal methods of assassination and torture to eliminate opponents, silence the 
Dominican press, and construct one of the most sadistic dictatorships in the Caribbean Basin 
from the 1930s to the early 1960s.193 Foreign observers agreed with such accounts. In 1945, U.S. 
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Ambassador in Ciudad Trujillo Ellis Briggs outlined, “The foundation of Trujillo’s 
administration has been and remains fear.”194 Additionally, Trujillo’s influence went beyond 
force. As narrated by Richard Lee Turits, Ignacio López-Calvo, and Lauren Derby, the dictator 
also utilized the Dominican state to build a personalistic political party, construct numerous busts 
and monuments in his name, rename ‘Santo Domingo’ as ‘Ciudad Trujillo,’ and implant himself 
into the everyday fabric of Dominican life. British Ambassador in Ciudad Trujillo Russell 
Duncan Macrae in 1947 neatly summarized, “Trujillo feels that he is the State and the interests 
of the country are his interests.”195 
 Abroad, the regime expended great effort to undermine anti-Trujillo exiles. U.S. and 
British officials, alongside Dominican exiles, recognized that opposition abroad posed the 
greatest challenge to the dictator’s reign while acknowledging the weaknesses facing groups 
based in the Dominican Republic. Noting the effectiveness of the dictator’s repression, one U.S. 
official explained, “The suppressive measures of the Government are carried out with such 
energy and vigilance that it appears almost certain that the opposition can achieve nothing in the 
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Republic.” Those few active opposition groups sought merely “to create incidents which attract 
outside attention to conditions existing [in the Dominican Republic] with the hope that foreign 
pressure may be brought to bear which will cause the withdrawal of the persons now in control 
of the Dominican Republic.”196 Consequently, the most effective opposition groups organized 
and networked outside the country. Despite the absence of a comprehensive examination of the 
dictator’s persecution of his opponents abroad, exiles’ testimonies and memoirs recount his 
ceaseless efforts to eliminate them wherever they went in the Americas.197 His officials and spies 
persecuted exiles such as Juan Bosch, Ángel Morales, José Antonio Bonilla Atiles, and others, 
culminating in the murders and disappearances of Mauricio Báez, Andrés Requena, José 
Almoina Mateos, and Jesús de Galíndez.198 The exiles’ resilience only seemed to justify the 
dictator’s acts. When Macrae reported that Trujillo had “no fear of internal revolution,” another 
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British official responded with the question, “because possibly all the likely revolutionaries are 
abroad?”199 
 Due to the dictator’s fixation on such transnational threats to his regime, his officials 
followed a policy of imperialismo dominicano in the Caribbean Basin designed to suppress 
exiles while monitoring governments that tolerated them. The best way to discern imperialismo 
dominicano’s work and scope is to look at the sources that defined it. A one-time official under 
Trujillo, José Almoina Mateos fled into exile and in September 1947 sent a memorandum on the 
despot’s foreign policy to Caribbean Basin governments, including Cuba, Mexico, the United 
States, and Venezuela.200 Almoina pleaded that Trujillo represented “an evident and constant 
threat to peace and security” in the Caribbean Basin, for the dictator’s “monarchical-absolutist 
government” shaped the regime’s “reactions and goals abroad.” For this reason, the exile wished 
to warn the region’s governments of the “danger” of Trujillo’s “actions that spill over, with 
absolute and irrefutable reality, the geographic-political borders of the Dominican Republic.” In 
over 90 pages, Almoina’s report detailed how the dictator supported dissidents who organized 
invasion conspiracies and newspapers against the Venezuelan government of Rómulo Betancourt 
and Acción Democrática [Democratic Action], paid off Cuban journalists and labor leaders to 
criticize and challenge the government of Ramón Grau San Martín and the Auténticos 
[Authentics], built a favorable lobby in the United States and accused anti-Trujillo politicians 
such as Spruille Braden of being “in favor of communism,” financed newspapers in Colombia to 
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combat ex-president and anti-Trujillo activist Eduardo Santos, financed pro-Trujillo and anti-
Cárdenas articles in Mexico, and supported coup and assassination attempts in Haiti.201 Other 
targets represented the bastions of the exiles’ support; Venezuela’s Betancourt, Cuba’s 
Auténticos, Colombia’s Santos, Mexico’s Cárdenas, and the United States’s Braden all offered 
asylum to exiles, refused to close critical publications, and denounced the dictator. Imperialismo 
dominicano thus sought to trump transnational anti-Trujillo networks. 
 Though focused upon Dominican-Cuban relations, Cuban officials in December 1949 
defined Trujillo’s foreign policy in terms similar to those employed by Almoina. Increasingly 
strained relations between the two nations had led the Auténtico government to discuss the 
dictator’s foreign policy toward not only Cuba but the region as a whole. In the resulting 
analysis, the despot’s “interventionist” and “aggressive” foreign policy sought to establish 
“imperialismo dominicano” throughout the Caribbean Basin, for the dictator “direct[ed] his 
efforts to raising and supporting in neighboring countries the development of fixed political, 
military, and social conditions that would guarantee the dictatorial Trujillista regime and permit 
the Dominican Republic to carry out a predominant role in the Caribbean Basin.” Referencing 
Almoina’s memorandum, Cuban officials highlighted the despot’s payments to journalists, 
subsidies to newspapers, bribing politicians, hiring lobbyists, and deploying spies. The Auténtico 
government also warned that Trujillo “accus[ed anti-Trujillo] Governments of supporting the 
expansion of communism in America” in order “to undermine the prestige of Governments 
ideologically” opposed to the dictator. He supported “conspiracies” against “neighboring 
republics” in the hope of encouraging “governments of a type akin to that of” his own. In an 
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“obligated” form of gratitude, such governments would support the dictator by “avoiding abroad 
conspiracies designed to overthrow Trujillo,” contribute to “favorable interests for the 
Dominican Republic,” and “establish the influence of the dictator in those countries.”202 
 The Second World War, however, challenged Trujillo’s foreign policy. Throughout Latin 
America, anti-dictatorial groups drew inspiration from the international conflict, as Ubico, 
Somoza, and Carías had discovered in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras.203 In his 
memorandum, Almoina noted that the United Nations and liberal governments interpreted the 
regime alongside other “dictatorships still in existence [in the Americas] as an effect of the 
historic cycle” of Latin American dictatorships that had come to an end.204 Briggs emphasized in 
the conflict’s aftermath that “Trujillo [was] a dictator, indifferent to or even hostile to many of 
the fundamental principles for which [the United States] stands” and a blatant hypocrite when he 
“ha[d] declared himself to be ‘on [the United States’] side’ in this war.”205 Although their 
activities dated back to the 1930s, anti-Trujillo exiles summoned the Second World War to 
buttress their propaganda and networking. Despite the dictator’s best attempts at “convincing the 
outside world that a democracy exist[ed]” in the Dominican Republic, the “Partido Dominicano 
Revolucionario [Revolutionary Dominican Party],” the “Unión Democrática [Democratic 
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Union],” labor organizations in La Romana and Puerto Plata, and other groups repeatedly cited 
the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and anti-fascism to bolster their denunciations.206 
 The regime took notice that the Second World War strengthened anti-Trujillo exiles’ 
networking in the Caribbean Basin. Dominican officials abroad devoted numerous files solely to 
newspaper articles, speeches, and pamphlets produced by these opponents in the mid-1940s. In 
Cuba, the “Unión Democrática Antinazista Dominicana [Dominican Anti-Nazi Democratic 
Union]” published América contra Trujillo [America against Trujillo].207 From Bogotá, the 
“Comité Colombiano Universitario Pro-Democracia en la República Dominicana [Colombian 
University Committee Pro-Democracy in the Dominican Republic]” denounced “nazitrujillismo 
[nazi-Trujillismo].”208 The “Partido Revolucionario Dominicano [Dominican Revolutionary 
Party]” printed La Historia del hombre que se proclamó igual a Dios [The History of the Man 
who Proclaimed Himself Equal to God], which mocked the dictator’s motto, “God and 
Trujillo.”209 The “Asociación de Estudiantes Hispanoamericanos en México [Association of 
Hispanic American Students in Mexico]” drew in delegates from Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Spain, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela and 
republished anti-Trujillo propaganda such as En Lucha contra Trujillo [Fighting against 
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Trujillo].210 Bosch and other exiles published Quisqueya Libre [Free Dominican Republic] from 
Havana and included articles from anti-Trujillo groups, leaders, and exiles throughout Latin 
America.211 Foreign observers often commented on how the proliferation of anti-fascist ideals 
and opposition groups’ networking irritated the dictator. Within the Dominican Republic, Briggs 
in mid-1944 believed, “Trujillo’s present preoccupation and repressive measures are doubtless 
not disconnected from concern over recent political disturbances in other countries, notably El 
Salvador, Ecuador, Cuba[,] and currently in Guatemala.”212 As had his British counterpart, 
Briggs located “no immediate prospect (barring the possibility of assassination) of Trujillo’s 
overthrow,” yet the official identified a “considerable and apparently growing sensitiveness of 
Trujillo in the face of the anti-Trujillo campaign of Dominican exiles, especially in Venezuela 
and Cuba, and of the Dominican Government’s concern at the espousal of the exiles’ cause by 
liberal elements in these and other countries.”213 British officials also reported that the 
networking between Dominican exiles and Venezuelan officials to lobby Caribbean Basin 
governments to break relations with the regime caused considerable “stress” upon the dictator’s 
foreign policy.214 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Asociación de Estudiantes Hispanoamericanos en México, En Lucha contra Trujillo, México, 
enero 1945, AGN, SERREE, Caja IT 2903226, Expediente “1945, Código 5/c.” 
211 There is no complete collection of Quisqueya Libre, but one can find copies in the “Colección 
Bernardo Vega” through the Archivo General de la Nación in Santo Domingo, a partial bounded 
collection at the Biblioteca Nacional de Cuba José Martí in Havana, and a partial bounded 
collection at the Biblioteca del Instituto de Historia de Cuba in Havana. 
212 Ellis O. Briggs to Secretary of State, A-297, Ciudad Trujillo, 27 June 1944, NARAII, RG84, 
“Dominican Republic, U.S. Embassy and U.S. Consulate, Santo Domingo, Classified General 
Records, 1944-1961” (hereafter US Embassy Santo Domingo), Box 2. 
213 Ellis O. Briggs to Secretary of State, No. 609, Ciudad Trujillo, 03 January 1945, NARAII, 
RG84, DRSCF, Box 1. 
214 No. 115 “Dominican-Guatemalan Relations,” Guatemala City, 17 July 1947, NAL, FO371, 
File “60868: Relations between Guatemala and the Dominican Republic.” 
 
 79 
 The networking between Dominican exiles and Venezuelan leaders especially unnerved 
Trujillo. A longtime opponent of the dictator, Rómulo Betancourt and his Acción Democrática 
party nurtured close relationships with many Dominican exiles such as Bosch.215 As a result, 
Betancourt and Acción Democrática’s rise to power in Venezuela in 1945 provided a haven for 
anti-Trujillo activism. Although Betancourt’s government ceaselessly attacked the Dominican 
dictator’s image from 1945 onward, events in 1944 already preoccupied the despot. In 1944, 
Dominican exiles in Caracas led by Buenaventura Sánchez lobbied Venezuelan political leaders 
to organize the “Comité de Amigos de Santo Domingo [Committee of Friends of Santo 
Domingo].” As Deputy Rosales Aranguren proclaimed before the Venezuelan congress, “The 
cause of Santo Domingo is not a cause of a group of Dominicans, nor of a group of Venezuelans, 
but an American cause.”216 Seizing upon the Second World War, Senator Jóvito Villalba 
explained that the Comité would “begin pursuing an extensive campaign for the application of 
the Four Freedoms of the Atlantic Charter in Santo Domingo.” Venezuelan political leaders in 
the Comité lectured on Venezuela’s “being a signatory to the Atlantic Charter,” expressed 
support for anti-fascist movements in Guatemala and elsewhere, and denounced the regime.217 
The efforts of Dominican exiles through such transnational organizations as the Comité climaxed 
when the Venezuelan congress demanded breaking diplomatic relations with the dictator. 
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 Transnational activism directly contributed to an escalation in Trujillo’s foreign policy in 
the mid-1940s. After the Venezuelan congress repudiated relations with the regime, Dominican 
Secretary of State for Foreign Relations Manuel Peña Batlle issued a “strictly confidential” 
circular to all Dominican officials abroad that drew together many of the elements which 
Almoina and Cuban officials linked to imperialismo dominicano. Peña Batlle outlined a list of 
objectives for Dominican officials to pursue that would defend the dictator’s image and regime 
in the face of rising criticism. At the top of the list, Peña Batlle ordered officials to “impede 
similar events [i.e. the Venezuelan congress’s denouncing diplomatic relations] from being 
produced in the country of your jurisdiction” and “observe as much as possible the activities of 
the so-called Dominican exiles.” To combat the growing number of anti-Trujillo transnational 
networks, officials also needed to “try to expand further the links your mission maintains with 
the country’s press where you are accredited.”218 
 Officials quickly attempted to realize Peña Batlle’s orders. In Havana, they hired 
Venezuelan exile doctor José Vicente Pepper. Pepper produced numerous books and articles, 
many of which were featured quite prominently in Dominican newspapers, that denounced the 
allegedly communist activities of Betancourt’s government. On the despot’s payroll, the doctor 
published the bilingual book Yo Acuso a Braden [I Accuse Braden] that labeled Braden a Soviet 
and communist agent after the U.S. official vocally denounced Trujillo’s regime.219 As part of 
his employment, Pepper received payments from the regime as a spy and maneuvered between 
Dominican officials and fellow Venezuelan exiles. Through the doctor, Trujillo sent various 
sums of money to purchase armaments as part of conspiracies to overthrow Betancourt’s 
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government.220 The regime also hired Cuban journalist José Arroyo Maldonado who worked 
with La Prensa Asociada, the Associated Press’s arm in Latin America. Officials provided 
Arroyo Maldonado with as much as $1,500 a month to prevent anti-Trujillo articles from 
appearing abroad and to counteract propaganda from prominent Dominican exiles or Cuban 
officials.221 Into the late 1940s, officials financed the activities and conspiracies of Pepper, 
Arroyo Maldonado, and various Caribbean Basin journalists, exiles, and officials as the means to 
deter anti-Trujillo activism and undermine opposing governments. 
 
B. Trujillo and the Guatemalan Revolution 
 Because of Trujillo’s policy of imperialismo dominicano, the Guatemalan Revolution 
caught the attention from Dominican officials. After the first year, many Guatemalans openly 
networked with anti-Trujillo activists, newspapers published numerous articles critical of the 
dictator, and Arévalo began a close relationship with fellow democratic leader Betancourt. 
Repeatedly, Dominican Ambassador in Guatemala City Roberto Despradel reported on the 
transnational links between Arévalo, Guatemalans, and anti-Trujillo groups and leaders. By the 
end of 1946, the ambassador found himself unable to realize Peña Batlle’s orders or expand 
imperialismo dominicano in Guatemala. Fearing Arévalo planned to break diplomatic relations 
with the regime, Despradel came to define the Guatemalan government as communist. 
 The ambassador initially forwarded to Ciudad Trujillo many of the complaints given by 
opponents of the Guatemalan Revolution but did not believe that Guatemalan affairs were 
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directed by Mexican, Soviet, or international communists. Like his U.S. counterparts, Despradel 
understood that the Revolution was linked to anti-dictatorial movements and anti-fascist ideals in 
the Caribbean Basin. In December 1944, he claimed “ideologues that turn a blind eye to reality” 
had initiated a conflict throughout Central America with Guatemala as the center of “the 
incessant revolutionary propaganda.”222 Though anxious about anti-dictatorial and anti-fascist 
sentiments, he showed little concern about the Revolution. Reporting on the activities of 
Mexican Ambassador in Guatemala City Romeo Ortega and visits of Lombardo Toledano, he 
concluded the Revolution was for them an international movement against “the dictators and 
tyrants of America.”223 Unlike Nicaraguan and Honduran officials, Despradel never defined 
Guatemala as a source of communist activities. He joined other Dominican officials in criticizing 
the rupture of diplomatic relations between Guatemala and Francisco Franco’s Spain and took 
note of the activities of Nicaraguan and Honduran exiles in Guatemala.224 He reported 
Guatemalan conservatives’ rumors of links between Moscow and alleged Guatemalan 
communists and fears that “Russia [would] build a Legation or Embassy in Central America with 
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a base in Guatemala” for Stalin to play “a great role in the political future” of Guatemala.225 
While reporting these developments, from October 1944 into mid-1945 he never denounced the 
Revolution as the product of Mexican, Soviet, or international communism. 
 Beginning in August 1945, Despradel began to show some concern as Guatemala 
emerged as a focal point for anti-Trujillo propaganda. Indeed, the summer of 1945 appeared to 
mark a rise in transnational anti-dictatorial activism in the country. In a report titled “Attacks on 
the Dominican Government,” he explained that Colombian ex-president Eduardo Santos 
continued employing his newspaper Tiempo in Bogotá to publish anti-Trujillo articles and 
recently met in Caracas with “enemies of the Dominican Government.” From Venezuela, Santos 
traveled to Guatemala to meet “with Arévalo and with some Nicaraguan and Honduran enemies 
of their respective governments.” As the Colombian leader remained a very reputable anti-
Trujillo activist, Despradel understood that this networking in Guatemala would target not only 
Somoza and Carías but the Dominican dictator as well. At the end of August he had not found 
any anti-Trujillo articles but “feared that soon a widespread campaign [would] begin.”226 The 
ambassador concluded his report by quoting a recent speech by Arévalo in which the 
Guatemalan president tapped into the anti-fascist ideals of the Second World War: 
The war has ended. The Allies have paid a terrible price in blood, life, and resources to 
defend liberty in all the countries of the world. Now begins the second phase of this great 
war with the purpose of assuring that those sacrifices will not have been in vain and to 
implant the democratic ideal in all nations. Particularly our America should not consent 
to the existence of totalitarian regimes under a democratic disguise. Guatemala has the 
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first democratic government in its history. We hope to soon see the same privilege reach 
other American lands that wish for it.227 
Despradel found a receptive audience in Peña Batlle who also understood that Arévalo’s 
criticisms applied to Trujillo. 228 
 Despradel’s analysis was quite prescient. In October, Guatemalan newspapers started to 
publish various anti-Trujillo articles, duly forwarded by the ambassador.229 In September, 
Arévalo invited Braden following the U.S. official’s public recriminations against Latin 
American dictatorships. Despradel naturally worried that the visit was to cement a U.S.-
Guatemalan shared position behind “the anti-dictatorial policies” of Arévalo’s government.230 In 
compliance with Peña Batlle’s orders, the ambassador wrote letters to Guatemalan newspaper 
editors to discourage anti-Trujillo writings and present the dictator as a democratic leader. In one 
such letter sent to the editor of Guatemala’s Mediodía, Despradel complained that the newspaper 
over the past month had widely disseminated critical anti-Trujillo writings, such as “Casos y 
Cosas, Movimiento Continental contra los Tiranos [Cases and Things, Continental Movements 
against Tyrants],” “Panorama, Los días de los Tiranos están Contados [Panorama, The Days of 
the Tyrants Are Numbered],” and “Casos y Cosas, Los Cosas de Trujillo [Cases and Things, The 
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Things of Trujillo].” Particularly resented, one article merely reprinted a cable to Braden 
championing his anti-dictatorial position.231 
 In the aftermath of similar events in Venezuela, Despradel believed Arévalo and his 
government sought to break diplomatic relations with Trujillo’s regime. In July 1944, Peña 
Batlle had ordered Dominican officials to prevent calls for suspending relations with the 
Dominican Republic. Less than a year and a half later, the Guatemalan Ambassador in Ciudad 
Trujillo departed, and Despradel fretfully commented that Arévalo’s government hesitated to 
send a new representative. By October 1945, he believed that “Arévalo and his friends [were] 
considering the proposition of not maintaining relations with the governments marked as 
dictatorships.”232 In a rather roundabout manner, Despradel attempted to allay his superiors’ 
concerns. He highlighted that numerous groups of exiles, students, journalists, workers, and 
politicians lobbied Arévalo’s government to end diplomatic relations with the Nicaraguan and 
Honduran dictatorships as well. As a result, he explained, “[the Guatemalan] government would 
not be able to break relations with [Trujillo’s regime] without breaking relations with the 
governments of Carías and Somoza, due to obligations to the student mass and the refugees of 
those two countries.”233 Acknowledging the tensions created by transnational groups of students 
and exiles, the ambassador hoped that Arévalo’s government would not unilaterally end relations 
with three dictatorships simultaneously. 
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 Only in 1946 did Despradel begin to describe Arévalo’s government as communist. 
Based upon the Dominican ambassador’s reports, such claims stemmed in large part from the 
growing friendship between Arévalo and Betancourt, the anti-Trujillo Venezuelan leader whom 
Dominican officials denounced as a communist. In the first of various reports on the matter, 
Despradel found that Arévalo in May 1946 began to speak very favorably of Betancourt and 
received Venezuelan officials with “much enthusiasm.”234 At this point, he wrote to Trujillo 
personally in order to recount his efforts to undermine this relationship. During a diplomatic 
event, the ambassador took to the side Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Relations Eugenio Silva 
Peña and proceeded to lecture him on the “political incompetence of Arévalo.” Despradel’s 
words evoked the same fears of his Nicaraguan and Honduran counterparts when speaking of the 
“free hand that [Arévalo gave] to the communists” in Guatemala.235 Arévalo soon invited 
Betancourt to visit Guatemala, convincing Despradel that the two democratic leaders were 
conspiring to spread communism. In a report to Peña Batlle, the ambassador remarked at length 
on the characteristics of the “two governments of a communist form . . . in Guatemala and 
Venezuela.”236 During his visit at the end of July 1946, Betancourt joined Arévalo in giving 
speeches that criticized the dictatorial government in the Dominican Republic, a seeming 
coordination of the two countries’ foreign policies against Trujillo. Despradel alleged that the 
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Venezuelan president had turned a diplomatic meeting with Arévalo into a “communist meeting” 
and a veritable “diplomatic boycott” against Trujillo’s regime.237 
 In August 1946, the rumor about Arévalo’s plans to break diplomatic relations with the 
regime reached Costa Rica when Dominican Ambassador in San José César Tolentino forwarded 
information from a reliable source.238 In the middle of a handful of cables and reports between 
Tolentino, Peña Batlle, and Despradel, Despradel had to interject that the Guatemalan foreign 
minister had assured him that such news was “untrue.”239 Still, doubts continued. A week after 
disputing the rumor, he noted the possibility that Arévalo would send a Guatemalan chargé 
d’affaires to Ciudad Trujillo who had studied “communism in Mexico, under the direction of the 
great Bolshevik ambassador [Constantine] Oumansky.” All Despradel could do was report that 
Trujillo’s regime had shown great patience and respect to Arévalo’s government without any 
“reciprocity.”240 
 
C. Arévalo Breaks Diplomatic Relations with Trujillo and Cayo Confites as the 
‘Brigada Internacional Comunista’ 
 In mid-1947, the Dominican dictator joined Somoza and Carías in openly charging 
Arévalo’s government and the Revolution as communist-dominated and threats to inter-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Roberto Despradel a Manuel A. Peña Batlle, No. 263 “Asunto: Informe político y 
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“3348: Oficios y Correspondencia, 1950.” 
238 Manuel A. Peña Batlle a Rafael Trujillo, 21607 “Asunto: Información suministrada al 
Embajador Tolentino acerca de posible actitud,” Ciudad Trujillo, 14 agosto 1946, AGN, 
SERREE, Caja IT 2903348, Legajo “3348: Oficios y Correspondencia, 1950.” 
239 Manuel A. Peña Batlle a Rafael Trujillo, 21885 “Asunto: Información suministrada al 
Embajador Tolentino acerca de posible actitud,” Ciudad Trujillo, 16 agosto 1946, AGN, 
SERREE, Caja IT 2903348, Legajo “3348: Oficios y Correspondencia, 1950.” 
240 Roberto Despradel a Manuel A. Peña Batlle, Ciudad de Guatemala, 21 agosto 1946, AGN, 
SERREE, Caja IT 2903348, Legajo “3348: Oficios y Correspondencia, 1950.” 
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American stability. When Arévalo suspended relations and assisted anti-Trujillo exiles during the 
Cayo Confites expedition, Dominican officials claimed the president sought to undermine 
regional solidarity. From mid-1947 onward, the Dominican dictator and his officials identified 
Arévalo and the Revolution as sources of communist infiltration in the Caribbean Basin. 
 Anti-fascism motivated Arévalo’s decision to suspend relations. Indeed, Arévalo utilized 
the so-called May 1947 ‘elections’ in the Dominican Republic to realize Despradel’s fear. A few 
weeks after the elections, Arévalo informed Guatemalan Foreign Minister Eugenio Silva Peña 
that the Guatemalan government did not wish to continue relations with Trujillo’s regime. The 
president cited his 1945 speech on the Second World War’s legacy and repeated that “democracy 
[was] not in danger only in Europe nor [was] defended only on the battlefield.” He described the 
May 1947 ‘elections’ in the Dominican Republic as akin to other “electoral farces,” “the worst 
type of coup d’état that a Government can deal against the free will of its people,” and 
“signif[ying] that the republic principle of alternability in power has been sadly adulterated.” 
Arévalo respected the principle of non-intervention and swore to “not intervene in the internal 
life of friendly countries, however grave the acts may be” there, but he claimed that “the 
American Republics, sworn to the defense of democracy, [were] not obligated to grant their 
friendship to Governments which in this America have exchanged the republican forms of 
government for monarchal [sic] forms.”241 
 Dominican officials moved quickly to refute Arévalo’s claims and characterize the 
Guatemalan president as a communist agent. Immediately, they conflated Arévalo and 
Betancourt as communist leaders who threatened inter-American stability. In the weeks after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Juan José Arévalo to Eugenio Silva Peña, Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Relations, 
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09 July 1947, NARAII, RG84, US Embassy Santo Domingo, Box 14. 
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Arévalo’s words were made public, Secretary of State for Foreign Relations Arturo Despradel 
assured Trujillo, “It is evident that the attitude of Guatemala, of course, surely, with the 
Government of Venezuela, is designed to try to prove that we represent an inconvenience for the 
harmony and unity that define the fraternal coexistence of the peoples and governments of this 
Continent.”242 He dismissed those democratic leaders’ charges against imperialismo dominicano. 
As had his brother in Guatemala City, he claimed that the suspension of diplomatic relations by 
Guatemala and Venezuela were “absolutely unilateral acts.”243 Repeatedly, the brothers alleged 
that Arévalo and Betancourt’s governments actions were “unjustifiable positions” that were 
“contrary to all the norms and principles that govern the foreign relations” of Latin American 
governments.244 
 This was the same script used by Dominican officials in public announcements in the 
United States, Great Britain, and Latin America. In this version, the severance of diplomatic 
relations “ha[d] not caused, however, any feeling of surprise, to the Dominican Government, 
owing to the knowledge which for some time the Dominican Government has had of [Arévalo’s] 
demagogic tendencies and of his efforts to guide the policies of his Government by the 
communistic ideology which he personally professes.”245 Dominican officials, as did their 
Nicaraguan and Honduran counterparts, warned that Arévalo’s policies threatened regional 
security in the Caribbean Basin. Trujillo interpreted the president’s action as evidence of “the 
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245 Dominican Republic Foreign Office, “Official Announcement,” 18 July 1947, with Julio 
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interest of President Arévalo in interrupting the rhythim [sic] of collective harmony and in 
breaking the unity which consolidates the peoples and the Government of the Americas, united 
in their democratic ideals.”246 Even the rhetoric of the Second World War was turned around to 
question Arévalo’s actions. Whereas Arévalo had recounted the anti-fascist ideals behind the 
international conflict, Dominican officials tried to highlight inter-American and global solidarity. 
“While the majority of the peoples and Governments of the American nations actively favor the 
unity and rehabilitation of devastated Europe,” they wrote, the president’s actions were a 
“deplorable contrast to these noble objectives” and aimed “to undermine and to break the unity 
and solidarity which serve as the very foundation of the peaceful living-together of the peoples 
of this Hemisphere.”247 
 Some of the dictator’s worst fears soon were realized. While ending diplomatic relations, 
Arévalo joined Betancourt and Cuba’s Auténticos in supporting a group of exiles, organized by 
anti-Trujillo leaders, in an expedition to overthrow the dictator. Alongside Honduran, 
Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Spanish exiles, Dominican exiles under Bosch, Juan ‘Juancito’ 
Rodríguez, and Miguel Ángel Ramírez received money, armaments, and more from Arévalo, 
Betancourt, the Auténticos, Cuban students, and the Haitian government under Dumarsais 
Estimé. Ultimately, the exiles came into possession of dozens of machine guns, 200 submachine 
guns, hundreds of pistols and bombs, bazookas, mortars, anti-tank guns, 7 ships, and 16 planes. 
At Cayo Confites in Cuba, they prepared an expedition that aimed to coordinate land and aerial 
invasions of the Dominican Republic with internal uprisings that would oust Trujillo. The exiles’ 
efforts took center stage in the Cuban press in mid-July, prompting Dominican officials’ protests. 
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Facing a public conflict that jeopardized regional stability, U.S. officials discouraged Cuban 
officials’ support, bringing the coup to an abortive end in September 1947.248 
 In internal and public communications, Trujillo and Dominican officials defined the Cayo 
Confites expedition as a “brigada internacional comunista.” Spies that infiltrated the expedition 
revealed Arévalo’s assistance. At the end of July, the International News Service quoted 
Dominican Ambassador in Washington Julio Ortega Frier stating that “3,000 ‘Communist 
revolutionaries’ plan[ned] to use Cuba as a base for an invasion of the Dominican Republic.”249 
This claim then appeared in various newspapers, including one from The Florida Times-
Union.250 Ortega Frier later sent to Arturo Despradel a translation of an October 16 article from 
Washington’s The Evening Star.251 In the article, Stephen Trumbull interviewed Dominican exile 
Ángel Morales who described the popular transnational support for the expedition originating 
from Cuban students.252 Trumbull never described any members of the Cayo Confites expedition 
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as communists, but Dominican officials were quick to label the coup as an international 
communist conspiracy. In his own response, Dominican Secretary of State Telésforo Calderón 
confirmed receiving the materials on the “Brigada Internacional.”253 Dominican Minister in 
Washington Joaquín Salazar forwarded a translation of an October 1 editorial in The Washington 
Post on the Cayo Confites expedition, questioning its downplaying of communism in the 
region.254 Indeed, the writer warned “it would be an improper and crass simplification of Latin 
American politics to assume that all resentment against Trujillo has communist inspiration” and 
that “it would be foolish to give credit, without more evidence, to the allegations of Trujillo that 
the conspiracy was purely communist.”255 Salazar reassured Trujillo that this mischaracterization 
would be soon refuted.256 
 Salazar understated such efforts. Dominican officials had already begun to utilize their 
contacts in the Caribbean Basin press to recast the public image of the Cayo Confites expedition 
and Arévalo’s role, reflecting those techniques identified by Almoina and Cuban officials as part 
of Trujillo’s policy of imperialismo dominicano. The head of the Dominican Information Center 
in Miami and New York City, Harry Klemfuss, prepared press releases and bulletins for news 
agencies in the United States and elsewhere. In these statements, he emphasized the “800 
communist-led revolutionists” and described the Cayo Confites expedition as a “Dominican 
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invasion by communists and self-exiled Dominicans,” often manually editing those drafts.257 By 
October 1, the press agent informed Ortega Frier: “We are making every use of our newspaper 
contacts to insure a favorable and friendly reaction from the press.”258 Dominican officials also 
employed Caribbean journalists on Trujillo’s payroll. Arroyo Maldonado of Prensa Asociada 
was a prime agent for the sponsored campaign. Prensa Asociada items were broadcast in Latin 
America as well as in the English version of the Associated Press. The Times-Picayune’s 
headline read as, “Arévalo accused of providing the weapons; The Heads of the ‘invasion’ 
accuse the ‘lunatics’ for the failure.”259 In November, Dominican Consul in San Francisco José 
Aybar “personally informed” the editor of the San Francisco Chronicle, Scott Newhall, that the 
Dominican government “possessed irrefutable proof that the failed invasion of an adventurous 
brigada comunista militarily trained” at Cayo Confites was organized by Arévalo and Betancourt 
and represented “a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere.”260 This concerted effort 
relentlessly invoked inter-American stability against alien communist conspiracies. 
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 Not surprisingly, Dominican officials’ incessant remarks that Arévalo’s government 
represented a communist threat to inter-American solidarity intersected not only with Caribbean 
Basin dictatorships but with a transnational group searching for regional anti-communist 
proponents against the Guatemalan Revolution. When criticizing the rupture in relations between 
the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, Dominican Chargé d’Affaires in Tegucigalpa Víctor 
Fernández Jiménez cited Guatemalan exile José Calderón Salazar’s Guatemala bajo el signo rojo 
in that Arévalo’s “Government – emerging from the chaos of a Revolution promoted by the 
Soviet Union –, tolerates communism.”261 In early July, Dominican Ambassador in Mexico City 
Gustavo Julio Henríquez sent a cable to Trujillo reporting that a committee of Guatemalan exiles 
was preparing to publish articles in the Mexican press in support of Trujillo and denouncing 
Arévalo’s “communist and pernicious ruling” in Guatemala.262 That same month, Guatemalan 
exiles from the “Comité Patriótico Guatemalteco,” the same group that helped publish Calderón 
Salazar’s Guatemala bajo el signo rojo, distributed various pamphlets that reproduced an article 
written by the Catholic and anti-communist Mexican journalist René Capistrán Garza for the 
Mexican newspaper El Universal. In the article, Capistrán Garza alleged that Arévalo’s rupture 
in relations with the Dominican Republic threatened “continental unity” and followed the 
“irritated attitude assumed by Russia” in opposition to the Marshall Plan.263 In Honduras and 
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Mexico, the Guatemalan exiles’ anti-Mexican, anti-Soviet, anti-communist ideology aligned 
quite well with the regional conflict between Arévalo’s government and Trujillo’s regime. Such 
an ideological alignment already began bringing together a Dominican dictator, well-known to 
support conspiracies against opposing governments, and Guatemalan exiles, well-versed in 
transnational networks opposed to the Guatemalan Revolution. As the next chapter will reveal, 
these exiles gladly seized this opportunity to cultivate a new regional anti-communist proponent 
against Arévalo’s government. 
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IV. Chapter 3: Dissident Guatemalan Exiles and Rafael Trujillo, 1947 
 In late July 1947, various Caribbean Basin diplomatic officials attended a celebration at 
the Salvadoran Presidential House in honor of Salvadoran military president-dictator Salvador 
Castaneda Castro. During the festivities, Dominican Chargé d’Affaires in San Salvador René 
Malagón took the opportunity to converse with the Salvadoran dictator about recent events, 
including the escalating tensions between Trujillo and Arévalo. Castaneda assured the 
Dominican official that a document “of great importance” would soon be delivered. The 
following day, Salvadoran Director of the Press, Guatemalan exile, and ardent opponent of 
Arévalo’s government Gustavo Martínez Nolasco called upon Malagón at the Dominican 
Legation. The Salvadoran official handed over the document in question, a reproduction of the 
Arévalo government’s official list of the dozens of Guatemalans expelled since the Revolution’s 
first days.264 Over the past weeks, multiple Guatemalan exiles had lobbied Trujillo to finance 
plans to end the Guatemalan Revolution, so the Dominican dictator was now investigating 
whether to support these exiles. 
 This chapter presents the relationships in 1947 among four prominent Guatemalan exiles, 
Trujillo, and Dominican officials as a case study of how exiles lobbied a Caribbean Basin 
dictator to serve as a regional anti-communist proponent against Arévalo’s government. Among 
the exiles, colonel Arturo Ramírez, general Federico Ponce, general Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, 
and Juan Pinillos wrote to Trujillo and met with Dominican officials. Independent of the 
international Cold War, these self-proclaimed ‘anti-communists’ came together under the 
transnational counter-revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution. 
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 Methodological innovations into the transnational dimensions of Latin American foreign 
relations and SERREE files recreate these relationships. Borrowing from literary, cultural, and 
American studies, Mary Louise Pratt suggests that a “contact zone” represents “the space in 
which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and 
establish ongoing relations.”265 Though Pratt introduces ‘contact zones’ to discuss colonial 
encounters and imperial relations, scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations and Latin American 
foreign relations have adapted the term.266 Gilbert Joseph employs the term to examine the “sites 
of multivocality; of negotiation, borrowing, and exchange; and of redeployment and reversal” 
that shaped how Latin Americans maneuvered under, against, and within the “American [U.S.] 
empire.”267 Ariel Armony utilizes ‘contact zones’ to analyze the “multifaceted network of 
interactions between governments and pressure groups centered mainly on the exchange of 
information, the mobilization of economic and military resources, and the coordination of 
operational plans” in Latin America’s Dirty Wars during the late 1970s and early 1980s.268 
Along this line, this chapter argues that exiles’ letters and meetings at Dominican diplomatic 
sites represented a semi-formal, transnational, anti-communist zone of contact and collaboration 
between Guatemalan exiles, Trujillo, and Dominican officials in which participants discussed 
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and organized conspiracies against Arévalo’s government. It is through such zones that one can 
identify how Caribbean Basin actors bolstered their own anti-communist ideology before the 
Cold War’s escalation. 
 
A. Colonel Arturo Ramírez and the Invasion Conspiracy 
 Colonel Arturo Ramírez was the first Guatemalan exile to lobby Trujillo for economic 
aid against Arévalo’s government. Writing to Trujillo, the exile presented his anti-Mexican, anti-
Soviet, anti-communist ideological opposition to the Guatemalan Revolution as similar to that 
held by the dictator. To obtain further information about the conspiracy, Trujillo ordered 
Dominican officials to remain in contact with the exile. In lobbying the dictator, Ramírez helped 
open the zone of contact and collaboration between exiles, Trujillo, and Dominican officials that 
would play a crucial role in other conspiracies. 
 As had other exiles in the mid-1940s, Ramírez visited the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa 
in early 1947 to disseminate his anti-communist worldview to U.S. officials. In March, the exile 
met for the first time with Military Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa lieutenant 
colonel Nathan Brown.269 Ramírez portrayed Arévalo as subservient to Mexican communist 
Vicente Lombardo Toledano, a “tool of Moscow,” and a “threat to Hemisphere Solidarity.”270 
Into July, Ramírez continued delivering reports alleging that Mexican and Soviet communism in 
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Guatemalan dictator Jorge Ubico’s ambassador to the United States, defeated candidate in 
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270 Nathan A. Brown, Jr., to M. A. Devine, Jr., Military Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in 
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Guatemala influenced regional conflicts and threatened Caribbean Basin stability.271 At every 
point, the exile found the hand of the Soviet Union and Mexico.272 Like his fellow U.S. officials 
throughout Central America, Brown placed little confidence in the exile’s claims. When 
describing his lobbying of the Salvadoran, Nicaraguan, and Honduran dictators, Ramírez 
admitted that Castaneda changed his mind, Somoza “weasled [sic]” out, and Carías was “too 
cagey to make a definite promise.”273 Brown on both July 15 and August 1 concluded that 
Ramírez’s “efforts ha[d] been unsuccessful.”274 
 Unknown to U.S. officials, though, Ramírez reached out to Trujillo. The exile first wrote 
the dictator on July 8 to lobby for assistance while tapping into his anti-communist ideology. 
“The communist outbreak in Central America was born from the continued efforts of Vicente 
Lombardo Toledano and the Soviets to the South of Mexico . . . to insert spearheads into the 
Continent,” Ramírez warned, “It is obvious to relate the threat that this illness poses to the 
American family.”275 The exile repeatedly evoked the metaphor of ‘illness’ to describe 
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communism in Guatemala.276 He implored Trujillo, “For such a motive, I write to you, 
respectfully, in order to inform you that there is a means of exercising the first step toward the 
establishment of a sanitary measure that will clean the American Continent of this Siberian 
leprosy.” The exile combined this language with a personal appeal to the dictator’s image as a 
leading ‘anti-communist’ statesman, “The entire world is expecting this sanitary measure that 
has already come to constitute a real dam against the advance of communism in the economic 
sense, and global Democracy will have in you a paladin.” Having made his appeal to Trujillo, 
Ramírez requested the opportunity to provide an exhibition to Dominican officials in 
Tegucigalpa on his plan to overthrow Arévalo’s government.277 
 Trujillo approved Dominican officials to meet with Ramírez and receive the exhibition, 
denoting the emergence of the zone of contact and collaboration between Guatemalan exiles, 
Trujillo, and Dominican officials.278 Accompanied by fellow Guatemalan exile Juan Pinillos, 
Ramírez delivered to Dominican Chargé d’Affaires in Tegucigalpa Víctor Antonio Fernández his 
exhibition, “EXPOSICIÓN SOBRE LOS ASUNTOS RELACIONADOS con GUATEMALA 
[EXHIBITION REGARDING THE AFFAIRES RELATED to GUATEMALA].”279 After 
repeating the exile’s numerous allegations that Guatemala under Arévalo was the “most 
disciplined and abject disciple of Soviet Russia in Central America,” the exhibition centered 
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upon the conspiracy.280 Exiles based in Nicaragua would invade Guatemala by passing through 
Honduras with the support of Carías.281 These exiles would seize important border posts before 
capturing three Guatemalan departments. At that point, Ramírez believed, an assortment of 
governments would intervene to prevent a full-scale civil war. A representation composed of 
Central American, Dominican, and U.S. representatives would request that Arévalo’s 
government allow Ramírez and leading exiles to join the Guatemalan congress. Working through 
the congress, these newly-returned exiles would demand a new government and remove Arévalo 
from power.282 
 Ramírez’s invasion plan was not realized. Constitutional suspensions implemented by 
Arévalo’s government revolved around reports of Ponce’s air-bombing conspiracy, no evidence 
suggests a relationship between the two plots, and Ponce’s actions probably overshadowed those 
of Ramírez. Notwithstanding these complications, Ramírez’s plot played a central role in 
bringing forward the zone between exiles, Trujillo, and Dominican officials. The dictator in 
particular took notice, though he had already begun to work against Arévalo. 
 
B. General Federico Ponce and the Air-Bombing Conspiracy 
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 General Federico Ponce’s air-bombing conspiracy became the first to receive Trujillo’s 
direct approval. Ponce sought to coordinate the aerial bombing of Guatemala City with planes 
purchased in the United States and an invasion of exiles. The exile’s plan intersected with the 
dictator’s new role as a patron of Guatemalan exiles opposed to Arévalo’s government, yet 
Ponce and Trujillo’s goals conflicted with U.S. officials’ policy toward Guatemala. It was U.S. 
officials who actually alerted the Guatemalan Government. 
 Ponce had approached U.S. and Dominican officials since June-July 1947. At the U.S. 
Embassy in Mexico City, First Secretary Walter Washington confessed his surprise when Ponce 
on June 23 called upon U.S. officials, without any prior notice. Nor did Washington buy into 
Ponce’s anti-communist rhetoric. The U.S. official merely recorded that Ponce “intimated that he 
was about to take some action” regarding Arévalo’s government.283 Next, Ponce headed to the 
Dominican Embassy in Mexico City. On July 17, Dominican Chargé d’Affaires José Paniagua 
sent an encoded cable to Dominican Secretary of State Telésforo Calderón forwarding the exile’s 
greetings to Trujillo.284 The zone, established during Ramírez’s lobbying, facilitated the 
dictator’s prompt response and reciprocal greetings.285 
 A month later, Ponce met with U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City Walter Thurston. The 
exile wished to notify U.S. officials about his plan to overthrow Arévalo’s government, handing 
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over a manifesto and a phonograph that would be distributed to the Guatemalan people.286 The 
manifesto took Thurston aback: 
Upon reading his manifesto and seeing that it spoke of the “serial bombardment which 
had just taken place over some points of the capital,” I told him that it would be a matter 
of great regret if he should bomb Guatemala City killing civilians. He replied that he 
would only bombard certain strategic points.287 
U.S. officials in Washington reacted immediately to Thurston’s report. Under Secretary of State 
Robert Lovett sent cables to his country’s embassies in Guatemala City, Mexico City, and 
elsewhere to notify local authorities about the plot.288 While U.S. Ambassador in Guatemala City 
Edwin Kyle took the information directly to Arévalo’s government, Thurston met with Acting 
Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico Jaime Torres Bodet.289 Torres Bodet assured 
Thurston his government would prevent any such plot.290 
 The exile had better luck with the Dominican dictator. On August 27, Dominican 
Ambassador in Mexico City Gustavo Julio Henríquez notified Trujillo that Ponce’s plan required 
“economic aid to initiate operations.”291 The next day, Trujillo agreed to assist.292 Over the next 
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month, Ponce worked with the ambassador to purchase weapons in Mexico and prepared to air-
bomb Guatemala City.293 
 Ponce’s conspiracy was soon found out, leading to constitutional suspensions in 
Guatemala. On September 16, Arévalo issued a presidential decree that suspended constitutional 
guarantees for thirty days, for Guatemalan Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Arturo Herbruger 
claimed to have “evidence Trujillo was supplying funds.”294 However, U.S. officials in 
Guatemala City doubted the Guatemalan government’s allegations. Throughout September, First 
Secretary Andrew Donovan made note that little evidence of the plot had been released to the 
public.295 Into October, Donovan kept emphasizing the lack of available proof.296 
 Never reported by U.S. officials, the Guatemalan government did receive evidence of 
Ponce’s plot. In Tegucigalpa, Guatemalan exile Juan Pinillos frequently met with Dominican 
Chargé d’Affaires Víctor Antonio Fernández to discuss regional affairs. Since Trujillo’s regime 
had no officials in Guatemala following the rupture in diplomatic relations, Fernández obtained 
information on the constitutional suspension from Pinillos.297 On October 06, Fernández 
forwarded to his superiors one of the many summaries that would be written by Pinillos over the 
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next weeks.298 Guatemala’s commander of the Guardia Civil [National Guard], colonel Víctor 
Sandoval, had made a radio speech at 8:00p.m. on October 03. Apparently, a Mexican gunrunner 
had approached the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City. Over the past weeks, the gunrunner 
had sold weapons to Ponce until the exile reneged on the “total arranged price.” Consequently, 
the gunrunner agreed to inform on the conspiracy if Arévalo’s government would “purchase the 
rest of the armaments.”299 
 Though skeptical of the allegations, U.S. officials did assist the Guatemalan government. 
On October 09, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Enrique Muñoz Meany met with Kyle to share 
reports from Washington, Mexico, and Honduras that Ponce had purchased bombers in the 
United States, now located in Florida or San Antonio, Texas, for a coordinated aerial bombing 
and land invasion. Kyle forwarded Muñoz Meany’s request to investigate the matter but noted 
that these rumors may have derived from the U.S. government’s own warnings to the 
Guatemalan government in August.300 Regardless of whether U.S. officials in Guatemala City 
believed the reports, Lovett ordered the Bureau of Customs to look into the matter.301 The 
dictator had provided assistance for the exile’s conspiracy, but U.S. officials never reported 
having located Ponce’s planes or ever believed that Trujillo had actually aided the exile. 
 Ponce’s conspiracy and the resulting constitutional suspensions provide an important 
example of how exiles’ conspiracies, facilitated by the zone between exiles, Trujillo, and 
Dominican officials, contributed to the transnational counter-revolution against the Guatemalan 
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Revolution. It also reveals its limits, as the potentially most consequential sponsor, the United 
States, refused to partake in the plot. 
 
C. General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes and the Guatemalan Army Conspiracy 
 General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes’s conspiracy to initiate a coup d’état through the 
Guatemalan Army illustrates how exiles’ ideology intersected with Dominican officials’ 
worldviews. As the Guatemalan Ambassador in London, Ydígoras Fuentes cultivated a 
relationship with Dominican Ambassador in London Andrés Pastoriza and lobbied for Trujillo’s 
economic aid; moreover, the exile’s writings resonated with Dominican officials, buttressing 
their indigenous anti-communist ideology. 
 Ydígoras Fuentes emerged as a prominent general and one of Guatemalan dictator Jorge 
Ubico’s protégés, yet the Guatemalan broke with Ubico’s regime in the first days of the 
Guatemalan Revolution. The resulting junta and Arévalo’s government sent Ydígoras Fuentes as 
the Guatemalan ambassador in London. Ydígoras Fuentes and historians have characterized this 
tenure in England as an ‘unofficial’ exile designed to discourage Ydígoras Fuentes from using 
his contacts in the Guatemalan Army to plot against Arévalo’s government.302 In his memoirs, 
Ydígoras Fuentes presented himself as a popular anti-communist opponent of the Guatemalan 
Revolution but never admitted to lobbying for Trujillo’s aid or conspiring against Arévalo’s 
government.303 According to SERREE files, Ydígoras Fuentes did utilize his ‘unofficial’ exile to 
build relationships with Trujillo’s regime and propose a conspiracy. 
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 Immediately after Arévalo’s government broke diplomatic relations with Trujillo’s 
regime, Ydígoras Fuentes and Pastoriza held a telephone conversation in which the Guatemalan 
touched upon the regional conflict. Describing the conversation, the Guatemalan expressed his 
genuine “friendship” with Pastoriza and “esteem” for the Dominican dictatorship.304 All this was 
of course meant to lever the regime for assistance in overthrowing Arévalo. Pastoriza got a sense 
on how ‘vast’ Ydígoras Fuentes’s network in the Guatemalan Army was and trusted that it could 
effectively wage a coup d’état. All the Guatemalan needed, Pastoriza explained to the dictator, 
was “an assistance of fifty thousand dollars” cash to circumvent the banks. As had other 
Dominican officials with Ramírez, Ponce, and Pinillos, the ambassador offered to mediate and 
relay information between Trujillo and Ydígoras Fuentes.305 
 Pastoriza had a dearth of documents from Ydígoras Fuentes on Guatemalan affairs to 
forward to his superiors. In “MEMORANDUM DE LA SITUACIÓN POLÍTICA 
[MEMORANDUM OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION], etc., de GUATEMALA,” the 
Guatemalan repeated the common tropes that Mexican and Soviet communism drove 
Guatemalan affairs, going back to the alleged role of “the Mexican Embassy” and “Soviet 
money” in the fall of Ubico’s dictatorship.306 With his memorandum, Ydígoras Fuentes gave 
Pastoriza a letter from an associate in New York City, Aguilar Kestler, who copied newspaper 
articles on Guatemalan affairs. As expected, the associate transcribed articles in conservative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes a Andrés Pastoriza, Embajador Dominicano en Londres, Londres, 
17 julio 1947, AGN, CBV, Expediente 070-106 “Documentos sobre la situación política de 
Guatemala.” 
305 Andrés Pastoriza a Rafael Trujillo, Memorandum, Londres, 21 agosto 1947, AGN, CBV, 
Expediente 070-106 “Documentos sobre la situación política de Guatemala.” 
306 Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, “MEMORANDUM DE LA SITUACIÓN POLÍTICA, etc., de 
GUATEMALA,” 09 agosto 1947, AGN, CBV, Expediente 070-106 “Documentos sobre la 
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newspapers from Guatemala City, New York City, and elsewhere that denoted Arévalo’s 
government as led by Mexican and Soviet communists.307 
 Ydígoras Fuentes’s conspiracy came to naught, as did the previous ones. Indeed, it is 
probable that events surrounding Ponce’s air-bombing conspiracy hindered any efforts. 
However, Dominican officials utilized Ydígoras Fuentes’s documents as anti-communist 
propaganda. On September 1, Calderón forwarded copies to Henríquez in Mexico City, “We 
have the greatest interest that you get [Ydígoras Fuentes’s documents] published in the Mexican 
press, and, to this effect, it is recommended that you take the necessary steps to ensure this 
end.”308 Furthermore, Trujillo in September 1953 would admit to giving $35,000 to Ydígoras 
Fuentes.309 Not only did Ydígoras Fuentes’s conspiracy resonate with Dominican officials and 
Trujillo; it set into motion a relationship that would continue into the early 1950s. 
 
D. Juan Pinillos and the Dominican Legation in Tegucigalpa 
 Juan Pinillos utilized the zone to provide information to and cultivate relationships with 
officials at the Dominican legation in Tegucigalpa. The exile’s relationship with Dominican 
officials originated with Ramírez’s conspiracy, but subsequent the exile’s main merit was that of 
providing his vast knowledge of Guatemalan affairs after the break in diplomatic relations 
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between Trujillo’s regime and Arévalo’s government. On August 21, he informed Fernández that 
Guatemalan exiles in Tegucigalpa had shipped military equipment from Puerto Barrios in 
Guatemala. Fernández forwarded this information to Despradel, and García Godoy summarized 
the information for Calderón.310 In early September, Fernández obtained more information from 
Pinillos regarding bureaucratic changes in Guatemala’s Guardia Nacional. By this point, 
Fernández saw the exile as a reliable informant.311 
 Pinillos’s information proved particularly useful when Trujillo’s regime sought to charge 
Arévalo for the Guatemalan president’s complicity in the Cayo Confites expedition. In their 
public reports, Dominican officials claimed that the Soviet legation in Guatemala City supported 
the ‘international communist brigade’ by providing money to the Cuban and Venezuelan 
governments. Pinillos interjected that there was no Soviet embassy or legation in Guatemala 
City. Rather, “The Russian Embassy in Mexico has had jurisdiction in Guatemala and has been 
sending delegates (unofficially) to remain in clandestine communication with Arévalo.” The 
exile related how “the money [for the Cayo Confites expedition had] been provided from Russia 
to Guatemala through unofficial Agents and Vicente Lombardo Toledano who has made 
incognito visits to Guatemala.”312 Fernández forwarded Pinillos’s information to Despradel, at 
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which point officials produced a report for Trujillo.313 As had Ydígoras Fuentes’s writings, 
Pinillos’s charges intersected with Dominican officials’ interpretations of Arévalo’s government. 
 
E. Conclusion 
 The conspiracies by Ramírez, Ponce, and Ydígoras Fuentes and Pinillos’s visits to the 
Dominican Legation together present an important case study of how Guatemalan exiles built 
collaborative relationships with a Caribbean Basin leader who served as a regional anti-
communist proponent of the transnational counter-revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution. 
These exiles utilized a regional conflict in the Caribbean Basin and their anti-Mexican, anti-
Soviet, anti-communist ideology to reach out to Trujillo and Dominican officials. The exiles’ 
lobbying and Trujillo and Dominican officials’ reciprocation built the semi-formal, transnational, 
anti-communist zone of contact and collaboration in which they discussed how to overthrow 
Arévalo’s government. Together, these actors furthered the transnational counter-revolution 
against the Guatemalan Revolution while U.S. officials persisted in giving Arévalo’s government 
credit for his reforms. Additionally, these exchanges would lead Trujillo to build collaborative 
relationships with other Caribbean Basin leaders who served as regional anti-communist 
proponents against the Guatemalan Revolution. 
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V. Chapter 4: A Caribbean Basin Anti-Communist Network, 1948-Early 1950s 
 Since the mid-1940s, Guatemalan exiles had cultivated beneficial relationships with three 
prominent Caribbean Basin dictators in pursuit of the transnational counter-revolution against the 
Guatemalan Revolution. Some, like generals Federico Ponce and Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, 
appeared to work solely with Trujillo. Juan Pinillos, doctor Carlos Padilla y Padilla, colonel 
Arturo Ramírez, and others traveled throughout the region, building rapport and contacts with 
multiple leaders and important officials. By the beginning of 1948, the exiles’ activities brought 
about a new phase in their counter-revolution. Spurred on by the exiles’ lobbying, Somoza, 
Carías, and Trujillo came together and formed the first anti-communist network in Latin 
America. 
 This chapter reveals how a loosely-formed Caribbean Basin network of self-proclaimed 
‘anti-communist’ dictators shared intelligence on and supported Guatemalan exiles’ conspiracies 
to overthrow Arévalo and Arbenz’s governments. From 1948 into the early 1950s, general 
Federico Ponce, Luis Coronado Lira, Manuel Melgar de la Cerda, general Roderico Anzueto, 
colonel Arturo Ramírez, and colonel Carlos Castillo Armas lobbied the dictators for assistance. 
In response, Somoza, Trujillo, Carías, and their respective officials corresponded and met to 
discuss the exiles’ plots. Independent of the international Cold War and without U.S. officials’ 
support, this Caribbean Basin anti-communist network pursued the transnational counter-
revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution and furthered an indigenous and regional conflict 
between Guatemalan exiles, Caribbean Basin dictators, and Guatemala’s governments. 
 Research on indigenous anti-communist networks in Latin America during the 
international Cold War offers the framework to analyze the goals and interactions of Guatemalan 
exiles and Caribbean Basin dictators. Scholarship on U.S. policy toward Guatemala has only 
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portrayed dictators as supporters CIA operations in the early 1950s to overthrow Arbenz’s 
government and overlooks the dictators’ earlier opposition to Arévalo’s government. In contrast, 
works on the cooperation between Mexican and South American anti-communist organizations, 
links between right-wing Chileans and Brazilians, transnational sources of support for Central 
American anti-communist regimes, and Operation Condor have highlighted how frequently anti-
communist Latin American leaders shaped regional conflicts.314 Along this line, this chapter 
examines how the zone of contact and collaboration between Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean 
Basin dictators continued to enlarge its numbers and broaden its scope. 
 
A. General Federico Ponce and Caribbean Basin Officials, 1948 
 Solicitations from Guatemalan exile general Federico Ponce facilitated the first meeting 
in which the network’s members shared intelligence on a plot to overthrow Arévalo’s 
government. Following his abortive air-bombing conspiracy, Ponce continued to lobby Trujillo 
and Dominican officials for economic assistance. To evaluate the exile’s solicitation, Trujillo 
ordered Dominican Special Ambassador Rafael Paíno Pichardo to meet in Washington with 
Nicaraguan Ambassador in Washington Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa. The February 1948 meeting 
between Paíno Pichardo and Sevilla Sacasa expanded the zone of contact and collaboration as 
Dominican and Nicaraguan officials took Ponce’s solicitation into consideration. 
 Having only recently emerged over the past months as a regional anti-communist 
proponent against the Guatemalan Revolution, Trujillo in early 1948 sought out advice from 
more experienced anti-communist proponents. Apparently, such information would allow the 
dictator to better gauge the capabilities of the exiles pleading for the patron’s assistance. 
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Following the abortive air-bombing plot, Ponce had made a new request for Trujillo’s aid.315 The 
opinion of the Nicaraguan official proved particularly enlightening. Sevilla Sacasa believed the 
exile’s “requested economic assistance seemed very substantial” and suggested having the 
Dominican ambassador in Mexico City, Joaquín Balaguer, meet with Ponce “to determine for 
what the requests sum pertain[ed].” Sevilla Sacasa’s advice did not end there as he advised 
Dominican officials to generate a “list of the people” that Ponce knew.316 
 Here, the Dominican and Nicaraguan ambassadors began analyzing the governmental and 
military structures in Guatemala. Sevilla Sacasa imparted his knowledge of Ponce, how the 
military junta under Arbenz and colonel Francisco Arana deposed Ponce, and the exile’s 
remaining influence in the Guatemalan Army. The Nicaraguan ambassador assured Paíno 
Pichardo that Ponce “ha[d] friends within the military element of Guatemala and is a staunch 
enemy of Arévalo” but warned that “the strong man in Guatemala within the [Guatemalan] Army 
is Colonel Arana, who shows a great loyalty to Arévalo in order to sustain [Arévalo] in the 
[Guatemalan] Presidency.” Before turning to other matters, the Nicaraguan ambassador shared 
with Paíno Pichardo the rumor that Arévalo invested much time and energy to appease Arana 
and prevent the general from backing any coups against the Guatemalan Revolution.317 
Ultimately, the two officials had exchanged information on Guatemalan exiles’ conspiracies 
against Arévalo’s government, and this intelligence-sharing would become common among 
members of the emerging anti-communist network. 
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B. Luis Coronado Lira, 1948 
 While Ponce brought Dominican and Nicaraguan officials together, Luis Coronado Lira 
became the first exile patronized by different members of the emerging network. In the mid-
1940s, he and his associate, Carlos Salazar, Jr., had traveled the Caribbean Basin and published 
various denunciations of Arévalo and the Guatemalan Revolution as the products of Mexican- 
and Soviet-inspired communism. By early 1948, Coronado Lira began to interact with 
Nicaraguan and Dominican officials, and two Caribbean Basin dictators sponsored him. 
 Somoza in March 1948 requested that the exile travel to Managua to organize a plot 
against Arévalo’s government. Based upon information from Nicaraguan exile and former 
advisor to Somoza doctor Francisco Aguirre, Gordon Reid at the U.S. Office of Central America 
and Panama Affairs on March 19 reported that the dictator had “called” Coronado Lira from San 
Salvador to Managua. Aguirre claimed, “Somoza then offered [the exile] men, money[,] and 
arms and told [Coronado Lira] ‘to get busy and start a revolution in Guatemala as soon as 
possible.’”318 U.S. officials in Managua attempted to monitor the exile’s movements with only 
marginal success. On March 22, Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Managua Maurice 
Bernbaum confirmed that Coronado Lira had been in Managua since March 13. When Bernbaum 
attempted to obtain more information, Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Oscar Sevilla Sacasa and 
Somoza’s son major Anastasio ‘Tachito’ Somoza both remarked that Somoza “had given no 
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encouragement.”319 Bernbaum’s only other information was that Coronado Lira spent the Holy 
Week “presumably seeing Somoza” until flying to Balboa, Panama, on March 29.320 
 Unknown to U.S. officials, Coronado Lira was then in Ciudad Trujillo April and May 
1948 and met with either Trujillo or the dictator’s higher officials. Following the February 1948 
meeting between Paíno Pichardo and Sevilla Sacasa and after meeting with Somoza, the exile’s 
traveling suggests that Nicaraguan and Dominican officials shared intelligence on or encouraged 
Coronado Lira’s activities. On April 23, Dominican Secretary of State for Foreign Relations 
Virgilio Díaz Ordóñez ordered Dominican Chargé d’Affaires in San Salvador René Malagón to 
meet with Salazar, Coronado Lira’s associate.321 At their meeting in early May, Salazar gave the 
Dominican official newspaper articles and a memorandum for Coronado Lira. From San 
Salvador, Malagón sent Salazar’s documents to Ciudad Trujillo and reported that Salazar would 
soon provide “definitive information” to Coronado Lira.322 Because Coronado Lira earlier met 
with Somoza, it is likely this ‘definitive information’ related to the exile’s lobbying the two 
dictators for armaments or resources. 
 Salazar’s memorandum argued that the situation in Guatemala stood against Arévalo’s 
government and bolstered Coronado Lira’s lobbying. The exile reported that in late April colonel 
Miguel Mendoza had organized a plot against Arévalo’s government that, upon being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 Maurice M. Bernbaum to Secretary of State, No. 74, Managua, 22 March 1948, 814.00/3-
2248, NARAII, RG59, DF814, M1527, Roll 2. 
320 Maurice M. Bernbaum to Secretary of State, No. 79, Managua, 30 March 1948, NARAII, 
RG84, US Embassy Managua, Box 24, Folder “800: Nicaraguan Involvement in Guatemala 
internal affairs, Confidential telegram file, 1948.” 
321 René Malagón a Virgilio Díaz Ordóñez, No. 91 “Asunto: Cuestiones relacionadas con el viaje 
del Lic. Luis Coronado Lira a nuestro país,” San Salvador, 11 mayo 1948, AGN, SERREE, Caja 
IT 2903349. 
322 Virgilio Díaz Ordóñez a Telésforo R. Calderón, 14306 “Asunto: Informes para ser trasmitido 




discovered, saw the suspension of the Guatemalan Constitution and congressional laws and the 
suppression of the Guatemalan people’s movements and associations. Salazar claimed, “The 
atmosphere in Guatemala is [one] of unease and anxiety motivated by the presence of soldiers 
and police that monitor neighbors and pedestrians within and outside of the capital.” Salazar 
warned Coronado Lira, or more likely the intended targets of the two exiles’ lobbying, that 
Guatemala’s official radio, La Voz de Guatemala [The Voice of Guatemala], gave half an hour of 
time to communist worker organizations. These organizations over the radio spoke of how “only 
communism is capable of destroying capitalism, yankee imperialism[,] and the rule of feudalism 
of landowners.”323 Such propaganda resembled that of other exiles who aimed to convince 
potential dictators, officials, and patrons to take advantage of these supposedly suitable moments 
to launch a plot against Arévalo’s government. To this effect, Salazar concluded his 
memorandum, “The political and economic situation is undisputedly chaotic.”324 
 No reports confirm that Coronado Lira took any venture to completion. Various events in 
the Caribbean Basin, such as the Costa Rican Civil War and the Venezuelan military’s coup 
against Rómulo Betancourt’s government, received much of Somoza and Trujillo’s attention. 
Additionally, Arévalo’s government faced numerous plots in 1948 and 1949, so it is possible that 
Guatemalan officials never verified Coronado Lira’s participation in one of these plots. Still, 
available sources confirm that the exile did receive economic assistance from not only from 
Somoza but Trujillo. In September 1953, an informant of First Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in 
Guatemala City Andrew Wardlaw described a meeting with Trujillo in which the dictator 
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mentioned having given money to Coronado Lira “to buy arms.” Trujillo complained to the 
informant that the exile had not pursued any plot against Arévalo’s government and instead 
“used [this] money . . . to finance” a global trip.325 Though Trujillo criticized Coronado Lira for 
not having orchestrated a coup, it is likely the exile utilized such funds to raise regional support 
against Arévalo’s government. Well into the early 1950s, Coronado Lira continued to network 
throughout the Caribbean Basin and lobby on behalf of notable plots against the Guatemalan 
governments.326 
 
C. Manuel Melgar de la Cerda, 1948 
 The formation of the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network culminated in late 1948 
during Manuel Melgar de la Cerda’s conspiracy. The exile not only requested multiple dictators 
to support a plot to invade Guatemala but implored one dictator, Trujillo, to lobby another 
dictator, Carías. As when debating Ponce’s solicitation earlier in the year, Trujillo reached out to 
Somoza to contact Carías. Melgar’s solicitation and the dictators’ responses brought the three 
regimes together against Arévalo’s government. Such maneuverings prove that, by the end of 
1948, a loosely-formed network composed of Dominican, Nicaraguan, and Honduran dictators 
and their officials patronized and shared intelligence on Guatemalan exiles’ machinations. 
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 Melgar represented the typical Guatemalan exile whose connections and prominence in 
Ubico’s regime enabled him to network in the Caribbean Basin and lobby for economic 
assistance against Arévalo’s government. Under Ubico, Melgar at various times served as the 
Minister of the Treasury and Public Credit, Subsecretary of Public Education, Minister of 
Agriculture, and Secretary to the President.327 As with Ubico’s other protégés, Melgar found 
himself expelled by the end of 1944.328 Though no U.S. or Dominican report identifies him as a 
prominent dissident involved in alleged coup plots between 1944 and 1948, Arévalo’s 
government did include Melgar on a list of notorious exiles, such as Ponce, excluded from a 
general amnesty at the end of 1947.329 
 Initially, Melgar’s solicitation for Trujillo’s aid conformed to the methods employed by 
other exiles over the previous years. In October 1948, the exile asked Dominican Chargé 
d’Affaires in Mexico City Rafael Damirón Díaz to present a confidential memorandum to 
Trujillo.330 The memorandum referenced the tropes that proliferated throughout the anti-
Mexican, anti-Soviet, anti-communist ideology. Melgar blamed “Soviet inspiration,” believed 
the region’s governments needed to join against the rise of communist regimes in the Americas, 
and feared that Guatemala was a base for “subversive forces” and “international communism.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 Manuel Melgar de la Cerda, Ciudad de México, 29 septiembre 1948, con Rafael Damirón 
Díaz, Encargado de Negocios ad interino de la República Dominicana en la Ciudad de México, a 
Telésforo R. Calderón, No. 232, Ciudad de México, 01 octubre 1948, AGN, SERREE, Caja IT 
2904052 “Fechas extremas 1948-1956, Ref. Antigua 2339” (en adelante Caja IT 2904052), 
Expediente “1948-1949, Código 5/c.” 
328 William C. Affeld, Chargé d’Affaires at U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, to U.S. Embassy in 
Managua, 22 October 1944, NARAII, RG84, US Embassy Managua, Box 6, Folder “800: 1944.” 
329 Milton K. Wells, Chargé d’Affaires at U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, to Secretary of State, 
No. 2774 “Subject: Guatemalan Government Announces that Majority of Political Exiles Will 
Be Permitted to Return,” Guatemala City, 23 December 1947, 814.00/12-2347, NARAII, RG59, 
DF814, M1527, Roll 2. 
330 Rafael Damirón Díaz a Telésforo R. Calderón, No. 232, Ciudad de México, 01 octubre 1948, 
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Melgar’s memorandum also seemed to borrow from the petitions delivered to Trujillo with its 
praising the Dominican dictator as a leading anti-communist leader in the Caribbean Basin who 
held off the Cayo Confites expedition. “The Dominican Republic understands, from its own 
experience, these criminal assaults,” the exile wrote, “The Republics of Central America and the 
Caribbean have a duty to fight, at all cost, in order that . . . there exist governments [throughout 
the Americas] that support these advanced peoples in americanidad against communism.”331 
 For two reasons, this exile’s conspiracy stood out from others brought to the Dominican 
dictator. First, the venture required no direct assistance from Trujillo, a matter Melgar repeatedly 
made clear, assuring that he already had “adequate armaments and sufficient money.” In January 
1949, Melgar’s allies would move into Esquipulas on the Guatemalan-Honduran border during a 
local religious pilgrimage. There, the exile would make contact with fellow counter-
revolutionary groups inside Guatemala. Thanks to their having raised sufficient funds on their 
own, these forces would arm themselves and launch their plot.332 Melgar even claimed that 
influential Guatemalans, including colonel José Enrique Ardón Fernández from the Guatemalan 
Army and Guatemalan Catholic leader José Calderón Salazar, already supported the proposal.333 
 Second, Melgar’s principal reason for reaching out to the Dominican dictator was to 
obtain the Honduran dictator’s assistance. The exile understood that others “ha[d] solicited from 
[Carías] support and perhaps something more, consisting in ammunition and money,” but Melgar 
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believed the Honduran dictator refused these requests due to a lack of “seriousness” in those 
plots. In contrast, Melgar swore that his forces had acquired the necessary armaments and funds 
to pursue their conspiracy, all of which the exile was more than willing to put before the 
Dominican and Honduran dictators.334 Melgar explained to Trujillo: 
. . . we only need for the government of Honduras to permit us to pass through its border 
and, within [Honduran] territory, the necessary storage of the armaments that we have[,] 
as well as the hospitality and guarantees to the military leaders that must move from 
Honduras to Guatemala at the appointed time.335 
Thus, the exile summarized his solicitation: 
We consequently request of the government of the Dominican Republic that, standing 
upon its good relations of close friendship with the government of Honduras, [Trujillo] 
carry out a gesture before señor Tiburcio Carías Andino, President of that country, to the 
effect that [Carías] gives his consideration to the project and opens the border to us for 
PASSING AND STORAGE only, in the understanding, as has been said, that the 
revolution would have its start in Guatemalan territory and with forces also 
Guatemalan.336 
Melgar recognized that both Trujillo and Carías’ regimes opposed Arévalo’s government and 
hoped that one dictator could vouch for the exile to receive the aid of another. 
 Melgar’s memorandum achieved at least part of its intended goal, for the dictators did 
share intelligence and lobby each other on behalf of the venture. On October 1, Damirón Díaz 
forwarded the exile’s memorandum.337 Ten days later, Trujillo ordered Dominican officials to 
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send a coded message about the exile not to Carías but to Somoza.338 Although the Dominican 
dictator never explained his reasons for reaching out to his Nicaraguan compatriot, it is likely 
that Trujillo, as during Ponce’s solicitation, wished for additional information from a more 
experienced regional anti-communist proponent against the Guatemalan Revolution. On October 
25, Nicaraguan Ambassador in Ciudad Trujillo colonel Guillermo Rivas Cuadra hand-delivered 
Somoza’s response to Dominican general Federico Fiallo, one of Trujillo’s military and 
intelligence advisers. Regarding “the proposition of Melgar,” the Nicaraguan dictator told his 
ally, “I am following up with [the] President [of] Honduras [regarding] permission to pass. If [I] 
obtain [the] results, I will notify [you] immediately.”339 The three dictators were not only sharing 
intelligence on Melgar but lobbying each other to endorse the exile’s proposal. 
 The exile’s conspiracy reveals the links established among the dictators within the span 
of a single year. No records have been located regarding Carías’s response, so it is possible the 
Honduran dictator did not endorse Melgar’s plot or Melgar was not able to pursue his plan. 
Notwithstanding this, the zone of contact and collaboration now incorporated discussions and 
meetings between exiles, multiple dictators, and their officials sharing intelligence on and 
support of Guatemalan exiles’ ventures to overthrow Arévalo’s government. 
 
D. General Roderico Anzueto and Colonel Arturo Ramírez, 1949 
 Intelligence-sharing played a central role in the emerging network, epitomized in the 
1949 plots of general Roderico Anzueto and colonel Arturo Ramírez. Lobbied by Anzueto, 
Trujillo ordered Dominican Ambassador in Mexico City Joaquín Balaguer to meet with 
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Nicaraguan Ambassador in Mexico City Alberto Sevilla Sacasa. The Dominican ambassador 
then reached out to the Honduran ambassador in Mexico City whose response reshaped 
Balaguer’s opinion of Anzueto and bolstered the image of Ramírez instead. Such intelligence-
sharing offers an important glimpse into the links among and goals of members of the network. 
 In early 1949, Anzueto began meeting with Dominican Consul in San Francisco José 
Aybar in order to build a potentially beneficial relationship with Trujillo. On January 25, Aybar 
wrote to the dictator following a luncheon where Anzueto claimed to be “a great admirer and 
friend” of Trujillo and opponent of Arévalo’s “communist regime.” The exile even offered to 
mediate between the dictator and the Archbishop of Guatemala, who was allegedly preparing his 
own plot against the Guatemalan government.340 Over the next months, Aybar served as an 
intermediary between Trujillo and Anzueto and reported in mid-July that the exile was in Puebla 
de Los Ángeles in Mexico plotting a conspiracy.341 
 Interested in the proposal, Trujillo in September 1949 ordered Balaguer to meet with 
Sevilla Sacasa to discuss Anzueto, marking this as the third time in two years that the Dominican 
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dictator solicited advice on Guatemalan exiles from Somoza or Somoza’s officials. Coming 
away from the meeting, Balaguer held a favorable opinion of Anzueto’s plan. On September 5, 
Balaguer told the Dominican dictator that the exile’s plot was ready to commence. According to 
Anzueto and confirmed by Sevilla Sacasa, the exile had raised funds, acquired armaments, and 
held important contacts, both inside and outside of Guatemala, to pursue the coup. Reassured by 
his Nicaraguan counterpart, the Dominican ambassador endorsed providing “some funds” to 
Anzueto, “not to exceed $10,000,” that would be “returned after the [conspiracy’s] triumph.” 
Together, Balaguer and Sevilla Sacasa suggested that the exile “travel discreetly to [the 
Dominican Republic] to finalize the details of the plan.” Between Sevilla Sacasa’s advice and 
Anzueto’s modest request for assistance, the Dominican ambassador concluded, “It is evident 
that with little effort there would precipitate the fall of [Arévalo’s] already tottering regime.”342 
 This intelligence-sharing on Anzueto’s plot soon expanded to include a subsequent 
meeting between Balaguer and the Honduran ambassador in Mexico City that recast Balaguer’s 
opinion of Anzueto. On September 8, Balaguer again wrote to Trujillo after Sevilla Sacasa 
delivered instructions for Anzueto’s travels to the Dominican Republic. However, the exile did 
not wish to leave. Taken aback, the Dominican ambassador had insisted upon another meeting, 
whereupon Balaguer confessed to Trujillo, “I was able to come to the conclusion that what 
[Anzueto] desires is principally to be provided with some funds, and that, for him, the other 
question [on the plan itself] is secondary.” The ambassador admitted that the exile’s hesitation to 
meet with Trujillo altered the venture’s appeal and led Balaguer to turn to his Honduran 
counterpart for additional advice. At that point, the Honduran ambassador explained that the 
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exile had “received on a certain occasion money from General Carías for the same purposes that 
[Anzueto] now attempts, and that after having wasted the sum that was put to [Anzueto’s] 
disposal [Anzueto] did not realize the agreed upon operation.”343 Discouraged by the exile’s 
reluctance and the information on Anzueto’s previous dealings with Carías, Balaguer suggested 
cutting contact with this exile. 
 Knowing that the Dominican dictator was interested in sponsoring a coup, the Honduran 
ambassador vouched for a familiar exile, colonel Arturo Ramírez. Although Trujillo and other 
Dominican officials had networked with Ramírez during the invasion conspiracy, Balaguer had 
not been included in these discussions and required an introduction by the Honduran 
ambassador. In their meetings, Ramírez soon divulged his plans for a coup plot in January 1950. 
Whereas Anzueto had hesitated to travel to the Dominican Republic, Ramírez gladly agreed to 
make this trip and meet personally with the Dominican dictator. Furthermore, the exile had the 
support of both Carías and the United Fruit Company, even while requesting $100,000 from 
Trujillo.344 Ramírez’s solicitation for economic assistance may appear large, but Balaguer 
insisted on keeping contact.345 Near the end of the year, Dominican Chargé d’Affaires in San 
Salvador Arturo Calventi met with Chief of Staff of the Salvadoran Army colonel Marco 
Antonio Molina, who recommended Ramírez as a viable leader for an upcoming plot.346 
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 The meetings among Dominican, Nicaraguan, and Honduran officials regarding Anzueto 
and Ramírez’s machinations demonstrate the important role of intelligence-sharing within the 
network. Anzueto lobbied Dominican officials for meetings and economic assistance, so Trujillo 
ordered Balaguer to reach out to Sevilla Sacasa. Balaguer utilized the network’s intelligence-
sharing to meet not only with Sevilla Sacasa but with the Honduran ambassador who opposed 
any patronage for Anzueto. Due to the Honduran ambassador’s suggestions, Balaguer began a 
relationship with Ramírez. As when dealing with Melgar, officials from three different regimes 
employed the network’s intelligence-sharing to evaluate exiles’ conspiracies. 
 
E. Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas and the 1950 Base Militar Attack 
 The Caribbean Basin anti-communist network and Guatemalan exiles, many of whom 
had benefitted from the network’s patronage over the previous years, played a key role in 
supporting colonel Carlos Castillo Armas’s earliest attempts to undermine the Guatemalan 
Revolution. The links between Castillo Armas and the network emerged as early as January 
1950, months before the attack on the Guatemalan Army’s Base Militar. Before Castillo Armas’s 
attack brought him a regional reputation, Somoza, Trujillo, and other Guatemalan exiles already 
knew of him. 
 Castillo Armas’s plan began to take shape in the winter of 1949-1950. Many of major 
Francisco Arana’s supporters and military colleagues in the Guardia de Honor [Honor Guard] 
revolted in July 1949 following a failed coup plot and Arana’s death.347 Castillo Armas did not 
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participate in the Guardia’s revolt, despite his rank as one of Arana’s better-trained officers, so 
the Guatemalan government, while arresting military officers loyal to Arana, released Castillo 
Armas.348 The colonel began working with dissidents from the elite and the Guatemalan Army, 
believing he could capture the Guatemalan Army’s Base Militar in Guatemala City with a 
handful of supporters and initiate a larger uprising.349 He felt confident in his support from both 
former military officers and those still within the Guatemalan Army. Speaking to a U.S. source, 
he claimed that the “main problem troubling him was the matter of arms” but “was . . . thinking 
of contacting SOMOZA or TRUJILLO for these arms.” Castillo Armas “realized that other 
Guatemalans had probably contacted SOMOZA and TRUJILLO for this purpose on previous 
occasions and had met with no success” but alleged that “those men had no standing or power in 
Guatemala and that this must have been known to SOMOZA and TRUJILLO.”350 
 Castillo Armas did make contact with Nicaraguan, Dominican, and even Salvadoran 
officials, so reported Dominican Chargé d’Affaires in San Salvador Arturo Calventi on meeting 
with Castillo Armas, the Nicaraguan ambassador in San Salvador, and Chief of Staff for the 
Salvadoran Army colonel Marco Antonio Molina. The list of “materials” that would be “needed” 
for the attack was pretty extensive, and Castillo Armas said he would also give it personally to 
Somoza. The Nicaraguan dictator, however, declined the meeting.351 Although Somoza would 
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soon emerge as a leading patron of Castillo Armas, it is probable that Somoza was waiting for 
events in Guatemala to calm following Arana’s death and the Guardia’s revolt. Along this line, 
Molina explained that the Salvadoran military attaché in Guatemala City had put a visit on hold 
due to the “internal political situation.”352 Both the need to evaluate Castillo Armas and the risk 
of another political setback motivated this caution. 
 Unable to thoroughly vet Castillo Armas or exchange intelligence on the Guatemalan, 
Molina, the Nicaraguan ambassador in San Salvador, and Calventi turned him away. In a 
conclusion that hearkened back to Sevilla Sacasa and Paíno Pichardo’s evaluation of Ponce in 
early 1948, the officials “consider[ed] the petition excessive and with [a] cost ris[ing] to 
approximately a million dollars.”353 In fact, the three officials came to a conclusion, based on 
Castillo Armas’s experience and petition, that reflected how the network’s members had judged 
various coup plots. They worried that Castillo Armas’s “movement lack[ed] a firm base” of 
support and thought best “to make contact with some [Guatemalan] military official” at the very 
least, but neither the military nor any civilians could speak to the Guatemalan’s chances of 
success. For these reasons, the members of the counter-revolutionary network denied Castillo 
Armas’s request.354 
 Castillo Armas was not the only exile to lobby the network to support the Base Militar 
attack. After the Guardia revolt, Arévalo’s government arrested and exiled various dissidents, 
including José Luis Arenas. Arenas led the Partido de Unificación Anticomunista [Anti-
Communist Unification Party, or PUA], not truly an organized political party but a significant 
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organization of protest against Arévalo’s government.355 Abroad, he traveled the Caribbean 
Basin and met with Mexican anti-communists and Dominican Ambassador in Mexico City 
Héctor Incháustegui Cabral.356 
 Furthermore, the Base Militar attack received support from Guatemalan exiles connected 
to the network. In November, a Consejo Supremo del Movimiento Revolucionario 
Anticomunista [Supreme Council of the Revolutionary Anti-Communist Movement] emerged, 
led by Castillo Armas, Guatemalan anti-communist leaders José Luis Arenas and Guillermo 
Dávila Córdova, and Guatemalan exiles colonel Arturo Ramírez and colonel Enrique Ardón. 
Arenas was now connected to the network, Ramírez had links with Dominican and Honduran 
officials, and Ardón had supported Melgar’s conspiracy. In two manifestos, the leaders tapped 
into the anti-communist ideology and identified themselves with Castillo Armas. With the 
“MANIFIESTO AL PUEBLO DE GUATEMALA [MANIFESTO TO THE PEOPLE OF 
GUATEMALA],” they defended having “to take up arms to save the country from the hands of 
COMMUNISM that has taken root in Guatemala with the dominion of arevalismo.” The 
Council’s leaders warned that communism’s “tragic claws” aimed to “destroy the religious and 
humanitarian sentiments” of Guatemala and “convert Guatemala into a forward base of 
operations for international communism” against “American democracy.”357 The 
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Secretary of U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, Memorandum, 14 September 1949, with Milton 
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“MANIFIESTO AL EJERCITO DE GUATEMALA [MANIFESTO TO THE ARMY OF 
GUATEMALA]” declared, “All the world’s armies agree through their weapons with the United 
Nations’ decision, to fight COMMUNISM . . . in the Asian Continent.” Referencing the Korean 
War, the Council warned “great armies in these moments spill their generous blood in order to 
contain and destroy the invasion of communist forces, that threaten to run over the old world to 
take on the American democracies.” The Council ended their call with a direct plea, asking that 
the Guatemalan Army “put itself on guard and prepare itself to combat and eradicate the 
communism that already finds itself in our land, uniting and making common cause with the 
Guatemalan people, whose cause our movement embodies.”358 
 Following the attack’s failure and a self-proclaimed ‘escape’ in mid-1951, Castillo Armas 
went to Tegucigalpa in exile.359 He soon became head of other exiles there and traveled between 
the region’s dictators. In January 1952, CIA officials reported his receiving funds from both the 
UFCO and the Peruvian dictatorship, though historian Piero Gleijeses presents Somoza as 
Castillo Armas’s chief patron.360 The majority of reports reinforce Gleijeses’s observation that 
Somoza served as the primary intermediary between the exile and the Caribbean Basin anti-
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communist network.361 The Agency also noted former Honduran dictator Tiburcio Carías and the 
UFCO as pledging support to Castillo Armas.362 
 By 1952, the network’s members and Castillo Armas were already in dialogue and 
employed their intelligence-sharing when the exile and Somoza began to prepare a new plot. In 
January 1952, Dominican Ambassador in Managua César Pina Barinas heard from the 
Nicaraguan consul in Chile that U.S. Ambassador in Managua Thomas Whelan was lobbying 
Truman to invite Somoza to the United States.363 On April 26, Military Attaché of the 
Venezuelan Embassy in Managua major Roberto Pulido-Guerrero met with Dominican Consul 
in Managua Alvaro Logroño Batlle to share information about a “golpe de estado” to begin in 
May “to bring down the communist government of President Arbenz in Guatemala.” Pulido-
Guerrero explained that “the head of the movement [was] Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who 
[was] in Tegucigalpa, and that the stated movement [was] being planned carefully.” The 
Venezuelan military attaché had met with Arenas and “attribute[ed] importance to this intent to 
overthrow Arbenz,” as well as “a high probability of success.”364 
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 By 1952, this regional conflict would begin to influence U.S. policy toward Guatemala. 
The network’s members already utilized their intelligence-sharing, allowing Castillo Armas and 
Somoza to prepare a new venture. As the State Department, White House, and CIA considered 
possible measures to overthrow Arbenz’s government, U.S. officials would take notice of how 
Caribbean Basin regimes supported the exile. The transnational counter-revolution against the 
Guatemalan Revolution would soon meet the international Cold War when this emerging plot 
became the CIA’s Operation PBFORTUNE. 
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VI. Chapter 5: Before Operation PBFORTUNE, Early 1950s 
 In July 1952, U.S. officials posted in Caracas, Guatemala City, Mexico City, and Panama 
City received instructions from the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on a new “semi-covert” 
project. The Bureau’s various departmental directors were distributing newspaper articles from 
Mexico City’s El Excelsior and Panama City’s La Hora that discussed the “communist situation 
in Guatemala.” As the directors explained, the U.S. embassies in Latin America hopefully would 
“by appropriate and discreet means be able to obtain the reproduction” of the articles in local 
newspapers. Of course, the Bureau wished that no evidence would implicate the U.S. 
government in disseminating these materials, but public affairs officials could work with Latin 
American editors and journalists to republish the articles.365 These instructions were quickly 
realized. In Panama City, U.S. Ambassador John Wiley already knew which newspapers would 
republish.366 U.S. Ambassador in Caracas Fletcher Warren managed to have the two original 
articles, and a few others, reprinted in Venezuelan newspapers in September.367 Whereas 
historians have presented the Bureau in 1952 as led by Latin Americanist experts who respected 
the non-interventionist ideal, those officials had actually implemented a propaganda project 
designed to denounce Guatemalan communism. Before Operation PBFORTUNE, the State 
Department was already engaging in interventionist activities in opposition to Arbenz’s 
government. 
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 This chapter examines how in the early 1950s U.S. officials, Guatemalan exiles, and 
members of the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network established the foundation for 
Operation PBFORTUNE. The State Department under Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs Edward Miller, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs Thomas Mann, and other Latin Americanist officials approved a new U.S. Cold War-
oriented policy toward Guatemala that retained the public image of the U.S. government’s 
adherence to the non-intervention ideal while allowing direct intervention to encourage 
opposition against Arbenz’s government. Guatemalan exile doctor Carlos Padilla y Padilla, 
Somoza, and Trujillo built relationships with U.S. president Harry Truman’s military aides, 
general Harry Vaughan and colonel Cornelius Mara. Guatemalan exiles and the network 
indirectly shaped U.S. policy toward Guatemala as the CIA considered how the network’s 
members already supported Guatemalan exile colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. At that point, 
Somoza utilized his relationships to lobby for a 1952 visit. Seemingly disparate, these events 
together would lead into the discussions surrounding Operation PBFORTUNE. 
 Alongside its taking into account the actions of Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean Basin 
dictators, this chapter challenges the literature’s presentation of Miller, Mann, and the staff of the 
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs as devoted adherents to the non-intervention ideal. Scholarship 
has focused upon the Dwight Eisenhower Administration’s policies toward Guatemala, only 
briefly touched upon Operation PBFORTUNE in 1952, and inadvertently overlooked important 
shifts in the early 1950s regarding the State Department and CIA’s policies toward Guatemala.368 
Richard Immerman, Bryce Wood, and Stephen Rabe have emphasized how Miller, Mann, and 
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their fellow Latin Americanist officials opposed any plot that would have undermined the U.S. 
government’s adherence to the non-intervention ideal.369 Instead, this chapter finds that the 
international Cold War increasingly shaped these officials’ interpretations of events in 
Guatemala. Emphasizing the growing strength of communism in Guatemala under Arbenz’s 
government, Miller and Mann by 1951 led the State Department in turning away from the U.S. 
government’s adherence to the non-intervention ideal. 
 
A. The State Department, Guatemala, and the International Cold War, Early 1950s 
 By 1952, Latin Americanist officials in the State Department came to define Arbenz’s 
government as a communist threat to U.S. national security and inter-American solidarity. 
Officials since the mid-1940s had debated the extent of communist penetration in Guatemala but 
believed in 1950 that the new government under Arbenz would alleviate U.S.-Guatemalan 
tensions and that the Guatemalan Army functioned as a reliable anti-communist institution. 
Escalating importance placed upon Cold War-related events, such as the Korean War, and 
Arbenz’s policies, especially Decree 900’s Agrarian Reform in May 1952, ended these 
expectations. 
 Anti-communism heavily influenced U.S. policy toward Guatemala in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. Piero Gleijeses in Shattered Hope argues that anti-communism emerged as an 
important but often unclear factor as the Cold War escalated. Into the late 1940s, officials’ 
perceptions of communist influence of Guatemala best reflected their generally “confused 
analysis of the country,” as when one official remarked that they between 1947 and 1951 
frequently debated whether Arévalo’s government “w[as] communist, crypto-communist, under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




communist influence[,] or not communist at all.”370 While in 1950 it probably would not have 
opposed a coup that originated within Guatemala, the State Department did not actively conspire 
against Arévalo’s government.371 
 The perceptions of and debates among Latin Americanist officials, most notably Miller 
and Mann, epitomized the State Department’s increasing focus on communist influence in 
Guatemala. Secretary of State Dean Acheson focused upon Cold War conflicts in Europe, the 
Middle East, and Asia. Robert Beisner describes how Acheson “usually did little more than stick 
his head in Miller’s office to see how things were going [in Latin America]. For most countries 
in the [Western] hemisphere, Miller, desk officers, and envoys in the field did the work.”372 For 
these reasons, Miller and Mann’s opinions and leadership of the Bureau of Inter-American 
Affairs heavily shaped U.S. policy toward Guatemala in the early 1950s. 
 At the turn of the decade, the two Latin Americanists worried about events in Guatemala 
but did not believe the country was under communist domination. Miller at the end of 1949 had 
“expressed his serious concern over the increasingly hostile attitude of the Guatemalan 
Government toward U.S. business interests there” and “the radical leftists tendencies of many 
Guatemalan officials.” One official claimed, “Miller stated his interest in working out some plan 
for letting the Guatemalan Government realize in no uncertain terms that the Department does 
not intend to stand by, blind to its interests, with a policy of inaction.”373 When the Guatemalan 
president asked for the removal of U.S. Ambassador in Guatemala City Richard Patterson, Miller 
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criticized Arévalo’s action.374 In a September 1949 briefing, he emphasized the poor treatment of 
U.S. businesses in Guatemala, the lack of common ground between the their respective 
delegations at the United Nations (UN), and the Guatemalan government’s not having signed the 
1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty.375 
 As requirements for any improvement in relations, the State Department expected the 
Guatemalan government to support U.S. Cold War-oriented policy at the UN regarding the 
Korean War, endorse the Rio Treaty, and encourage domestic anti-communist sentiment. The 
Guatemalan government’s position on the Korean War became an important issue. Officials at 
the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City in mid-1950 organized a visit by Miller to Guatemala.376 
During their meeting, Miller repeatedly touched upon the Korean War, and the Guatemalan 
president on multiple occasions “gave categoric [sic] assurances that Guatemala’s international 
position [was] one of support of the United States and the United Nations.” Arévalo’s response 
not only assured Miller; the official assumed that the president’s position would give indirect 
support to the country’s moderates.377 Mann, too, endorsed this affirmation.378 
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 Developments regarding the Rio Treaty proved equally promising. The State Department 
had blamed anti-U.S. sentiment and Guatemalan communists for the government’s refusal to 
ratify the Rio Treaty.379 Since 1947, U.S. officials had “consistently urged the Guatemalan 
Government to ratify the Rio Treaty,” yet the Guatemalan congress refused.380 With the outbreak 
of the Korean War, Guatemalan officials sent the Rio Treaty to the congress with Arévalo’s 
approval, once again earning Mann’s endorsement.381 Though the Guatemalan government 
issued a reservation on Belize, Chargé d’Affaires in Guatemala City Milton Wells reported that 
only a few communists expressed their discontent.382 
 Adding to the seeming improvement in relations, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs 
interpreted Arbenz’s election in November 1950 as beneficial. A May 1950 assessment of U.S.-
Guatemalan relations took note of the influential communists inside the Guatemalan government 
but still repeated Miller and Mann’s opinions that recent developments favored moderates or 
“more responsible elements.”383 Throughout their reports, they believed Arbenz would steer the 
country back to the “center” and marginalize vocal communists.384 Even while urging others to 
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maintain a “watchful-waiting” attitude and “reserve judgment,” Wells admitted the election 
offered some “optimism.”385 
 Such hopes soon dimmed as the Bureau came to characterize the new president as 
undesirable. Though not defining Arbenz as a communist, officials concluded that communists 
profited from his election, created communist-led organizations, and occupied important 
positions, whether in the Guatemalan congress or the Institute of Social Security.386 In their 
reports, officials lamented that “the ascending curve of communist influence has not even tended 
to level off, but has rather continued upward on an accelerated incline.”387 Once signaling a 
positive turn, the Korean War and Guatemala’s reservation on the Rio Treaty now exacerbated 
U.S.-Guatemalan tensions. The State Department contrasted all other Latin American 
governments’ endorsements of the Rio Treaty against the Guatemalan government’s lone 
reservation. Expecting contributions to U.S. efforts regarding the Korean War, officials reported 
that the new government “failed to meet squarely the important issue of Communist infiltration 
at a time when U.S. blood and treasure [were] being expended in defense against Communist 
aggression.”388 
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 By early 1952, the State Department juxtaposed Guatemalan communism with 
international communism and the Soviet Union as detrimental to Cold War-oriented goals and 
possible threats to U.S. national security. Officials warned Arbenz’s government about persons 
in Guatemala linked to international communism. The president ignored these recommendations 
while communists shaped his government’s policies, published pro-Soviet materials, and 
organized communist parties. Reviewing hemispheric relations, U.S. officials noticed the only 
country not a signatory to the Rio Treaty.389 In a March 1952 letter, Miller summarized, “No 
doubt as communism flourishes in Guatemala, it will have increasing influence in neighboring 
countries.”390 
 In deliberations, U.S. officials came to doubt the Guatemalan Army’s role as a reliable 
anti-communist institution and contributor to hemispheric defense. U.S. policy aimed to 
reinforce the Army as “the most effective bulwark in that country against the spread of 
Communist influence.” Although Guatemala occupied a small role in hemispheric defense, 
tensions prevented the application of new inter-American defense agreements, such as the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Act, or Guatemala’s taking a position in the Inter-American Defense 
Board.391 By 1952, U.S. officials determined that communism would erode the strength of the 
Army and other anti-communist institutions.392 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
toward Latin America, see Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor 
and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 175-228. 
389 “Policy Statement,” Washington, 02 May 1951, 611.14/5-251, in FRUS 1951, 1420, 1432, 
1434-1435. 
390 Edward G. Miller, Jr., to George P. Shaw, U.S. Ambassador in San Salvador, 10 March 1952, 
NARAII, RG59, EGM, Box 7, Folder “Guatemala.” 
391 “Policy Statement,” Washington, 02 May 1951, 611.14/5-251, in FRUS 1951, 1428-1429; 
“Paper,” [Washington,] 12 June 1951, Under Secretary’s Meetings, Lot 53 D 250, in FRUS 
1951, 1438. 




 As these concerns escalated, Arbenz’s government implemented the Agrarian Reform 
program under Decree 900 in May 1952.393 U.S. officials noted that the project relied upon 
communist officials and party members to implement the policy and organize peasants. 
Gleijeses, Nick Cullather, and other scholars present the program as the key moment when U.S. 
officials, congresspersons, and journalists interpreted Arbenz’s government and Guatemala as 
dominated by communist influence and a Soviet puppet.394 While Arbenz’s government drafted 
the Reform, the Bureau led the State Department, the military, and the CIA in concluding in the 
March 1952 National Intelligence Estimate 62 (NIE-62), “The political situation in Guatemala 
adversely affects U.S. interests and constitutes a potential threat to US security.”395 
 
B. Miller, Mann, and the New U.S. Cold War-Oriented Policy toward Guatemala 
 Even before the Agrarian Reform, Miller and Mann in 1951 approved a new Cold War-
oriented policy that allowed for the U.S. government’s direct intervention in Guatemalan affairs 
to encourage opposition to Arbenz’s government as long as the image of the U.S. government’s 
adherence to the non-intervention ideal remained intact. A year earlier, Latin Americanist 
officials hoped that the appearance of U.S. respect for sovereignty would actual assist anti-
communist groups in Guatemala.396 However, Miller and Mann soon changed their minds. 
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 Later that year, Mann already believed direct intervention might become a necessary 
option. In May, Thomas Corcoran on behalf of the United Fruit Company (UFCO) approached 
him and asked if the State Department would play a role in the November 1950 elections in 
Guatemala. Mann told the lawyer that “any attempt by the [U.S.] Government to intervene would 
not only be counterproductive, but would meet with opposition in Guatemala, in the other 
American republics[,] and in the United States itself.” Corcoran then mentioned that U.S. 
companies could quietly influence the Guatemalan elections, but Mann doubted that such 
intervention would remain hidden. Rebuffed, the lawyer attempted one more time to gain his 
support. Corcoran noted the chance that various groups in the United States might be open to a 
more aggressive policy. Once again, the Latin Americanist official affirmed his faith in the non-
intervention ideal. “I would be surprised,” he retorted,” if a majority of the American public 
should wish to sacrifice hemisphere [sic] solidarity and the Inter-American system.”397 At first 
glance, this conversation cements Mann’s place in the historical literature as a staunch defender 
of the non-intervention ideal, but his comments show that he at least left the door open for 
dialogue. At the end of the conversation, he commented that he did not wish “to guess what the 
policy in the future might be if it were definitely determined [by the State Department] that the 
Guatemalan Government and people had fallen under the totalitarian control of Communist 
elements.” Rather than interpreting the non-intervention ideal as sacrosanct or inviolable, he 
admitted that, in the event of “overriding military considerations,” the Bureau might cast the 
ideal to the side.398 
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 Such considerations built up in the aftermath of Arbenz’s election. The month after the 
election, Mann, Assistant Officer in Charge of Central America and Panama Affairs Ernest 
Siracusa, and colonel Cornelius Mara met with Guatemala’s representative on the Inter-
American Defense Board, colonel Oscar Morales López, to discuss the Guatemalan Army’s 
requests for U.S. armaments. Over the course of the conversation, the two officials reiterated 
their government’s refusal to intervene and noted the Bureau’s hopes that Arbenz’s election 
would galvanize moderate groups there. However, they then claimed that the Bureau might take 
up a “re-consideration” of policy. Coming in the aftermath of Mann’s meeting with Corcoran, 
their explanation seemed to blend the lawyer and the Latin Americanist’s positions. In the 
absence of a “positive stand” by Arbenz’s government to halt communist inroads, they 
hypothesized, “public opinion in the United States and elsewhere in the Hemisphere would 
probably support a more direct approach to the problem.” The U.S. government, of course, 
would need to “manag[e] the situation in Guatemala skillfully and well” and assess future 
policies, “possibly with consultation of leading American republics.” Whereas Mann earlier had 
feared that intervention would undermine hemispheric solidarity and the inter-American system, 
they now saw it as a possible solution before any “real damage can be done within the Inter-
American System and to hemispheric solidarity.”399 
 Miller, too, was gauging such possibilities. In mid-1951, his colleagues produced a report 
on developments in Guatemala from March to May.400 Commenting on the paper, Miller 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 Colonel Oscar Morales López, Colonel Cornelius J. Mara, Thomas C. Mann, Ernest V. 
Siracusa, “Subject: Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Officer in Charge of Central 
America and Panama Affairs (Siracusa),” [Washington,] 29 December 1950, 714.562/12-2950, 
in FRUS 1950, 928-930. 
400 W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Office of Inter-American Affairs, to Albert F. Nufer, Director of 
Office of Middle American Affairs, Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs, Edward G. Miller, Jr., “Subject: Review of Recent Developments in 
 
 143 
proposed the propaganda project that would ultimately be implemented in 1952. Over recent 
months, the Bureau had been considering initiating the project. The project aimed to implant 
anti-communist and anti-Arbenz articles in various Latin American newspapers, and the latest 
events in Guatemala had led him to put the propaganda program up for consideration. The one-
time champion of non-intervention thus requested in early June a memorandum “recommending 
for the approval” from the Under Secretary to move forward with the project and “put the 
squeeze on the commies in Guatemala.”401 
 By mid-1951, Miller and Mann led the State Department toward intervention in order to 
encourage local resistance to Arbenz’s government. In June 1951, Mann informed the State 
Department that the Department of American Republic Affairs “decided that it is advisable to 
apply certain economic pressures,” ranging from cutting funds for the Inter-American Highway 
and hospital construction to reducing trade. He warned that the “proposed policy is, in effect, a 
violation of the Non-intervention Agreement” and “pointed out that these proposed actions 
would be the first of its kind since the establishment of the Good Neighbor Policy” that had been 
“a corner-stone of our Latin American foreign policy.” Regarding the public image of the 
government’s adherence to those principles, he “emphasized that [the U.S. government] should 
proceed quietly” and warned, “If it became obvious that [U.S. officials] were violating this 
agreement, . . . other Latin American governments would rally to the support of Guatemala,” 
“strengthen[ing] the hands of the nationalists and communists.” When others noted that 
economic pressures would increase unemployment and strengthen communism, he replied “that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Communist Penetration of Guatemala,” Washington, 07 June 1951, 714.001/6-751, NARAII, 
RG59, Decimal File 1950-1954, Box 3249. 
401 Edward G. Miller, Jr., to W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., “Subject: Review of Recent Developments 
in Communist Penetration of Guatemala,” Washington, 07 June 1951, FW714.001/6-751, 
NARAII, RG59, Decimal File 1950-1954, Box 3249. 
 
 144 
the situation in Guatemala would get worse instead of better and that the communists would fight 
in order to retain their power,” for the communists were “well organized and ha[d] arms.” Rather 
than presenting such a development as detrimental to U.S. policy toward Guatemala, Mann 
believed economic pressures would affect the “pocketbooks” of Guatemalan anti-communists 
and “stimulate action against the communists.” He concluded “that the center and right elements 
in Guatemala will see that it is necessary to get together and clean their own house.”402 
 Miller approved. The following month, he wrote to Deputy Director of the Office of 
International Trade Loring Macy and outlined how Arbenz’s government remained “unwilling or 
unable to act against the communists.” He summarized for Macy that the Department “recently 
saw fit to review its policy towards Guatemala and, as a result, adopted certain measures 
designed to persuade the government that its best interests do not lie in the perpetuation of its 
present attitudes.” Policy toward Guatemala now withheld technical and financial assistance, 
limited armaments sales, prevented U.S. and international loans, and applied economic pressure. 
As Mann had outlined, the Department would “attempt to insure that at no time will 
[Guatemalan] officials have any tangible grounds on which to accuse the United States of 
discriminating against Guatemala for political reasons or of attempting to intervene in her 
internal affairs.”403 
 This new policy remained in effect in 1952. In February, the Department discussed a 
request by Arbenz’s government for road-building equipment. The Latin Americanist officials 
aimed to limit funds, assistance, equipment, and trade to Guatemala “without, however, exposing 
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ourselves to charges that we were violating any of our Inter-American commitments.” As had 
Miller and Mann, Edward Clark of the Office of Middle American Affairs emphasized that 
officials were “to be selective and relatively cautious in the application of this [new U.S. Cold 
War-oriented] policy in order to avoid the possibility that Guatemala could document a case in 
the Organization of American States or elsewhere that we were engaging in economic warfare in 
violation of our commitments.” Clark summarized, “If the Guatemalans suspect or conclude 
among themselves that we are not being fully cooperative . . . we will have succeeded entirely in 
our purpose. However, we should never by our actions give them proof that we are not being 
cooperative.”404 
 
C. General Harry Vaughan, Colonel Cornelius Mara, Guatemalan Exiles, and 
Caribbean Basin Dictators before Operation PBFORTUNE 
 Before 1952, Truman’s two military aides general Harry Vaughan and colonel Cornelius 
Mara were already familiar with the regions’ political divisions and had cordial relationships 
with Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean Basin dictators. The two aides served important roles in 
the early 1950s as military advisors on trips through the Caribbean Basin to evaluate military 
assistance programs in the region. In the process, Guatemalan exile doctor Carlos Padilla y 
Padilla, Somoza, and Trujillo built advantageous relationships with Vaughan and Mara. 
 Vaughan and Mara understood regional and U.S.-Guatemalan tensions. While preparing 
for a visit to Guatemala, Vaughan had discussed local affairs with Latin Americanist official 
Paul Daniels who asked him to share any observations while in Guatemala. Daniels stressed that 
the “present political situation in the Central American countries is a little tense” and “the visit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 “Memorandum of Conversation, by Edward W. Clark of the Office of Middle American 
Affairs,” [Washington,] 05 February 1952, 814.2612/2-552, in FRUS 1952-1954, 1028. 
 
 146 
might be construed by countries not sympathetic with the Arévalo government as United States 
approval of the latter.” Vaughan responded that “he had no intention of making any public 
statements, which . . . would be especially dangerous at [the] time.”405 Mara similarly 
participated in the December 1950 discussion with Mann, Assistant Officer in Charge of Central 
America and Panama Affairs Ernest Siracusa, and Morales López when Mann and Siracusa 
highlighted their preoccupations with Guatemala.406 
 In early 1951, Vaughan, Mara, and general Wallace Graham prepared to travel to 
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, with the final visit to coincide with Arbenz’s presidential 
inauguration. For four reasons, Siracusa interjected that the officers should not visit Guatemala. 
First, Arévalo had recalled U.S. Ambassador in Guatemala City Richard Patterson, an issue that 
vexed the State Department.407 Siracusa reasoned it would “seem improper for” anyone from the 
U.S. “President’s personal staff” to visit Guatemala. Second, he feared any “tension” and the 
“constant possibility of repercussions” following the November 1950 elections. Third, he 
considered the “trouble” that could follow any honors given by Arbenz to Vaughan and Mara. 
Siracusa supposed that the “Communist elements” in Guatemala who elected Arbenz feared his 
welcoming U.S. military officers and would interpret their arrival as proof that Arbenz was 
“preparing to abandon [the Communist elements] for a more moderate course.” Fourth, Siracusa 
complained about the Guatemalan government’s position on the Korean War, “We have had 
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nearly 50,000 casualties in Korea,” yet the “Guatemalan Government’s attitude toward 
international Communism is still equivocal.”408 
 Vaughan informed Mann that Guatemalan military officials had invited the aides, but 
Clark expanded on his colleague’s position. He stressed Arévalo’s “toleration and coddling of 
the Communists,” Arbenz’s having been “elected with the cooperation and support of the 
Communists,” and Arbenz’s showing “no official indication [to] reverse the policies of President 
Arévalo” and mend relations after Patterson’s recall.409 These protests shaped the final decision 
as Undersecretary of State James Webb wrote, “Because of the unsatisfactory state of relations 
between the United States and Guatemala, it is believed that our delegation to the inauguration 
should be one which meets the minimum demands of protocol without, however, affording the 
Guatemalan Government grounds for taking offense.”410 The resulting removal of Guatemala 
from the itinerary reflected the escalating influence of the Cold War on the Department’s policy. 
 Additionally, Vaughan and Mara’s itinerary reveals how Padilla had established a 
relationship with Truman’s two military aides.411 Padilla had been included as the aides’ 
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interpreter, but the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa and Honduran Ambassador in Washington 
Rafael Heliodoro Valle quickly intervened. Heliodoro Valle requested that U.S. officials 
discourage Truman’s military aides from allowing Padilla to serve as translator.412 One of the 
officials who sought to distance the State Department from Padilla in 1947, Gordon Reid agreed, 
“I can see no reason for [Padilla’s] accompanying the President’s military aide . . . and to be 
giving the impression that he is a man of influence.” He warned that Padilla had “been known to 
be involved in plots allegedly leading toward the assassination of various presidents,” was “not 
noted for his general honesty, and had “atrocious” English. Reid concluded that the aides “could 
not receive [Padilla].” Heliodoro Valle “bluntly stated that he had repeatedly hinted to [Truman’s 
military aides] that another person would be more suitable” as an interpreter but “had been 
unsuccessful in getting [Vaughan or Mara] to take his hint.”413 
 Siracusa had to call upon Mara, “I said [to Mara] that a check in our files had revealed 
information to the effect that Dr. Padilla had long been known for his involvement in 
revolutionary plots, particularly in Guatemala.” Siracusa highlighted “that because of this fact it 
might be a matter of concern to the Guatemalans that Dr. Padilla was accompanying a group” of 
officers “who were official guests of a friendly Government.” He even suggested that Padilla’s 
presence “might also be [a] cause of embarrassment to Honduras.” Mara understood this position 
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and agreed to Padilla’s removal.414 When meeting at the White House, Vaughan and Mara “said 
that Padilla had been instrumental in arranging the trip” to Honduras but wished “to avoid 
embarrassment to the Honduran Ambassador.” The aides stated that “they would tell [Padilla] 
that since the trip had become official due to the invitation of the Honduran Government it had 
been necessary to make a check on all persons who were going.”415 
 Somoza similarly held cordial relationships with the aides. Before arriving in Honduras, 
Vaughan and Mara visited Managua, whereupon the dictator insisted they return to Managua 
after finishing their work.416 During the subsequent trip, multiple Nicaraguan officials greeted 
Vaughan and Mara, and Somoza took them to a luncheon at Managua’s Hotel Majestic and held 
a reception at the Club Terraza. Siracusa described the officers’ time in Managua as “highly 
successful” and noted, “The personalities of Generals Somoza and Vaughan were most 
congenial.”417 U.S. Ambassador in Managua Capus Waynick too reported favorably to Truman 
on the visit.418 
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 Trujillo’s officials also attempted to build cordial relationships with Vaughan and Mara. 
He, as did Somoza, had a long history of inviting U.S. military officials to the Dominican 
Republic and consistently provided a welcoming environment, military decorations, and other 
amenities to facilitate such relationships.419 Trujillo in July 1951 had Dominican Ambassador in 
Washington Luis Thomen award the decoration of the Order of Juan Pablo Duarte to Vaughan in 
an event included in Dominican propaganda materials in the United States.420 During 
negotiations in July 1952 for F-47 planes, Thomen wrote that “Colonel C. J. Mara, member of 
the Group of Assistants of President Truman, . . . was helping me to hurry up this matter.”421 
Trujillo and Thomen, as had Somoza and Padilla, cultivated beneficial relationships with 
Vaughan and Mara. 
 
D. The CIA, the Caribbean Basin Anti-Communist Network, and Castillo Armas, 
Early 1950s 
 In the early 1950s, the CIA became an important force behind proposals to support 
indigenous counter-revolutionary movements against Arbenz’s government. In analyses, the 
Agency did not know about the links and intelligence-sharing within the Caribbean Basin anti-
communist network but recognized that certain regimes provided aid to Castillo Armas and 
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Guatemalan exiles. Additionally, Director Walter Bedell Smith and Deputy Director Allen 
Dulles resembled Miller and Mann, for they also sought projects to strengthen anti-communist 
opposition in Guatemala without undermining the image of non-intervention. 
 Before the early 1950s, the CIA focused on what they believed to be conflicts and regions 
central to the international Cold War and did not invest significant resources on or attention 
toward Guatemala. Reports discussed the Korean War, Soviet capabilities in the world, Chinese 
communism, Turkey, Italy, Greece, and other areas crucial in the Cold War, and Cullather’s 
redacted but officially commissioned history of the CIA in Guatemala stresses that “Guatemala 
remained a low priority” before the early 1950s.422 In 1951 Latin America remained “favorable 
to US interests” with Guatemala only noted for “pronounced anti-US attitudes in high official 
circles.” Despite communist attempts to encourage isolationist sentiments among Latin 
Americans, the majority of governments endorsed the Rio Treaty and would side with the United 
States during the ideological conflict.423 
 Gradually, the Cold War influenced analyses. Cullather finds that, by the time of the 
Korean War, officials “were more apt to draw parallels [between Guatemala and] Korea, Russia, 
or Eastern Europe” and became “more apprehensive about Guatemala than their counterparts” in 
the State Department.424 In mid-1950, reports highlighted “the rapid growth of Communist 
activity in Guatemala and the probability that Guatemala may become the central point for the 
dissemination of anti-US propaganda in Central America and the Caribbean islands.”425 
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Eventually, the Agency concluded with the State Department and military in 1952’s NIE-62 that 
communism aimed to weaken anti-communist institutions such as the Guatemalan Army and 
threatened U.S. national security and Cold War-oriented goals.426 
 It was the CIA that implemented one of the first programs to intervene in Guatemalan 
affairs and encourage anti-communist opposition. In August 1950, the Agency’s Office of Policy 
Coordination (OPC) argued that it was “considered necessary and appropriate to commence 
counter-propaganda.” They suggested creating a “psychological warfare program” that would 
appear “indigenous in its origins” and rely upon “native elements.”427 An operative even enrolled 
in Guatemala’s Instituto de Antropología e Historia [Institute of Anthropology and History]. 
Since the project received only $6,000 in funding and produced nothing consequential, this 
project was far from “the beginning of a sustained effort to deal with [Guatemalan communism] 
by covert means.”428 
 It was also the Agency that became the first U.S. government institution to evaluate the 
prospects of aiding Castillo Armas. After meeting with Mann in May 1950, the lawyer Corcoran 
approached Dulles, “but without approval from [the] State [Department], [the] CIA evinced little 
interest.”429 In late October 1951, the National Security Council’s (NSC) Executive Secretary 
James ‘Jimmy’ Lay requested that Bedell Smith meet with a representative of the UFCO and 
other U.S. business interests in Guatemala.430 The next month, the representative offered “the use 
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of [U.S. businesses’] facilities and personnel to assist [the] CIA in any program which [the 
Agency] may contemplate for combating the growth of Communism in Guatemala” and 
provided Dulles with a contact through the UFCO in New Orleans. Dulles told the representative 
that his Agency was “very much interested in his proposal.”431 Soon, Bedell Smith and Dulles 
brought the proposal to colonel J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division for the 
Directorate of Operations of the CIA.432 On November 14, Bedell Smith’s assistant wrote Lay 
that the representative had “offered the facilities and personnel of [the companies] to assist [the] 
CIA in any current or proposed operations which we may conduct to combat the growth of 
Communism in Guatemala.” The assistant confirmed, “[The] CIA is very interested in this offer 
and will pursue the matter further through direct contact with the officials of the United Fruit 
Company with whom we are already working in another connection.”433 
 It is probable that Corcoran and the UFCO representative sought out the CIA’s aid to 
support Castillo Armas. In October 1952, the Agency reported that involvement with the exile 
originated before March 1952 when the lawyer approached them “for assistance to [the] Castillo 
Armas and [Guatemalan anti-communist leader Juan] Córdova Cerna movement.”434 The lawyer 
had lobbied Mann and Dulles around May 1950, coinciding with Castillo Armas’s maneuvering 
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for support from the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network.435 Consequently, it is likely 
Castillo Armas at his own initiative had already created a relationship with Corcoran and the 
UFCO.436 Due to Castillo Armas’s relationships with Somoza and Carías, one of the dictators 
may have introduced the exile or convinced the UFCO to back the exile.437 
 By early 1952, the Agency was analyzing the strength of exiles such as Castillo Armas 
yet remaining unclear on the links between the exiles and Caribbean Basin regimes. In January 
1952, King provided an evaluation of Guatemala for Frank Wisner, Deputy Director of Plans for 
the CIA. King outlined, “At least three Guatemalan exile groups are plotting against the Arbenz 
regime.” The three leaders, Castillo Armas, colonel Arturo Ramírez, and general Miguel 
Ydígoras Fuentes, were already linked to Caribbean Basin dictators.438 Still, the Agency did not 
have accurate information on these links or the exiles’ sources of support through the network. In 
one instance, King correctly identified that the UFCO offered support to Castillo Armas but 
alleged that the exile’s other patron was Peruvian without mentioning Somoza. In another 
instance, he did not list any sources of support for Ramírez with the exception of “American oil 
promoters” and placed Ramírez in exile since 1948, not 1945.439 
 With such poor knowledge, the CIA began evaluating Castillo Armas’s capabilities 
following rumors that he planned an important revolt at the end of January. On January 19, 
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officials reported that he had support from the Guatemalan Army for a revolt in the last days of 
January but were uncertain whether he was in Honduras, El Salvador, or Mexico.440 Not 
surprisingly, the Agency authorized an agent to “locate but not contact Carlos Castillo 
Armas.”441 Similar to Caribbean Basin dictators in early 1950, officials gathered more details 
about the revolt and support inside and outside Guatemala, including weapons in Honduras, 
support from anti-communist students in Guatemala City, promises of aid from the UFCO, and 
allies in the Guatemalan Army in such districts as Jutiapa and Quetzaltenango.442 The CIA soon 
determined that the exile had the support of Córdova Cerna’s anti-communist organization and 
some members of the Guatemalan Army, but a Guatemalan Army captain based in Jutiapa 
explained on January 25 that Castillo Armas delayed the January revolt.443 
 By March 1952, the CIA began to meet with individuals close to Castillo Armas. One 
official reported conversations with the UFCO representative’s New Orleans contact and an 
associate of the exile in Mexico City. The contact claimed that Castillo Armas’s movement had 
“a good chance of succeeding” while admitting “uncertainty as to [the movement’s] plans, 
resources, requirements, and opposition.” The associate insisted that the exile had “the moral, 
and possibly some material, support of ex-President Carías of Honduras and the good will of 
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President Gálvez” and alleged that he had “been promised the support of President Somoza of 
Nicaragua who has offered to send a personal representative with [Castillo Armas] to ask aid of 
President Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.” The agent commented on March 17 on the “lack 
of intelligence” on Castillo Armas’s activities and suggested that the exile “prepare a complete 
Order to Battle to include all details of [the] Guatemalan Government and [the] opposition[‘s] 
strength.”444 The next day, orders went out for contacts in Tegucigalpa “to receive [the] first 
report [on Castillo Armas] and set up [a] secure method of receiving weekly reports through 
[the] embassy pouch.”445 On March 22, King concluded that “Castillo [Armas] must be 
contacted” and requested information on “opposi[tion] forces” against Arbenz’s government; any 
“opportunity for buying support, particularly [from the Guatemalan] Army[,] Guardia Civil[,] 
and key gov[ernment] figures;” and “all details required for estimating [the] success of [the] 
proposed movement [from Castillo Armas] and how we can assist.”446 In April, the Agency 
reported further meetings with Castillo Armas’s associates in Mexico City and information on 
the Guatemalan Army, anti-communist students in Guatemala, and the proposed invasion.447 
 By May 1952, meetings took place between the Agency and the exile’s allies.448 One 
official reported meetings with Castillo Armas’s associates at the Westbury Hotel in New York 
City and that the exile was “willing to delay his movement until he is given the green light.”449 
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King himself met with another ally at the Hotel Carlton and outlined contacts who would “serve 
as the cut-out between Castillo Armas” and the CIA while handling “all military matters.”450 The 
Agency by May 1952 had already begun evaluating the exile’s sources of support inside and 
outside Guatemala and links to the network’s members, in spite of their seeming ignorance of the 
depth of his support from within the Caribbean Basin. 
 
E. Somoza Lobbies for a Washington Visit 
 While the CIA established links with Castillo Armas, Somoza lobbied for a visit to 
Washington. The dictator needed to visit Boston for reasons related to his health but hoped to 
meet with important U.S. officials, so he employed his connections with Vaughan and U.S. 
Ambassador in Managua Thomas Whelan. 
 Somoza relied heavily upon Whelan, knowing from Nicaraguan and Dominican officials 
that the ambassador was actually soliciting the dictator’s visit.451 In February 1952, noting 
Somoza’s imminent visit, Whelan wrote to Miller that the dictator “need[ed] to have a small 
operation performed.” The ambassador explained that Somoza “would also like to have the red 
carpet unrolled for him in Washington” and added, “I am told on [the] best of authority that 
Somoza would rather have a decoration from [the U.S. government] than anything else in the 
world.” Whelan assured Miller that Commander in Chief of Caribbean Command lieutenant 
general William Morris, Jr., believed the dictator “was one of the best friends we had and 
[Morris] thought we ought to be able to cook up some sort of decoration for [Somoza].” The 
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ambassador even mentioned, “I know that the Congressmen who have visited me, and who, of 
course, talked with [Somoza], would not object.” Whelan concluded, “What would be the 
objection to inviting him to Washington and pinning a decoration on him?”452 
 Miller rejected Whelan’s suggestion, citing a similar suggestion from Nicaraguan 
Ambassador in Washington Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa which had received no encouragement. 
Miller warned that the dictator “would be up here unofficially[,] and I believe there would be 
embarrassing consequences if he came to Washington without invitation.” Facing a backlog of 
requests for visits that were delayed from construction on the White House, Miller opposed even 
unofficial visits. Instead, he offered alternative accommodations and “some kind of military 
decoration [from] the Army.” Promising to meet Somoza elsewhere, he assured Whelan of the 
dictator’s favorable position: “Please bear in mind that I am extremely fond of Tacho [Somoza] 
and wish that there were more people in high positions in South America who are as friendly to 
the United States.”453 
 The dictator kept pressing. Claiming “Somoza invited himself,” on April 09 Miller 
admitted to Acheson that Somoza was headed for the United States.454 The dictator already lined 
up the first days of May for the visit. Attempting to accommodate, Miller stressed the informal 
nature of the visit and only recommended “minimum courtesies due a Chief of State.”455 
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 Vaughan then intervened. Not content with the ‘unofficial’ status, the aide used his 
position to upgrade the visit’s prestige and courtesies. On April 7, he handwrote Truman that 
Somoza “has expressed his intention of coming to Washington to repay the visit of his ‘good 
friend Senator Truman in 1938.’” While admitting that Somoza was “a ‘dictator’ by some 
standards,” Vaughan also noted his “firm friend[ship with] the USA and Harry Truman,” 
concluding that “We should give him some recognition plus a dinner and a ‘kidney medal.’” 
Vaughan took credit for being considered by the State Department as “an authority (?) on Central 
America.”456 Truman showed little interest, “I wish you would discuss Simoza’s [sic] visit with 
State and Defense. It is going to be rather difficult to take care of him[,] but we will manage it 
some way.”457 Vaughan switched to the State Department, asking the same.458 
 Miller and the State Department continued to treat Somoza’s visit as ‘unofficial.’ 
Siracusa repeated Miller’s preference that the dictator would be classified an ‘unofficial’ guest 
with the “minimum courtesies due a Chief of State.” Siracusa and Truman’s Chief of Protocol R. 
D. Muir recommended that Truman meet with Somoza and host a small luncheon on May 2.459 
Miller provided Acheson a memorandum describing a tentative schedule that included Somoza’s 
meeting with Acheson, Somoza’s meeting with Truman, and Truman’s hosting a small luncheon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Major General Harry H. Vaughan to Harry S. Truman, 07 April 1952, HST, PSF, Subject 
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for Somoza on May 2.460 Recognizing that Acheson did not hold the dictator in the highest 
regards, Miller reassured the Secretary of State that the program did not include “any 
entertainment by you.”461 Acheson seemed persuaded and recommended Truman to show the 
dictator “the minimum courtesies due a Chief of State.”462 
 Acheson and Miller reminded Whelan of the ‘unofficial’ nature of Somoza’s visit, giving 
“leeway for additional informal functions by GEN[eral] Vaughan or CONG[ressional] leaders.” 
Miller stressed the need to not create a precedent, potentially leading to “[a] procession of self-
invited guests through WASH[ington] which [would] completely disrupt WASH[ington’s] 
official and social life.”463 
 But Vaughan did not relent. Calling Miller on April 10, the aide claimed to have “spoken 
to [Truman] concerning the proposed visit of Somoza,” and that the President had reassured him 
that, despite “some embarrassing aspects” of the visit, U.S. officials “had to give Somoza the 
honors due his office.” Skeptical, Miller reached out to his fellow Latin Americanist officials 
Mann, Siracusa, and Albert Nufer, asking for confirmation of Vaughan’s claims. Miller finally 
rebuffed the aide, explaining “the importance of differentiating between unofficial and state 
visits.” While agreeing in principle, Vaughan insisted that the dictator receive “the customary 
medal of Commander of the Legion of Merit.” The aide’s efforts were to no avail. Miller 
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emphasized the risk of stirring “the wrath of the American press on us and on Somoza.” 
Vaughan bowed to this argument.464 
 And yet, in mid-April, Somoza attempted to extend the visit. Frustrated with the 
dictator’s self-invitation, Miller warned that any extension of Somoza’s time in Washington 
would conflict with other meetings and pleaded for Whelan to dissuade the dictator.465 Searching 
for a conciliatory schedule, John Ohmans of the Office of Middle American Affairs asked if the 
dictator could follow the original plan.466 After The New York Times on April 20 cited Somoza’s 
visit as semi-official, Miller complained to Whelan that a clarification was in order: the visit was 
“personal and unofficial.”467 
 When Somoza’s schedule was finalized, the State Department reported that the dictator 
would land in Miami on April 28 and, contemplating a five-day tour from Miami to Washington, 
a meeting with Acheson, Miller, and Whelan was included for May 2. Truman’s luncheon 
remained scheduled for May 2, including Somoza, Sevilla Sacasa, Acheson, Vaughan, and 
various Cabinet and congressional officials.468 
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 Preparing for the visit, Miller briefed the President and the Secretary of State, assuring 
them that no “particular topic” would be discussed at the luncheon. Sure, Miller noted, Somoza 
might lobby for financial assistance or loans for projects such as Nicaragua’s Rama Road. 
Perhaps, Acheson could relay to the dictator “how much Nicaragua’s consistent support of 
United States foreign policy is appreciated.” Remarking favorably on Nicaragua’s political 
situation due to agreements between Emiliano Chamorro’s Conservatives and Somoza’s 
Liberals, Miller explained that the “working two-party system in Nicaragua, a free press and bi-
partisan representation at international meetings, might be commented on as favorable evidence 
of democratic progress.”469  
 A memorandum by Siracusa and Ohmans detailed the visit, Somoza’s history, and U.S.-
Nicaraguan relations. Somoza, the two authors noted, was “an able man with an engaging 
personality” and “informal, genial, energetic, persuasive[,] and politically astute,” though with 
“impulsive, vain and egocentric” habits and a “desire for personal gain.” They believed that “the 
Nicaraguan government is democratic and republican in form” while “President Somoza has run 
it largely as a one man show.” Somoza’s “methods have often been criticized in the United 
States and Latin America,” but the dictator “restored order to Nicaragua,” was recently “less 
repressive,” and allowed “a two party system” and “a free press.” Most importantly, “Nicaragua 
ha[d] consistently supported United States foreign policy.” Even the “prior occupation of 
Nicaragua ha[d] left no residue of ill-feeling,” thanks to the dictator’s “great admir[ation] of this 
country.” Siracusa and Ohmans did warn that “Somoza remains, however, a target for a loosely 
knit group of revolutionaries and expatriates frequently called the Caribbean Legion.” Reflecting 
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their limited grasp on the efforts of the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network, the officials 
merely shrugged off such a regional conflict.470 They either did not know or report that Somoza 
remained a vocal anti-communist proponent against Arbenz’s government. 
 Landing in Miami on April 28, Somoza immediately sent a telegram to Truman with the 
usual diplomatic pleasantries, bordering on sycophantic, with “warmest wishes for [the 
President’s] personal happiness and the increasing greatness of the United States.”471 The 
dictator used the same personal tones with Miller.472 That same day, Miller’s friend, former U.S. 
Ambassador in Managua, and current U.S. Ambassador in Caracas Fletcher Warren sent a 
message for Somoza, expressing wishes for a quick and healthy recovery.473 On April 30, Miller 
returned the pleasantries, even citing the improved weather for the leader’s arrival and wishing 
him the medical attention he needed.474 
 
F. Conclusion 
 Somoza arrived in Washington at a fortuitous moment. Guatemalan exiles, Somoza, and 
Trujillo had beneficial relationships with Vaughan and Mara; Miller, Mann, and Latin 
Americanist officials in the State Department had approved a new U.S. Cold War-oriented policy 
toward Guatemala designed to encourage opposition against Arbenz’s government; and CIA 
officials had met with Castillo Armas’s associates. Thanks to Somoza, Whelan, and Vaughan’s 
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maneuvering, the Nicaraguan dictator now had the opportunity to lobby U.S. officials to endorse 





VII. Chapter 6: Considering Operation PBFORTUNE, 1952 
 After months of debates and preparations, the CIA in early September 1952 was ready. 
Over the previous weeks, contacts and agents had prepared multiple containers labeled as farm 
equipment to be shipped from New Orleans, Baltimore, and other U.S. ports to Managua.475 
Inside, the packages contained 5,000 blast and fragmentation grenades, 140 light machine guns, 
1,000 rifles, 1,500 machine pistols, 30 anti-tank rifles, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and 
much more.476 By August 19, officials drew up a memorandum for Chief of the Western 
Hemisphere Division colonel J.C. King and Deputy Director Allen Dulles’s approval.477 Finally, 
Bedell Smith on September 9 endorsed the memorandum.478 The Agency was about to deliver 
these armaments to Somoza and Castillo Armas, both waiting in Nicaragua to invade Guatemala 
and overthrow Arbenz’s government. 
 This chapter examines the lobbying and discussions behind the U.S. government’s 
decision to provide assistance to overthrow Arbenz’s government in 1952 during Operation 
PBFORTUNE. Somoza and Castillo Armas presented their conspiracy as conforming to the 
State Department’s Cold War-oriented policy without threatening the public image of the non-
intervention ideal. Truman’s military aides Vaughan and Mara endorsed the conspiracy, yet 
Miller’s staff and Bedell Smith’s CIA debated whether to provide material assistance. In the end, 
the Agency gave a ‘green light’ to what would become known as Operation PBFORTUNE. 
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 The debates surrounding the Agency’s ‘green light’ have never received a full treatment, 
for scholars merely note the lack of available sources and gloss over the summer of 1952 when 
discussing U.S. policy toward Guatemala.479 Blending newly-declassified CIA reports, never-
before-consulted U.S.-based materials, and Dominican files, this chapter reconstructs those 
months’ events. The final result presents Somoza and Castillo Armas as capable agents, Vaughan 
and Mara as active participants, a cautious State Department, and a CIA ready to act. 
 
A. Somoza in Washington, May 1952 
 In a surprisingly uncharacteristic move, Miller never filed a report on Somoza’s lobbying, 
despite the dictator’s essential role in the foundation of Operation PBFORTUNE. Only a year 
later in September 1953 would the official divulge a few comments to journalist Herbert 
Matthews. In fact, Miller prefaced that the entire affair had “been superconfidential,” forcing the 
journalist to subsequently record the conversation on a note.480 Though the note contains some 
discrepancies from official reports, the journalist’s reputation as a diligent reporter suggests a 
fairly accurate account of Miller’s remarks.481 The official repeatedly stressed his ignorance of 
Somoza’s intentions and distanced the State Department from the entire affair. In a light-hearted 
manner, the dictator had joked, “‘“Just give me the arms and I’ll clean up Guatemala for you in 
no time,”’” as Department officials “‘all laughed.’” When Somoza “repeated the remark” during 
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Truman’s luncheon, Miller reiterated, “‘Again, everyone took it as a good joke.’”482 The official 
provided nothing further on the dictator’s scheme. 
 Others, however, shared far more on Somoza’s activities. In Washington, Dominican 
Ambassador Luis Thomen met with both the Nicaraguan dictator and Vaughan. The two 
confirmed the jovial atmosphere of events and deluge of jokes. At one point during the luncheon, 
Vaughan had even jested that Somoza could use nuclear bombs to build a canal through 
Nicaragua. In addition, the dictator described Truman’s giving a tour of the renovated White 
House, interrupting the chefs in the new kitchen, and playing piano.483 Not only was the 
president quite proud of the recently completed renovations and prone to giving tours to foreign 
leaders.484 Both First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Managua Rolland Welch and U.S. 
Ambassador in Managua Thomas Whelan later commented that Truman and Somoza discussed 
classified affairs, likely related to the conspiracy, while “alone” in the White House’s kitchen.485 
 At such moments, the Nicaraguan dictator pressed Truman, Vaughan, and the State 
Department on the conspiracy. Departing from his humorous comments, Somoza stated “that he 
was prepared to take the initiative in overthrowing the present regime in Guatemala.”486 As 
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would be consistently reported, the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network’s members aimed 
to provide material support to the exiles under Castillo Armas and dissident Guatemalan military 
officers for a coordinated invasion over the borders and uprising within Guatemala. Alongside 
armaments and money, the members offered moral support through the UN, the OAS, and any 
regional or international venues.487 Consequently, Somoza argued, the U.S. government’s 
involvement would be indirect, consisting of a “non-critical attitude” and “behind-the-scenes 
approval” of the conspiracy. Evoking the language of his earlier joke, the dictator insisted that 
“‘the Central Americas could clean up the situation.’”488 
 According to the dictator himself, the lobbying had mixed results. Fearing potential 
blowback upon his government, Miller stalled discussions on the matter.489 Throughout his 
accounts to U.S. and Dominican officials, Somoza criticized the official for vetoing any covert 
assistance.490 At one point, the dictator complained that Miller opposed “even moral support to 
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take drastic measures in Guatemala.”491 In contrast, Truman and Acheson were not as adamant. 
Without committing to the conspiracy, the president, according to Somoza, did express interest 
and asked for further information.492 At most, Acheson admitted that the State Department 
opposed Arbenz’s government, an accurate reflection of many U.S. officials’ sentiments in 
1952.493 Rather, it was Vaughan who stepped forward and committed the U.S. government to the 
plot. The dictator had indeed asked Truman and Acheson about the “assistance,” that is, the 
armaments, that Castillo Armas required, but Somoza never claimed to have secured their 
blessing. Instead, Vaughan affirmed that the U.S. government would provide such 
“assistance.”494 
 
B. Somoza, Vaughan, and Mara, May – July 1952 
 Spurred on by Vaughan’s affirmation, Somoza nurtured his relationships with Truman’s 
military aides upon leaving Washington.495 In New York after the surgery, the dictator discussed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491 Charles B. Layton, CARMA S-2-52, Managua, 01 December 1952, with Garrison B. 
Coverdale to Special Assistant for Intelligence for Department of State, G-2-CDR, Washington, 
24 December 1952, NARAII, RG59, OMAA/CRN, Box 2, Folder “Nicaragua: General 
Somoza.” 
492 Document 31, Washington, 13 November 1952, in FRUS Guatemala, 48; Emilio Rodríguez 
Demorizi, Embajador Dominicano en Managua, a Rafael L. Trujillo, Managua, 21 julio 1952, 
AGN, SERREE, Caja IT 2903958 “Fechas extremas 1939-1952, Ref. Antigua 2270” (en 
adelante Caja IT 2903958), Expediente “Nicaragua, Sec. Calderón, 1948-1952, Código 5/c.” 
493 Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi a Rafael L. Trujillo, Managua, 21 julio 1952, AGN, SERREE, 
Caja IT 2903958, Expediente “Nicaragua, Sec. Calderón, 1948-1952, Código 5/c.” 
494 Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi a Rafael L. Trujillo, Managua, 21 julio 1952, AGN, SERREE, 
Caja IT 2903958, Expediente “Nicaragua, Sec. Calderón, 1948-1952, Código 5/c;” 
“MEMORANDUM: Conversaciones con el Dr. Eduardo Zuleta Ángel, en Panamá, del 2 al 5 de 
octubre de 1952,” AGN, SERREE, Caja IT 2903958, Expediente “Panamá, 1948-1952, Código 
5/c.” 
495 Although Clark has hinted at Somoza’s efforts, only Roorda has analyzed how a dictator 




various subjects with Vaughan, who offered Somoza an airplane for the return to Managua.496 
The aide’s actions took the State Department by surprise, for their office was responsible for 
handling such matters.497 Not only had Vaughan circumvented the State Department. Akin to his 
intervention when the dictator was preparing to visit Washington, the aide claimed to act on 
Truman’s orders.498 Whether in lobbying for Somoza’s visit, requesting a plane for the dictator’s 
departure, or offering his government’s assistance for the conspiracy, Vaughan continued to use 
his position to make such arrangements, seemingly all on his own initiative. 
 For his part, the dictator poured awards and attention upon both of Truman’s aides. 
Before leaving Washington, he mentioned bestowing the Presidential Medal of Merit upon 
Vaughan and the Cross of Distinguished Service upon Mara.499 Only the latter, though, was able 
to fly with Somoza to Managua.500 There, the dictator boasted of his “‘close friendship’” with 
Truman and doted on Mara.501 The aide attended ceremonies at the Club Terraza, visited the 
Nicaraguan Military Academy, and was the guest of honor at a luncheon.502 The dictator did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 Anastasio Somoza to Major General Harry H. Vaughan, Telegram, New York, 21 June 1952, 
HST, PSF, OF, Box 1434, OF 432, Folder “Nicaragua.” 
497 John L. Ohmans to Thomas E. Whelan, 23 June 1952, NARAII, RG59, OMAA/CRN, Box 2, 
Folder “Nicaragua: General Somoza.” 
498 Robert B. Landry, Air Aide to President Harry S. Truman, to Harry S. Truman, 
“Memorandum for the President,” 24 June 1952, HST, PSF, OF, Box 1434, OF 432, Folder 
“Nicaragua.” 
499 Anastasio Somoza to Major General Harry H. Vaughan, New York, 23 June 1952, HST, PSF, 
OF, Box 1434, OF 432, Folder “Nicaragua.” 
500 Major General Harry H. Vaughan to Anastasio Somoza, 25 June 1952, with Major General 
Harry H. Vaughan to Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, Nicaraguan Ambassador in Washington, 25 June 
1952, HST, PSF, OF, Box 1434, OF 432, Folder “Nicaragua;” Secretary to Robert B. Landry, to 
Cornelius J. Mara, “Memorandum for Colonel Mara,” 3 July 1952, HST, PSF, OF, Box 1434, 
OF 432, Folder “Nicaragua;” Anastasio Somoza to Harry S. Truman, Telegram, Miami, 06 July 
1952, HST, PSF, OF, Box 1434, OF 432, Folder “Nicaragua.” 
501 Rolland Welch, Despatch No. 11 “Subject: Weeka No. 80 – Section I,” Managua, 11 July 
1952, 717.00(W)/7-1152, NARAII, RG59, Decimal File 1950-1954, Box 3263. 
502 Rolland Welch, Despatch No. 11, Managua, 11 July 1952, 717.00(W)/7-1152, NARAII, 
RG59, Decimal File 1950-1954, Box 3263; Cornelius J. Mara to Oscar Sevilla Sacasa, 
 
 171 
limit himself to awarding military decorations. The Guardia Nacional’s official publication 
included various pictures of Mara’s speaking with Somoza’s family, sitting at the head table with 
Somoza at the Club Terraza, and receiving from Somoza the Medalla del Servicio 
Distinguido.503 
 These efforts paid off. As had Vaughan in Washington, Mara unilaterally endorsed the 
plot. During a cocktail party at Whelan’s residence in Managua, First Secretary at the U.S. 
Embassy in Managua Rolland Welch found the dictator and the aide “talk[ing] rather openly of 
the attempt on Guatemala to be made with Nicaraguan and U.S. backing.”504 At this juncture, the 
ambassador approached Ohmans, who just happened to be visiting the U.S. Embassy.505 
Surprised by Mara’s boldness and claims, Whelan asked the Office of Middle American Affairs 
representative to speak with the aide.506 Though Ohmans had not participated in any of the 
events in Washington during Somoza’s visit, his report on Mara’s actions accurately recreated 
the conspiracy’s core details. The dictator aimed to remove the “cancerous growth in the 
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Americas” and solve “the Guatemalan situation.” Somoza, “without any involvement for the 
United States,” would “get arms into the hands of the Guatemalan oppositionists to help 
contribute to the downfall of the present rulers there.”507 As with Truman, Acheson, Miller, and 
Vaughan, the dictator presented the conspiracy to Mara as suitable for the U.S. government’s 
goals. 
 Inadvertently but not unsurprisingly, Mara unleashed a bureaucratic conflict with the 
State Department. While in Managua, the aide lambasted the Department’s policy toward 
Guatemala as “too weak,” “vacillating,” and in need of “strong action.” Mara even called out 
Miller and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann by name for “not acting strongly 
enough with Guatemala.”508 Rather than reciprocating in kind, the State Department chose to 
focus on the aide’s championing the conspiracy without any approval from Washington. Miller, 
Welch, and others alleged that Mara acted at his own behest. Somehow, they argued, Somoza 
“sold” Mara on the conspiracy, leading to unsupported claims that the U.S. government was 
“definitely interested” in the plot.509 
 Returning to Washington, the aide directly lobbied Truman. On July 11, Mara gave the 
president three memoranda. In one, he wrote, “A gentleman in whom you have confidence 
advises that the situation in Guatemala has reached such a stage that some positive action is 
necessary.”510 Employing the language of Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean Basin regimes who 
complained that U.S. officials failed to oppose Guatemalan communism, the aide outlined that 
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the Guatemalan people and Latin American governments “cannot but feel that we condone, if we 
do not fully approve,” of Arbenz’s government.511 Mara also took the opportunity to demand 
once again the State Department “decide on some stringent action and implement it in a sudden 
move.”512 In a handwritten note that also evoked the language of Somoza and others who long 
opposed the Guatemalan Revolution and believed the conspiracy would uphold the image of 
non-intervention, the aide implored Truman, “[Somoza c]ould clean up the Guatemala regime 
with 10,000 rifles and one million rounds without ever involving [the] U.S.”513 
 This lobbying further exacerbated the bureaucratic conflict with the State Department. In 
Washington, Ohmans and Whelan met with Mara, who confirmed his lobbying the president.514 
The aide even shared the memos and note prepared for Truman, though his descriptions of the 
president’s response were rather vague. During the meeting, the officials could not determine 
whether Truman endorsed the conspiracy. On a previous occasion, Ohmans recalled, Mara found 
the president “non-committal.” Whelan, though, remembered the aide’s remarking that “Truman 
believed Somoza could do it.” Regardless, the officials were told that the president would discuss 
the matter with the State Department.515 
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 Preemptively, Miller and his officials protested Mara’s lobbying and blamed the aide for 
encouraging Truman to endorse the conspiracy. Immediately, he ordered Whelan to return to 
Managua. There, the ambassador was to make clear the State Department’s opposition “in 
sponsoring a ‘covert’ aggression on any American State.” Miller also lectured on the United 
States and Nicaragua’s memberships in the OAS and the UN.516 Next, he wrote to Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews about “how potentially dangerous” the aide’s 
actions were and requested that the Deputy Assistant take up the matter directly with Acheson.517 
While Freeman Matthews warned the Secretary of State about Mara’s “extravagant ideas,” 
Miller attempted to distance the State Department from the aide’s actions.518 First, he 
communicated to Whelan that any rumors of assistance for the conspiracy were coming from the 
Army, that is, Mara, not the State Department.519 Second, he reprimanded the ambassador for 
bringing Ohmans or any other officials into the affair. Returning to Managua, Whelan made 
certain that his embassy remained uninvolved in the plot.520 From there on out, Miller insisted 
that Mara “went directly to Truman” with the memos and the conspiracy without the approval or 
involvement of the State Department.521 
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C. The CIA, the State Department, and the Conspiracy, Mid-1952 
 While Mara lobbied the president, the CIA developed their contacts with Castillo 
Armas’s organization and allies. As early as June 23, King approved handing off money to 
unnamed contacts traveling between New Orleans and Guatemala.522 The recipients of further 
assistance, however, remained up for debate. There was no consensus behind Castillo Armas, for 
officials were actually deliberating between two potential exiles. Some vouched for Castillo 
Armas’s plan, with its minimal involvement on the part of the U.S. government.523 Others 
recommended armaments and funding for dissidents led by Carlos Simons, a prominent 
Guatemalan not connected with Castillo Armas.524 Sometimes, it appeared that the Agency 
considered encouraging both leaders, as when reports suggested “token assistance” for Castillo 
Armas to ensure the “continued confidence” of Simons.525 
 Out of these internal discussions, the Agency in early July threw its support behind 
Castillo Armas. In a recommendation delivered to Deputy Director of Plans Frank Wisner, an 
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official outlined the links between Castillo Armas, Somoza, and Honduran officials.526 The depth 
of these connections, though, still remained unclear to the CIA. Somoza and other members of 
the network had long patronized the exile, among others, without any inducement, yet the 
official conjectured that the U.S. government’s approval could coax “material support” from 
these anti-communist leaders. With this superficial understanding of the regional dynamics of the 
opposition to Arbenz’s government, the recommendation urged immediate action. In the event of 
an attack by Castillo Armas without sufficient report, the Agency feared the “elimination of all 
effective anti-Communist opposition in Guatemala” due to governmental crackdowns and the 
loss of morale. Armaments, money, agents, and other resources would strengthen Castillo 
Armas’s movement and increase the probability of the Arbenz government’s downfall. Of 
course, officials continued to stress that the U.S. government needed to persuade Somoza, 
Trujillo, and others to support the exile. Such persuasion would inform Caribbean Basin leaders 
“that any assistance they give to Castillo [Armas] will not reflect to their discredit.”527 
 With this recommendation, a meeting was held on July 10 between leading State 
Department and Agency officials, including Miller, Mann, Dulles, an official directly under 
Dulles, and CIA Inspector General Stuart Hedden.528 In another uncharacteristic move similar to 
what occurred during Somoza’s visit to Washington, neither Miller nor Mann reported on the 
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meeting. Instead, Dulles’s official provided both a handwritten memorandum and a later official 
memorandum. Together, the parties debated three questions the CIA put forward: 
1. Does [the State Department] want the change in government envisaged in the 
Summary? 
2. Would [the State Department] like it to be assisted covertly? 
3. Would [the State Department] oppose it?529 
Miller and Mann’s responses conformed to their Cold War-oriented policy toward Guatemala. 
The two did want a new regime, even if imposed through force.530 Nonetheless, they both limited 
the CIA’s involvement to protect the principle of non-intervention. Supposedly, Miller approved 
the Agency’s assistance if “assured of success” and if the U.S. government’s role remained 
“covered up.” According to Dulles’s official, he added, “It is up to you [the CIA] to decide.”531 
Such an endorsement of the Agency did not come from Mann. Bluntly, he opposed any 
intervention unless offered a “98% certainty of success,” no one in Latin America knew of the 
U.S. government’s involvement, and any assistance was restricted to money.532 
 Naturally, these responses caused confusion. Dulles’s official reported that Miller and 
Mann had “not answered clearly[,] but by implication, positively” to the Agency’s 
involvement.533 An inference of approval was not enough for Bedell Smith, who called 
Undersecretary of State David Bruce to discuss the matter to review the same questions.534 
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Despite the Director’s involvement, ambiguity persisted. In early October, Bruce would deny 
having “said anything that could be interpreted as approval.”535 As had Dulles, Bedell Smith 
interpreted the responses as signifying consent.536 Four days after meeting with Miller and Mann, 
the Agency approved material aid.537 Dulles and Hedden the next day met with a representative 
of the UFCO and other groups opposed to Arbenz’s government. The officials outlined that those 
groups “should pay the bill” and only expect the CIA to suggest “where the principals might buy 
the goods” needed.538 
 Within a week, further bureaucratic complications led to a second meeting between the 
Agency and the State Department. Again, Miller and Mann pressed Dulles regarding the CIA’s 
involvement in the plot. Fortunately, the Deputy Director was well prepared. Opening the 
meeting, Dulles showed a cable to an Agency contact discouraging relationships with Castillo 
Armas, focusing on intelligence gathering, and outlining psychological warfare operations.539 
These parameters fell within the objectives and policies approved over the past years by both 
Miller and Mann, who made clear their approval.540 Quite understandably then, the debate 
between the two departments revolved not upon propaganda or opposition to Arbenz’s 
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government but the potential dissemination of any knowledge regarding the Agency’s 
involvement in a counter-revolutionary movement. 
 Here, it was Dulles who took the initiative to lobby in support of the conspiracy. He 
assured Miller and Mann that the Agency had not yet provided financial assistance, which most 
likely would come from the UFCO or other groups. Similarly, “utmost care” would be used to 
either direct Castillo Armas’s organization to armaments or delivering hardware. Repeating the 
fears from the early July recommendation, the Deputy Director cautioned that the collapse of the 
exile’s movement would undermine local opposition to Arbenz’s government. He even 
suggested that “whatever happened in” Guatemala would bring “blame” upon the U.S. 
government.541 The bureaucratic conflict between the State Department and Truman’s military 
aides also served Dulles’s interests. In the aftermath of Mara’s endorsing the conspiracy and 
lobbying the president, Mann worried that the aide’s memos, Somoza’s comments, and other 
recent events would further implicate the U.S. government as behind Castillo Armas’s 
movement. Cleverly, Dulles manipulated the bureaucratic conflict and “suggested that [all of] 
this again was evidence that[,] if anything happened, there would be plenty of other persons to 
blame for it.”542 
 The CIA pushed forward with material assistance, going beyond the parameters 
established by Miller and Mann. The following day, Dulles ordered Wisner to develop cover 
stories, identify suitable ports, and create manifests for shipping armaments.543 Multiple contacts 
and agents, including the State Department’s Deputy Operations Coordinator J. Lampton Berry, 
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began putting materials together.544 Approval also came for one contact, under the pseudonym 
‘Jacob R. Seekford,’ to head to Managua and help with unloading, storing, and preparing 
shipments.545 Even as such efforts ramped up, there remained some confusion or ambiguity. At 
the end of July, Dulles halted preparations for any further shipments for reasons not made his 
staff.546 
 At this juncture, Castillo Armas maneuvered by playing upon the Agency’s fears of the 
collapse of anti-communist opposition to Arbenz’s government and presenting himself as willing 
to realize the conspiracy without the U.S. government’s assistance. On July 31, the exile 
informed Seekford that he required submachine guns, pistols, grenades, bombs, mines, and 
more.547 This request came right as Dulles stalled operations, but Castillo Armas pursued two 
tracks to restart the Agency’s assistance. First, the exile cut back on his requests, removing 
bombers and planes, to make his solicitations more affordable and reasonable. Second, he 
refused to terminate the conspiracy. Reiterating the ever-present concern among CIA officials 
that an insufficiently outfitted invasion would simply collapse and weaken local resistance, 
Seekford warned that the exile would “make the attempt even without such assistance.” The 
contact joined Castillo Armas in lobbying the Agency that “the best solution [was a] green light 
to [Somoza] and [the] shipment of materiel to him.”548 
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 Castillo Armas’s lobbying either succeeded or coincided with decisions already being 
made by leading Agency officials to give such a ‘green light.’ Within days, the CIA sent requests 
to the U.S. Army’s Chief of Staff for material assistance to be readied.549 Throughout August, 
officials and contacts reported that Bedell Smith and Dulles secured the “green light” to deliver 
armaments to Somoza and Castillo Armas’s organization.550 After the Director requested 
recommendations and the memorandum on delivering material assistance, the “green light” was 
officially approved in early September.551 
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VIII. Chapter 7: Operation PBFORTUNE, 1952 
 Like many, King was furious. Since July, his people had pushed forward with Operation 
PBFORTUNE. Not only had the Agency invested weeks to obtain what Dulles and Bedell Smith 
took as approval of the venture. Fearing that any failed conspiracy would bring the wrath of 
Arbenz’s government down upon Guatemala’s anti-communist opposition, the CIA had prepared 
packages of grenades, rifles, and more for shipment. It also deployed agents to coordinate with 
Somoza and Castillo Armas in Nicaragua. Despite these measures, the Agency was soon caught 
by surprise. Beginning in September, State Department officials were reporting conversations 
with Dominican Ambassador in Washington Luis Thomen, Colombian Ambassador Eduardo 
Zuleta Ángel, and Nicaraguan Ambassador in Washington Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa. These 
Caribbean Basin officials, seemingly without any restraint, had casually remarked about the plot, 
an uprising organized by regional dictatorships with the U.S. government’s understanding and 
indirect, possibly direct, support. Taken aback at what could become proof of their having 
knowingly violated the non-intervention ideal, Miller and his associates canceled the operation 
on October 8, infuriating the Agency. The Department’s caution made sense. After all, neither 
they nor the CIA understood the network’s intelligence-sharing or its previous conspiracies 
against Arévalo’s government. Still, King and his contemporaries would never acknowledge that 
Somoza, Castillo Armas, and the network’s members had organized Operation PBFORTUNE’s 
foundation, invested their own resources, lobbied additional allies, and accomplished far more on 
their own initiative. For many in the United States, blame rested not with the Agency, Truman’s 
aides, or even the State Department. In a racist and paternalistic tone, the chief of the CIA’s 
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Western Hemisphere Division argued, “This confirmed our general belief that no Latin 
American can be trusted to keep his mouth shut.”552 
 This chapter illustrates that Operation PBFORTUNE represents the moment when U.S. 
Cold War-oriented policy toward Guatemala intersected with the transnational counter-
revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution. With the ‘green light’ to provide assistance for 
the conspiracy, the CIA’s involvement bolstered regional support and radicalized the actions of 
Somoza and other members of the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network. Most notably, the 
network’s intelligence-sharing accelerated and expanded as the Nicaraguan dictator and others 
welcomed more collaborators into the conspiracy and met with State Department officials. 
Officials feared this invigorated intelligence-sharing jeopardized the image of the U.S. 
government’s adherence to non-intervention and terminated Operation PBFORTUNE. Though 
the network’s members had cooperated with Truman’s military aides and the CIA, U.S. officials 
preferred to blame the aborted operation on “unreliable” latinos. 
 My purpose is to apply Greg Grandin’s suggestion to investigate the “dynamic nature of 
counterrevolution” in Latin America and “its ability to draw new political actors into its orbit.”553 
Tying Grandin’s methodological note with Odd Arne Westad’s model for identifying how Third 
World elites solicited and incorporated the Cold War superpowers’ resources and ideologies, I 
argue that the network’s intelligence-sharing shaped and encouraged the already prone network 
members to embrace, if not submit to, CIA support to pursue their long-standing objective.554 
Caribbean Basin officials and Guatemalan exiles were not bystanders of Operation 
PBFORTUNE but active collaborators who propelled the conspiracy. Therefore, these leaders 
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Latin Americanized and transnationalized what has been previously presented in the literature as 
a rather unilateral U.S. action, dictated by Cold War needs and perceptions coming from 
Washington.555 This concerted action, by its very nature, was transformative, a watershed not 
just in the global Cold War but in intra-Caribbean relations as well.556 
 
A. The Conspiracy as Operation PBFORTUNE 
 The network’s intelligence-sharing picked up speed with the earliest discussions between 
Somoza and leading U.S. officials. While in Washington, the Nicaraguan dictator had first 
broached the subject after Vaughan’s offers of “assistance” for the venture.557 After informing 
Thomen regarding this possibility, he waited until July 21 to confirm this “assistance” to 
Dominican Ambassador in Managua Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi.558 The wait – two months long 
– was necessary while Dulles, Hedden, and the Agency secured approval, yet even Somoza’s 
first inquiries showed a gained momentum.559 
 At the same time, Truman’s military aides continued encouraging the plot. In early 
August, Nicaraguan Ambassador in Washington Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa met with them to 
counteract Miller’s negative reactions to Mara’s lobbying.560 Led on by Mara, the ambassador 
outlined for the State Department that the dictator would only request armaments through either 
a military assistance program or purchasing weapons from the Department of Defense. Vaughan 
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was not only “very much impressed” with these developments; the aide promised to “personally 
bring it up with General [Omar] Bradley, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”561 While 
pretending to consider only standard military equipment to appease the State Department’s 
concerns, the aide’s offer remained wedded to the conspiracy. Over further discussions on 
Nicaraguan equipment, Mara had received reports from Sevilla Sacasa on the regime’s military 
needs. Somoza waxed ecstatic, thanking Vaughan for “the necessary backing to realize the 
project.” Although the dictator never directly stated whether this ‘project’ related to the venture 
against Arbenz’s government, he did assure Vaughan that the resources represented “a necessary 
measure in relation to [Nicaraguan] security against the communist threat which intensifies its 
gravity for the Central American countries of the type which is unfolding in Guatemala.”562 Of 
course, Vaughan and Mara were on board. When the State Department canceled Operation 
PBFORTUNE, Vaughan forwarded Somoza’s poorly translated letter to the CIA. In a response 
for the aide and approved by Bedell Smith, Wisner admitted that all parties involved “kn[ew] 
what ha[d] transpired in connection with this matter” and would not speak further.563 This was 
not hindsight; Vaughan and the CIA had long recognized the goal behind Somoza’s requests. 
 In any case, the CIA’s ‘green light’ immediately emboldened its members. In early 
August, Castillo Armas and his contact ‘Jacob R. Seekford’ had requested approval for Somoza 
which Dulles promptly confirmed the next week.564 Before the end of the month, the exile and 
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the dictator met in Managua.565 There, Somoza promised the exile “would be given all the 
support necessary.” Upon reviewing the orders of armaments, Somoza’s son Tachito interjected 
that the regime could not provide transport planes. According to the CIA official who reported 
on the meeting, Castillo Armas “stated, as instructed by [the Agency], that all equipment 
provided would [be] replaced in kind.”566 As this meeting followed Seekford’s solicitations and 
Dulles’s approval and was reported by the Agency without protest, the exile’s words rang true. 
Furthermore, Castillo Armas suggested that a CIA official “work with General Somoza.”567 
Shaped in large part by the exile’s lobbying, the ‘green light’ had brought together the dictator, 
the exile, and the CIA. 
 As he had done with Trujillo in July, the dictator informed his allies in the network of the 
U.S. government’s support. He agreed to help with aircraft as well as armaments, personnel, and 
bases. And if this were not enough, Somoza also informed the exile that he would be the 
“liaison” with Trujillo.568 Over the past years, the two dictators had often exchanged information 
on exiles, yet Somoza had never before offered such assurances. CIA backing coalesced the 
network’s members further and increased their resolve. 
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 Trujillo still needed verification. On September 5, he ordered his ambassador in 
Washington to investigate.569 As the network’s members frequently exchanged information on 
plots against the Guatemalan governments, Thomen responded as his counterparts had since 
1948. Led to believe that the U.S. government now endorsed the conspiracy and in a manner 
consistent with the network’s intelligence-sharing, he contacted Miller to discuss the new 
venture. Meeting on September 11, the U.S. official did note that Thomen referred to 
“understandings” between the two dictators “with regard to anti-communistic activities in the 
Caribbean and particularly in Guatemala” which the ambassador wished to corroborate. Like 
Somoza, Trujillo “wanted to assure [the U.S. government] that the Dominican Republic was 
ready and anxious to do everything incumbent upon it to engage in anti-communistic 
activities.”570 
 In his report on the meeting, Miller presented himself as upholding the non-intervention 
ideal. All parties had discussed Arbenz’s government, he told the Dominican ambassador, and 
the State Department saw the “seriousness of the situation.” However, Miller supposedly 
rebuked that “no understandings had been arrived at as to methods of combating communism.” 
He also lectured Thomen on the advantages of non-intervention. If the region’s leaders were 
concerned about events in Guatemala, he suggested turning to the appropriate “inter-American 
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machinery,” as any other efforts on the part of the U.S. government could bring “long-run 
damage.”571 
 The Dominican ambassador’s account diverged significantly from that produced by 
Miller. During the conversation, Thomen had inquired into the U.S. government’s response to 
“any unexpected movement” against Arbenz’s government. Consistent with the State 
Department’s Cold War-oriented policy toward the country, Miller looked forward to “a change 
of regime in Guatemala” to which his government “would offer recognition and support.” The 
Assistant Secretary of State had also described his government as “absolutely non-
interventionist.”572 For his superiors’ benefit, though, Thomen quoted Miller and included details 
conspicuously absent from the U.S. official’s report. Following his remarks on non-intervention, 
the Assistant Secretary of State had “add[ed] immediately as commentary, that: ‘the situation of 
other countries is probably very distinct’ with respect to the problems of non-intervention.” 
Miller had then asked, “‘What would be the attitude of [the Dominican government]?’ ‘Would 
[the Dominican government] recognize the new Government?’”573 
 The Dominican ambassador walked away from the meeting with a response that better 
resembled those received by Dulles and Bedell Smith rather than that in Miller’s report: 
unofficial endorsement of the plot. Fulfilling his orders to investigate the Nicaraguan dictator’s 
claims, Thomen believed Somoza had discussed Arbenz’s government with leading U.S. 
officials. Without “openly participat[ing] in a plan to overthrow the communist Government of 
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Guatemala,” they would not only “welcome any movement” but “turn a blind eye” while 
offering “support.”574 Accurately conveying the State Department’s Cold War-oriented policy, 
the ambassador warned: 
Knowing the duplicity of the people [within the U.S. government] here, it would not be 
too adventurous to assume that what [U.S. officials] desire is that someone else resolves 
their problem, overthrowing the Government of Guatemala, but in such a manner that 
[U.S. officials] could not be accused of being interventionists.575 
Thomen had been a keen observer of U.S. policy. His analysis dovetailed quite nicely with the 
actual debates leading to the U.S. government’s approval of Operation PBFORTUNE. 
 Facing no discouragement, the network’s intelligence-sharing continued to expand. Back 
in Managua, the Nicaraguan dictator had welcomed the Colombian government’s cooperation.576 
Increasing the number of Caribbean Basin regimes involved, Somoza reached out to Colombian 
Ambassador Eduardo Zuleta Ángel. Formerly the Colombian Minister of Foreign Relations, he 
was also a lawyer for the UFCO, now actively pursuing closer relations with the anti-communist 
governments in the Caribbean Basin.577 Through the ambassador, Somoza secured important 
financial support for the conspiracy. During discussions on the venture, Dominican Ambassador 
in Managua Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi had suggested to Somoza and Zuleta that “Nicaragua 
and the Dominican Republic carried the heaviest load” while “yankee assistance could be greater 
than that offered.” Though only a new participant in the plot, Zuleta assured that he could 
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acquire additional help from the United Fruit Company and the Venezuelan military junta.578 
This claim reflected the junta’s recent cooperation with the Colombian government and growing 
cooperation with Trujillo’s regime.579 
 It was at this juncture that Rodríguez Demorizi became the first to comment on the 
radicalization of the network’s intelligence-sharing and, as had his colleague in Washington, 
cautioned Trujillo. Castillo Armas was “active” in lobbying for allies while Somoza had 
approved shipments of planes from the United States. Whereas the Nicaraguan dictator took such 
events as evidence that the conspiracy stood on a “solid foundation,” the Dominican ambassador 
paused. Remarking on the expansion of the network’s intelligence-sharing, Rodríguez Demorizi 
pointed out that Somoza’s including Zuleta “compromise[d] further [Somoza’s] moral position 
against the number of individuals that have been made participants in [the plot].” The Dominican 
ambassador observed that, “with the intervention of Zuleta,” the conspiracy “bec[ame] wider and 
larger.”580 
 State Department officials soon shared Rodríguez Demorizi’s concerns. Overlooking his 
meetings with Dulles, Miller notified U.S. Ambassador in Managua Tom Whelan of his recent 
conversation with Thomen. In sharp tones, the Assistant Secretary of State blamed the 
Nicaraguan dictator for “going around representing himself as an authorized agent of Uncle Sam 
to stamp out communism in the Caribbean” and “using [the U.S. government’s] good name in 
enlisting ‘allies’ in this cause.” Acknowledging the bureaucratic conflict between the State 
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Department and Truman’s military aides, Miller did concede that the “seed which Colonel Mara 
planted [was] growing into a greater tree than [the State Department] had conceived of.”581 
Despite the aide’s obvious role in fomenting the plot, Miller’s greatest concern fell upon 
Somoza. The Assistant Secretary of State feared the dictator may “be apt to spread this thesis 
even more” and “get [the U.S. government] into trouble.”582 Whelan had been aware of these 
concerns. Having reported on Mara’s lobbying on behalf of the conspiracy earlier in the year, the 
ambassador had already notified the State Department about recent developments. Following his 
conversation with Castillo Armas about the CIA’s support and believing that the U.S. 
government endorsed the plans, the Nicaraguan dictator had even told Whelan about his working 
with Trujillo and preparing to reach out to the Venezuelan military junta.583 The Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs and the CIA took note of Somoza’s remarks, yet Miller and Mann either never 
received or ignored Whelan’s report.584 
 Other State Department officials took notice of Somoza’s intelligence-sharing and 
Zuleta’s involvement. Preparations had begun for Miller to attend the inauguration of 
Panamanian president José Antonio Remón in early October. After Miller’s recent complaints, 
John Ohmans of the Office of Middle American Affairs notified Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. 
Embassy in Managua Rolland Welch. Based upon the Assistant Secretary of State’s account, 
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Somoza was telling other Latin American leaders about a “green light from President 
Truman.”585 Miller knew that such encouragement had come from Truman’s aides but was 
implying that the dictator was acting unilaterally and without cause. Consequently, the State 
Department felt that, if Somoza and Miller were to attend the inauguration in Panama at the same 
time, rumors would spread that the U.S. government was giving “instructions” to the dictator.586 
Zuleta’s activities only increased Washington’s worries. On September 25, the Colombian 
ambassador met with Miller’s friend, U.S. Ambassador in Caracas Fletcher Warren, and later 
delivered a memorandum on Caribbean affairs. Though the memorandum discussed a variety of 
topics, Warren took notice of an item related to the conspiracy. Over in the Dominican Republic, 
Trujillo wanted to ensure that the U.S. government had issued a “green light” for the venture 
against Arbenz’s government.587 Coming after Thomen’s meeting with Miller and mirroring 
those made earlier by Castillo Armas and Somoza while lobbying the CIA, the Dominican 
dictator’s condition made sense. 
 Following Thomen and Zuleta, Sevilla Sacasa brought the State Department’s full 
attention upon the conspiracy and the network’s radicalized intelligence-sharing. On September 
26, Miller and Ohmans met with the Nicaraguan ambassador. When Sevilla Sacasa referenced 
Vaughan’s mediation with armaments, the Assistant Secretary of State had no objections. It was 
the Caribbean Basin regimes’ asking themselves, “‘[W]hat to do about Guatemala?,’” that 
peaked everyone’s interest. Between telephone conversations and plans to meet in Panama 
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during the inauguration, they were ready to back up Castillo Armas and “‘cut out the cancerous 
growth in Guatemala.’” Ohmans quickly rushed the ambassador to Mann’s office, where the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State merely “caution[ed]” against taking the U.S. government’s 
support “for granted.”588 
 In response to this flurry of activities, the State Department decided to officially disavow 
the U.S. government’s support for the conspiracy. On September 29, Sevilla Sacasa, Mann, and 
Ohmans met for a second time. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State warned, “The 
Department of State d[id] not believe it wise to speak of military adventure against Guatemala 
participated in by a group of American States.” After all, agreements with the UN and the OAS, 
in conjunction with leadership in the Korean War, all stood against action in Guatemala, 
especially an action that was unlikely to remain bound to “secrecy.” While Sevilla Sacasa 
appeared “obviously disappointed” that there was not even “tacit approval to the suggestion of a 
military operation,” Mann concluded that Miller would repeat these points to Zuleta in 
Panama.589 
 
B. Miller and Zuleta in Panama City, October 1952 
 In what had by then become a characteristic in his approach to Operation PBFORTUNE, 
Miller never filed a report on meeting with Zuleta in Panama City. The two had long carried on a 
cordial relationship and friendly correspondence dating back to Zuleta’s service as the 
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Colombian ambassador in Washington, even referring to each other as ‘tocayo’ due to their 
shared first name.590 Admiring the Colombian’s capabilities and anti-communist sentiments, 
Miller described Zuleta as “one of his country’s most distinguished lawyers” and “one of the 
outstanding Latin Americans.” In his most glowing review, Miller acknowledged that the 
ambassador was “an absolutely reliable and trustworthy friend of this country and of the [State] 
Department, and, despite tendencies toward extreme vanity and pomposity – as well as a 
congenial tendency towards exaggeration – his work is devoted and unmarked by 
partisanship.”591 It was due to this relationship and through this channel that Miller requested a 
meeting with Zuleta in Panama City.592 Zuleta agreed, and the two prepared to rendezvous 
between Tuesday, September 30, and Thursday, October 2.593 
 Though never officially reporting on the meeting in Panama, Miller’s only reference 
suggests the conflict between his original considerations of the conspiracy, illustrated during his 
meetings with the CIA, and his later opposition to the network’s radicalized intelligence-sharing. 
On October 8, Miller told Warren about meeting with Zuleta.594 To his friend, the Assistant 
Secretary of State revealed a racist and paternalistic worldview when discussing the network’s 
intelligence-sharing without mention of Mara and the CIA’s participation in the conspiracy. 
Miller “ha[d] mixed feelings about this whole business” since it was “good to see some of the 
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latinos getting together on an anti-communist front.”595 He did not comprehend the extent of the 
network’s intelligence-sharing, remained unaware of the numerous attempts by the network’s 
members to foment uprisings in and conspiracies against the Guatemalan governments, and did 
not admit that any U.S. officials had encouraged Somoza or other Caribbean Basin officials’ 
participation in this recent conspiracy. Rather, he interpreted the members’ discussions as the 
first time Caribbean Basin leaders ever participated in any anti-communist operation or venture, 
still crediting U.S. officials as the sole architects of a long term anti-communist strategy in the 
area. Thus, he didn’t oppose the ‘front’ against Arbenz’s government but “this business of a 
‘green light’ from Uncle Sam,” which “would be much better if some of the characters involved 
in this were more discreet.”596 He had considered the conspiracy if U.S. officials’ participation 
remained marginal and did not threaten the non-intervention ideal, but the CIA’s ‘green light’ 
and the resulting intelligence-sharing had unnerved him. 
 Miller never filed a report on meeting with Zuleta. Once again, he sought to prevent any 
trail of his office’s involvement in the plot. In early November, Warren wrote that Venezuelan 
National Security Chief and member of the Caribbean Basin anti-communist network Pedro 
Estrada had heard of Miller’s seeking more information on events in Guatemala through Sevilla 
Sacasa and the new Venezuelan Ambassador to Washington, César González.597 When Estrada 
canceled his plans to visit Washington, the Assistant Secretary of State confessed that “the less 
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[he] kn[ew] about this the better.”598 As when removing the U.S. Embassy in Managua from the 
conspiracy, Miller merely emphasized his office’s appearing uninvolved in such schemes. 
 For his part, Zuleta, a new addition to the network, had no qualms discussing the meeting 
with Dominican officials. On the afternoon of October 1, the Colombian called upon Dominican 
Ambassador in Panama City Rubén Suro. Though Suro was unavailable, another official found 
Zuleta at the hotel El Panamá on October 2 around 2:00a.m. There, the Colombian began 
describing his “lengthy and intimate conversations” with Miller on the afternoon and evening of 
October 1. Inebriated, the Assistant Secretary of State had claimed to Zuleta that “the State 
Department looked upon that concerted action [against Arbenz’s government] with interest and 
sympathy and encouraged it.”599 Miller’s remarks matched up with his original considerations, 
but these words were the product of drinks during the celebrations in Panama. At a lunch at the 
residence of U.S. Ambassador in Panama John Wiley on the afternoon of October 2, Zuleta held 
a second conversation with Miller, one that “did not have the euphoria of drinks and drinking” 
and led to another meeting with Dominican officials on October 3.600 
 Sobered, the Assistant Secretary of State had set forward the State Department’s official 
opposition to the conspiracy. The U.S. government could not engage in any activities that would 
be seen as intervening in Guatemalan affairs.601 As he had done since Mara’s lobbying, Miller 
did not disapprove of the plot. Rather, he “did not even want any representative of a foreign 
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Government to inform any of [the State Department’s] officials about this matter.”602 For his 
part, Zuleta criticized the State Department’s hesitance. Repeating the mantra of Caribbean Basin 
officials who saw themselves as combating communism without the support of the U.S. 
government, the Colombian announced that “the United States lost Asia; [the United States] had 
lost Argentina, Paraguay, Chile, Ecuador[,] and Peru, leaving in South America only Colombia 
and Venezuela.” He believed that “panamericanism, in the principles and agreements that give 
[panamericanism] life, assumes as a basic idea an anti-communist America, for which no 
measure that seeks to remove communism from America can be refuted as a violation of those 
principles and agreements.”603 As had the network’s members since the mid-1940s, Zuleta 
conflated leftist and reformist movements in Latin America with communist-inspired threats 
while more or less mocking the U.S. government. 
 Miller and Zuleta’s meeting ended with another individual walking away with the 
impression, as had Dulles, Bedell Smith, and Thomen, that the State Department offered indirect 
support for plots against Arbenz’s government. After lecturing on the non-intervention ideal and 
agreements with the U.N., Miller admitted that he “could allow that Zuleta personally, as a 
friend, discuss informally whatever news about the subject.” The Assistant Secretary of State 
went on, remarking that the decision to terminate Operation PBFORTUNE “was not at all shared 
by the White House, at which one detects that the tendency is to liquidate the current situation in 
Guatemala.”604 
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C. Blaming ‘the Latinos,’ Late 1952 and 1953 
 In early October, the CIA was attempting to deliver the armaments to Somoza in 
Managua when the State Department intervened. Even after Mann made known his department’s 
official disapproval, Bedell Smith on October 04 ordered the Agency “to get the show on the 
road” and approved deliveries.605 In Panama City, Tachito brought up the issue of weapons 
delivery during conversations with Miller, and an agent asked the Assistant Secretary of State to 
approve a paper for the Munitions Department. Miller took the document to Freeman Matthews 
and Bruce, went to Acheson, and then sent messages for all shipments to be diverted from 
Nicaragua to Panama.606 On October 7, another CIA official in Managua approached Whelan to 
send a verbal message from the White House to Somoza without the State Department’s 
involvement, but Whelan refused and notified his superiors.607 
 At this point, the State Department officially terminated Operation PBFORTUNE. On 
October 8, Miller, Mann, Freeman Matthews, and Bruce met with Wisner, King, and other CIA 
officials. Wisner explained that his office believed the State Department had approved delivering 
armaments to Castillo Armas and Somoza for the plot against Arbenz’s government.608 As 
evidence, the Agency presented the various meetings and conversations with State Department 
officials, but those officials repeatedly disagreed. When Wisner referred to the meetings between 
Dulles and Miller, the Assistant Secretary of State claimed to have stressed how “the risk of 
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providing arms was too great but that he had no objection to monetary contributions.” When 
Wisner brought up Bedell Smith’s conversation with Bruce, Bruce too denied having given 
approval.609 
 In the midst of this debacle, the two agencies decided to blame Truman’s aides and 
especially Somoza for the entire ordeal. Miller’s office mentioned the dictator’s claims of having 
received the U.S. government’s support for the venture, to which the Agency distanced itself.610 
Instead of considering how the CIA’s ‘green light’ had impacted events over the past months, the 
Agency and the Department focused on the bureaucratic conflict between the State Department 
and Truman’s military aides. Both offices “agreed that General S[omoza’s] statements could be 
based only upon remarks made to him by members of the White House staff,” that is, Vaughan 
and Mara.611 Consequently, the two departments sidestepped any debate over how the CIA’s 
‘green light’ to Castillo Armas and Somoza triggered Caribbean Basin officials’ discussions over 
the past months. Most importantly, Miller would not be held accountable for having somehow 
led CIA, Dominican, and Colombian officials to interpret his words as indirect support for the 
conspiracy, and the CIA avoided criticism for having overreached or for having misconstrued 
Miller, Mann, and Bruce’s statements. 
 As King began to criticize Somoza and other Caribbean Basin officials, Castillo Armas 
deferred in order to ensure the continued support of the CIA. On October 10, King ordered a 
message to the exile that blamed Somoza’s “indiscretions,” Tachito’s approaching Miller, and 
Sevilla Sacasa and Thomen’s conversations for having “alerted” the State Department. The chief 
of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division assured Castillo Armas that important officials 
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endorsed the conspiracy in spite of the State Department’s orders.612 In the hopes of future 
assistance, the exile agreed with King’s assessment.613 Recognizing that the Agency remained an 
important source of assistance, the exile was certainly not going to disagree. 
 When discussing Operation PBFORTUNE’s cancelation, others would follow King’s 
lead while ignoring the role of any U.S. government agency and targeting Somoza, an easy 
victim to blame. At the end of 1952, Welch noted Somoza’s lack of “secrecy or caution.”614 
Edward Clark of the Office of Middle American Affairs soon summarized that the entire affair 
was “another indication of Somoza’s untrustworthiness in matters which should be treated by 
him on a highly confidential basis.” Now, there was “literally no way of knowing to how many 
people he ha[d] related this same tale.”615 In a later report, Clark characterized the dictator’s 
discussing the conspiracy “rather widely and loosely” as “disturbing” and a “misinterpretation” 
of conversations with Truman, Acheson, and Miller.616 As would others, this official ignored or 
was unaware that certain military aides, the CIA, and even Miller had chosen to help and instead 
perceived Somoza’s sharing intelligence as the dictator’s seeming lack of integrity or diplomatic 
acumen. The official concluded, “Needless to say, and for obvious reasons, no encouragement 
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for action of the type proposed by Somoza was given by any of these three officials.”617 U.S. 
officials would continue to downplay the role of Truman’s military aides and the CIA in the 
conspiracy, memorializing Somoza as the instigator of the entire debacle and completely 
ignoring or not comprehending how the CIA’s ‘green light’ radicalized the network’s 
intelligence-sharing. 
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 The transnational counter-revolution did not end with the termination of Operation 
PBFORTUNE, although most in the U.S. government lamented this was the case. Following the 
1952 elections, the State Department and the CIA waited as Dwight Eisenhower prepared to take 
the presidency.618 In the meantime, the Agency’s hopes for improvements in Guatemala 
dwindled. With the same ignorance that proliferated during their recent venture, CIA officials 
worried that local anti-communist opposition to Arbenz’s government lacked the necessary 
capabilities for a successful coup, while Somoza and Trujillo would only assist Guatemalan 
exiles if the U.S. government played a predominant role.619 Even after their recent experience 
with overzealous dictators, they claimed at multiple instances that these potential patrons would 
support Castillo Armas only if the U.S. government offered a “carrot” rather than a “stick” to 
induce Somoza, Trujillo, and others’ participation.620 Only late in the summer of 1953 would the 
Eisenhower Administration authorize Operation PBSUCCESS.621 But Guatemalan exiles and 
Caribbean Basin dictators did not wait for the approval of the northern colossus. 
 As it had for almost a decade, the transnational counter-revolution had continued into 
1953 without the support or knowledge of those U.S. officials who were, at most, only 
deliberating whether to attempt a new venture against Arbenz’s government. By the early part of 
the year, Castillo Armas had laid the groundwork for a new plot. In March, the exile networked 
in Managua with his ardent patron, Somoza. Receiving word of the Guatemalan’s activities over 
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in Nicaragua, Trujillo personally ordered him to head for the Dominican Republic.622 In Ciudad 
Trujillo, the Dominican despot offered a memorandum outlining stipulations for any further 
assistance.623 Of course, Castillo Armas was more than glad to acquiesce to the demands of such 
a prominent regional anti-communist proponent against the Guatemalan Revolution. 
 In mid-May, the exile arrived at the Dominican Embassy in Tegucigalpa to meet with his 
frequent contact, Ambassador José Paniagua.624 Alongside him was Guatemalan lawyer and anti-
communist leader Juan Córdova Cerna.625 Having recently been “violently expelled from 
Guatemala by the communist regime of Jacobo Arbenz,” Córdova Cerna “painted . . . the 
political situation prevalent in Guatemala” as one of turmoil and chaos.626 The two proceeded to 
mimic those exiles that had come before them, denigrating the Guatemalan Revolution and 
lobbying for armaments. Their “revolutionary movement against the Arbenz regime” was finally 
“prepared and ready to move forward as soon as the circumstances [would] permit it.”627 Once 
again, though, another venture to topple the Guatemalan government hinged upon the largesse of 
Caribbean Basin dictators. Castillo Armas and Córdova Cerna had, according to the ambassador, 
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“emphasized ‘their wish to obtain a quantity of armaments’” from the Dominican despot. With 
such weapons, the two would finally be “in the happy position to realize their revolutionary 
movement against the Arbenz regime.”628 
 In what had by now become the custom, Castillo Armas handed over a memorandum for 
Trujillo, “EL COMUNISMO EN GUATEMALA [COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA],” that 
repeated the anti-Mexican, anti-Soviet, anti-communist ideology of Guatemalan exiles and 
Caribbean Basin dictators. He opened by describing the “communist cells” in Guatemala that had 
emerged, in “clandestine form, under instructions from the centrals in Moscow and Mexico” 
during the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico. While in Mexico, those who would spearhead the 
Guatemalan Revolution and its governments, including Alfonso Solórzano, Jorge García 
Granados, Carlos Manuel Pellecer, and Enrique Muñoz Meany, had been “carefully 
indoctrinated in the Marxist disciplines and battle tactics recommended by Lenin.” Upon Ubico’s 
ouster, these Guatemalans poisoned the country with Mexican and Soviet communism and 
corrupted the resulting governments. Under the protection of Arévalo and a new Communist 
Party, “the influence of the Soviet Union” spread. Communists took control of Guatemala’s 
banking, social security, and other institutions; welcomed Spanish exiles and international 
communists into their country’s borders; dominated workers’ unions; and allowed congresses to 
attack “the United States and the democratic countries of America.” Upon taking power, Arbenz 
continued this process while putting into motion the Agrarian Reform.629 Castillo Armas may as 
well have spliced together the writings of colonel Arturo Ramírez, Luis Coronado Lira, general 
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Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, Juan Pinillos, and Carlos Padilla y Padilla that had circulated for 
nearly ten years. 
 The exile’s targeted audience, however, included more than the Dominican dictator 
alone, for the intelligence-sharing of the counter-revolutionary network remained as active as 
ever. In spite of Operation PBFORTUNE’s abrupt collapse, the network’s members kept 
disseminating information on exiles’ conspiracies. Having lobbied various allies throughout the 
region on behalf of Castillo Armas the previous year, Somoza notified Trujillo of the exile’s new 
plans.630 While writing the memorandum for Trujillo, Castillo Armas also prepared a 
“confidential report” for Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. It was Dominican Ambassador 
Paniagua who commissioned Dominican Secretary Víctor Fernández Jiménez to hand-deliver not 
only the exile’s memorandum for Trujillo but the report for Batista. Over the next couple of 
days, this Dominican official traveled first to Havana to place Castillo Armas’s letter in the 
hands of Batista’s secretary Raúl Acosta Rubio before completing his errand in Ciudad 
Trujillo.631 Just as Somoza convinced the Venezuelan military junta and the Colombian 
government to contribute to Operation PBFORTUNE, Trujillo’s officials were reaching out to 
the Cuban dictator. 
 These efforts by Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean Basin dictators would, once again, 
intersect with U.S. Cold War-oriented policy, this time to create Operation PBSUCCESS, topple 
Arbenz’s government, and bring an end to the Guatemalan Revolution. In the Eisenhower 
Administration, officials insisted upon a bolder strategy, expanding upon the exiles and dictators’ 
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efforts and putting into motion a plot that went far beyond anything before. The lessons of 
Operation PBFORTUNE informed the CIA under newly-promoted Director Allen Dulles and the 
State Department under Allen’s brother John Foster. Immediately, the two departments set out to 
streamline their policies and avoid the bureaucratic conflicts that derailed Operation 
PBFORTUNE.632 Colonel J. C. King, agent Jacob R. Seekford, and others contributed to the 
leadership and organization of Operation PBSUCCESS. At the outset, U.S. officials determined 
that their resources and investments needed to reinforce pre-existing conditions in the Caribbean 
Basin. Circumventing Vaughan and Mara’s mishaps, the CIA coordinated with the U.S. military 
to approve military assistance programs with Somoza’s Nicaragua, Trujillo’s Dominican 
Republic, and others that exacerbated the regional tensions between these anti-communist 
regimes and Arbenz’s government.633 While the region’s dictators were demanding a unified 
opposition and placing even greater emphasis upon exile leaders’ abilities to convince the 
Guatemalan Army to defect, the architects of Operation PBSUCCESS went much further.634 
Solicitations of exiles, from general Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes to colonel Roberto Barrios y Peña, 
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inundated the CIA, the State Department, and even congressional officials.635 Ignoring the 
background of such figures, the Agency pushed Castillo Armas ahead of more experienced 
exiles. Most strikingly, the heart of the new program was an array of financial assets and 
psychological warfare aiming to penetrate the Guatemalan Army, erode the morale of soldiers 
and officers, and induce the very disloyalty necessary for a successful coup.636 In taking over the 
counter-revolution, the U.S. government accomplished what dictators and exiles never had. 
 Yet, as had Operation PBFORTUNE, Operation PBSUCCESS built upon the 
longstanding regional conflict and the efforts and goals of Guatemalan exiles and Caribbean 
Basin dictators. Through personal meetings and the distribution of leaflets and newspaper 
articles in Mexico City and elsewhere, José Luis Arenas, José Calderón Salazar, and Carlos 
Salazar, Jr., with the CIA’s money, encouraged other exiles to back Castillo Armas.637 Not 
surprisingly, Arenas and Luis Coronado Lira traveled the Caribbean Basin and met with Cuban, 
Dominican, Honduran, Mexican, and Nicaraguan officials and anti-communist leaders well-
versed in years of these machinations.638 Their own years of experience in traveling the region to 
bolster support for conspiracies facilitated their navigating diplomatic difficulties and acquiring 
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the necessary visas and travel documents.639 Furthermore, the CIA tapped into the exiles’ 
networking and ideology. Agency officials provided thousands of dollars for an anti-communist 
meeting in Mexico City, the “Primer Congreso contra la Intervención Soviética en América 
Latina [First Congress against Soviet Intervention in Latin America],” put together by Jorge 
Prieto Laurens of the Frente Popular Anti-Comunista de México [Popular Anti-Communist Front 
of Mexico], a colleague of Arenas and Coronado Lira. At the “Congreso,” Guatemalan exiles 
publicized their efforts with the help of dozens of other Latin American anti-communist 
delegates.640 U.S. officials even requested reproducing the falsified Arévalo-Yakubovsky 
letter.641 
 This propaganda was not the only factor that contributed to Operation PBSUCCESS. 
Castillo Armas and Córdova Cerna’s anti-communist organization within Guatemala remained a 
cornerstone.642 Juan Pinillos and Coronado Lira drew close to the Venezuelan military junta.643 
Between Operation PBFORTUNE and Operation PBSUCCESS, Pinillos served as a pivotal link 
between Castillo Armas, Trujillo, and the Venezuelan junta.644 This networking continued during 
the CIA’s plot, where Pinillos became the “middle man” between Castillo Armas’s allies, Carías, 
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and the Honduran government.645 In an effort to acquire colonel Arturo Ramírez’s backing for 
Castillo Armas, CIA officials promised $10,000.646 And, as ever, Somoza, Carías, and Trujillo 
were ready to throw their support behind any seemingly successful plot to finally halt the 
Guatemalan Revolution. The CIA trained Castillo Armas’s forces in Nicaragua, built bases in 
Honduras, and hired pilots and planes that resembled the very conspiracies the State Department 
had opposed in the 1940s. Operation PBSUCCESS depended upon the assistance of these local 
leaders.647 
 Though the first of its kind, Operation PBFORTUNE would not be the only Latin 
American Cold War conflict in which U.S. Cold War-oriented policy radicalized an indigenous 
conflict in the Caribbean Basin. From the early 1950s onward, the State Department and the 
military provided military assistance and economic aid to dictatorial and military regimes in the 
Western Hemisphere, including those of Somoza and Trujillo. As these anti-democratic yet self-
proclaimed anti-communist leaders utilized such resources to tighten their grasps upon their 
subjects, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and other countries witnessed a plethora of anti-
dictatorial and revolutionary movements that soon found themselves confronting their despots 
and the U.S. government. When one such movement under Fidel Castro took hold in Cuba, anti-
dictatorial groups under José Figueres and Rómulo Betancourt competed with Somoza and 
Trujillo’s ally Batista to shape the outcome. When the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations 
chose to arm an invasion, the CIA turned to those who had coordinated Operations 
PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS. Ironically, the disastrous Bay of Pigs plot rested upon a 
diverse assortment of Cuban exiles originally patronized by Trujillo and others. Following 
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Trujillo’s assassination and a civil war in the Dominican Republic, the Johnson administration 
approved a military invasion which benefitted Trujillo’s protégés and impaired Dominican 
democracy. When Somoza’s dynasty later fell against the pressure of a revolutionary movement, 
it was the region’s military regimes that first funded and trained dissident exiles before the U.S. 
government assumed responsibility for these ‘contra-revolucionarios,’ or ‘contras.’ Operation 
PBFORTUNE was more than the first CIA operation in the Caribbean Basin during the second 
half of the twentieth century. It was a template for how, throughout the Caribbean Basin, the 
combination of regional conflicts over democracy and dictatorship and U.S. Cold War-oriented 
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